



JPRS-UMA-92-036  
30 SEPTEMBER 1992



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

# ***JPRS Report***



## **Central Eurasia**

***Military Affairs***

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# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-92-036

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30 September 1992

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### Potential for Replacing Draft With Contract Service System Viewed

92UM1432A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 33, Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Mukhin: "Contract Service Not Far Off"]

[Text] In spite of the fact that widespread contract service will be introduced in the Russian Army only after reductions and reform have taken place, preparatory work has already begun in this regard.

As early as spring of this year, specialists of the Main Command of the CIS Combined Armed Forces prepared draft "Regulations on Performance of Military Service in Positions of Soldier (Sailor) and Sergeant (Petty Officer) According to Contract." Their content is based on the record of contract service in the United States, FRG, and other countries in which the principle of voluntary military service exists.

The document envisages the signing of contracts with young men of recruitment age, with individuals who have served at least six months as servicemen on basic term of duty, with persons up to age 40 who are liable for call-up, and with representatives of the weaker sex (ages 19 to 40). One can see that the regulations expect to attract broad segments of society for voluntary recruitment in the army. But the question arises—will people join?

Servicemen and recruits from various military districts and fleets were surveyed on this account by the Center for Military Sociological, Psychological, and Legal Research of the Armed Forces in 1989-1991 and 1992. The data obtained show that a great number of recruits and servicemen on basic term of service would like to serve in accordance with a contract: 36 percent of soldiers (sailors), sergeants, and petty officers, and no less a percentage of recruits expressed the desire to become professionals if certain contract conditions were put into effect. What are these conditions?

According to the regulations, the monthly monetary allowance of a volunteer, depending on the place (region) and nature of service, may constitute an amount two to three times the average monthly salary of civilian employees. Servicemen who conclude a contract receive a lump-sum payment once each year for diligence and other worthy attributes in the amount of up to twice the monthly monetary allowance and are provided material assistance in the amount of one month's level.

In addition, military servicemen performing service according to contract will be provided free food and uniforms, and their travel to leave destination will also be paid for by the Armed Forces. They live in separate areas of the barracks or dormitory. Those desiring to rent

an apartment receive a monthly compensation. Communal maintenance services afford separate quarters in accordance with general practice only to servicemen who have served at least five years in the armed forces.

The center's survey data show that 24 percent of respondents are fully satisfied with the proposed terms of service according to contract, while 60 percent are only generally satisfied in this regard.

But another question arises here—how long will volunteers want to serve in the Army? If not for long—three to five years—this will set the military budget back quite a bit, for it will be necessary to train new professionals to replace those who have left (according to survey data, 75 percent of the servicemen indicated they wanted to sign a contract for a term of not more than three years). The terms envisaged by the regulations resolve this problem to a certain extent by providing incentives for extending the contract. For example, a serviceman who extends his contract another 10 years receives a supplement of five times the monetary allowance for his job position and military rank. Additionally, supplements are established for service tenure, service under harsh climatic conditions and in remote localities (up to 100 percent of the pay for a given job position), for job rating, and for special conditions of service. The minimum contract term is three years (it may be two years for those performing basic term of service). In the future this may be extended three to 10 years.

Another important question concerns the personal attributes (education, disciplinary record, etc.) of future volunteers. Survey materials show that this is also a problem. Among those who would not be averse to volunteering, 75 percent come from families of workers, 13 percent from peasants, and 12 percent from office workers.

Also a matter of concern is the fact that 4 percent of the youths surveyed who would constitute "volunteers" did not finish high school, while 22 percent were raised without a father or mother, or had neither parent.

### Transcaucasus MD to Become Troop Grouping

92UM1482A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Sep 92 p 2

[Report under the rubric "The Press Center of the Transcaucasus MD Reports": "The Transcaucasus MD Becomes a Group and the Commander Is Replaced"]

[Text] In accordance with an decree of Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and an order issued by Army Gen Pavel Grachev, Russia's minister of defense, Col Gen Valeriy Patrikeyev turned over his official affairs and his position to Lt Gen Fedor Reut on 11 September.

Lt Gen Reut will serve as commander of the Transcaucasus MD until 31 December 1992 and will become commander of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus on 1 January 1993.

**Garrison to Be Built in Grodno Oblast, Belarus**

92UM1482B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Sep 92 p 3

[ITAR-TASS report under the rubric "With a Telegraph Line": "One More Address—The Settlement of Ross"]

[Text] Construction on another military post in Belarus will be started in the immediate future. It is being built for the families of servicemen leaving Germany. It will be located on the outskirts of Ross, an urban-type settlement in Volkovysskiy Rayon, Grodno Oblast. This time specialists with the Grodnozhilstroy association and the German Argenbenobe [transliteration] company will be the contractors. Next year the international team will release 926 apartments ready for occupancy, a trade center, a school and a kindergarten, as well as public utilities for the post. Construction will be financed with funds allocated by Germany.

**CIS: POLICY****Shaposhnikov Deputy on CIS Reaction Force**

92UM1424A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 14 Aug 92 p 2

[Interview with Colonel Vasiliy Petrovich Volkov, permanent representative of the High Command of CIS Armed Forces at Commonwealth Headquarters, by Yuriy Bekhterev and Yevgeniy Gorelik, associates at the press center of the CIS Working Group, under the rubric "In the CIS Working Group": "A Unified Army: Arguments of the Military"]

[Text] Are the regiments of the CIS peacekeeping forces prepared to move out? Is sovereignty with transparent borders possible? Is Ukraine to be another nuclear power?

Colonel Vasiliy Volkov, permanent representative of the High Command of CIS Armed Forces at Commonwealth Headquarters, answers these and other questions.

It has become the rule that all CIS agreements and protocols are produced at meetings of leaders of the Commonwealth nations. An important precedent has occurred. It is more than a month to the next summit at Bishkek, but a document of prime importance has already been signed by the leaders of the seven states and gone into legal effect. It is a protocol establishing the temporary procedure for forming and activating special forces for maintaining peace in hot spots of the former fraternal Union.

This document prepared by the specialists and experts was approved in Tashkent on 16 July at a conference of ministers of foreign affairs and defense of the Commonwealth countries. The idea of having the nations' leaders sign it immediately was also conceived at the conference. This mission, not an easy one, was taken on by the CIS

Working Group, and the "mandate" to serve as agent was assigned to Colonel V. Volkov.

In slightly more than a week Vasiliy Petrovich traveled to almost all of the Commonwealth capitals and visited B. Yeltsin, N. Nazarbayev, I. Karimov, A. Akayev, R. Nabyev, L. Ter-Petrosyan and M. Snegur, who ratified the document with their signatures. President S. Niyazov received the CIS courier very warmly in hot Ashkhabad, granting him a 40-minute audience. He did refuse to autograph the document, however.

[Volkov] Sapparmurad Atayevich basically agreed with the main provisions of the protocol. He felt that he should study them more thoroughly, however, and confer with the parliament. In parting, he invited me to fly to Turkmenistan again. Unfortunately, he did not specify when....

How do the Commonwealth states intend to form and employ the CIS rapid-response forces? The plan is for each country signing the protocol to form and train special military or militia subunits and groups of observers, which can be enlisted for conducting specific operations to maintain peace in this or that region.

Only the Council of Heads of State is authorized to decide on such actions, after this has been requested by one or more Commonwealth states. And it must be done with the agreement of the parties in the conflict. At the same time the document stresses that such an action must not be regarded as a substitute for settling the conflict through talks and that it is a limited measure.

What sort of functions are assigned to the peacekeeping forces? In brief, their main mission is to establish the primary conditions for strengthening peace and understanding achieved by the parties in a conflict, to protect the civilian population and help establish closer ties between the opposing forces. What is more, the CIS contingent "fights" only with peaceful means and is authorized to use weapons only in extreme circumstances. For protecting people from violence, for example, and in the case of a blatant attack on themselves.

[Bekhterev, Gorelik] Vasiliy Petrovich, to the best of our knowledge more than 70 documents have already been approved on military matters....

[Volkov] I know what you want to ask: Why are most of them not having a real effect? I can only give you my opinion, a subjective one in many ways, of course. As a legal specialist it is perfectly clear to me that we must first establish the legal basis for the formation and functioning of the armed forces. An entire package of agreements and protocols must therefore be passed. It is perfectly understandable why the leaders of the sovereign states give so much attention to the legal aspects of defense problems at every meeting. Something else is also clear. Until such a package is put together, it is difficult to expect effective implementation of the individual decisions.

[Bekhterev, Gorelik] We recall how, at the first meetings of the councils and heads of state and the heads of government, documents pertaining to the establishment of a CIS Joint Armed Forces were worked out in detail. This idea then gradually gave way to the slogan of "a national army for each sovereign power." In your opinion, what are the plusses and minuses of this change in approaches?

[Volkov] Many people regard national armed forces as a feature of sovereignty. There is unquestionably some logic in this. There is also logic in the view that a national army can protect the republic's independence in the case of small, local conflicts. It is also true, however, that a national army is helpless in the case of large, global conflagrations.

The bold idea of establishing a single army for all the world's nations is gradually taking hold in the minds of many people on various continents. It would be designed to extinguish regional fires and guard peace and tranquility on the planet. We, however, are going against the logic of the world process, attempting once again by force of old habit to destroy everything, to tear a well-built edifice down into individual boards in order then to struggle individually to build unimposing shacks out of them. I believe that life will set us straight and force us to unite once again. Unfortunately, we will pay a very heavy price for this future elucidation.

[Bekhterev, Gorelik] But the strategic forces are still shared, are they not?

[Volkov] In principle, yes. Since the adoption of the first agreement, however, the meaning which each country attaches to this term has changed markedly. In all fairness, it has to be said that in the beginning agreements on the strategic forces were turned out like pancakes and in some respects were not well conceived or carefully weighed. Under the agreement of 30 December of last year, for example, practically all the units having anything at all to do with the strategic forces were included in them. The list was unnaturally long and openly inflated.

This evoked justified complaints on the part of the Ukrainian colleagues, and the matter of defining the composition of the strategic forces came up at the very next meeting. What we believed to be the optimal version of a draft agreement had been worked out by the time of the July meeting of Commonwealth leaders in Moscow. It was not supported, however. While there are no major disparities on this matter between Russia and Byelarus, we have not yet achieved agreement between Russia and Ukraine.

[Bekhterev, Gorelik] Given this development of events, is it possible to implement the agreements calling for the redeployment of all nuclear weapons onto Russian territory?

[Volkov] With the good will of the participants, I believe that it is possible, even though there is open discussion of changes in these accords in Ukraine. The specialists have

responded with what I consider to be an alternative worth considering: removal of the strategic nuclear warheads from the missiles and their replacement with simulators, which would preserve the viability of the missiles, in which case some of the warheads could be stockpiled also on Ukrainian territory. People in the republic's Ministry of Defense object to this, citing the ecological danger which the missile fuel would pose. As A. Kozyrev has put it, however, let us keep only one of the two evils for now—the lesser of the two, God willing. We can deal with it together at a later date. Ukraine intends to destroy nuclear weapons on its own, however, even though this will involve expenses of many billions of rubles. Is the republic up to this in its present economic situation? And to what purpose?

[Bekhterev, Gorelik] Vasily Petrovich, there is a lot of talk about borders today—and with increasing alarm. We understand that you might not be exactly the person to address this matter, since you represent the "pure" armed forces. Still, we would like to know what you think the forced establishment of border sovereignty will lead to.

[Volkov] We have become convinced—particularly from the example of the southern borders—that they are gradually becoming transparent and easily penetrated by any, even extremely unwelcome guests.

I am in agreement with my colleagues in the Border Troops that we must have joint efforts by all the Commonwealth states which would like to restore the border to normal status. Without infringing upon the interests of each separate republic, of course.

[Bekhterev, Gorelik] We know that a package of military issues is to be on the agenda of the forthcoming meetings of CIS leaders in Bishkek at the end of September. If this can be discussed, essentially what are they?

[Volkov] Unfortunately, the Commonwealth has existed for seven months now without a well-defined concept of collective security for the member nations. Nor do we have a document on CIS nuclear strategy yet. The command element intends to present draft agreements on these extremely important matters for the assessment of the heads of state. It is also planned to prepare for the meeting drafts of other documents of great importance to the normal functioning of both the national armies and the joint forces.

## CIS: GROUND TROOPS

### Ground Forces Air Defense Academy Established in Smolensk

92UM1481A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 2 Sep 92 p 2

[IA Severo-Zapad report under the rubric "In Brief":  
"An Air Defense Academy Has Opened"]

[Text] The Ground Forces PVO [Air Defense] Academy, Russia's first, has opened in Smolensk. It was created out of a higher radioelectronics engineer school.

Lt Gen Viktor Chertkov, head of the academy, had this to say: "All of the ground forces higher military PVO institutions were in Ukraine, and we have now essentially been deprived of these scientific military centers. Russia therefore had to have its own."

The Smolensk academy intends to train highly skilled commanders. It is planned to begin accepting officers at the academy in 1993. Talks are underway even now, however, about bringing some of the students from the Kiev academy.

### CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

#### 8 Su-25s Transferred to Krasnodar

92UM1481B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 2 Sep 92 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report; "Attack Aircraft at Smolensk"]

[Text] Eight Su-25 attack aircraft have been transferred to a military airfield near Krasnodar. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia reports that the aircraft transfer was made as a preventive move to provide security for Russian troops stationed in the Caucasus region.

#### Initial Data on Su-35 Multipurpose Fighter

92UM1451B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 8 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel Vitaliy Morozov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; (Note: aircraft dimensions given in diagram not reproduced: length—22 meters, height—6 meters, wingspan—15 meters): "Su-35: Fighter of the Next Century"]

[Text] As has already been emphasized in a number of articles under the rubric "Arsenal," modernization is a very economical way of improving combat equipment and weapons, and updating and extending the life of the most successful models. In the United States, for example, they deemed it necessary to modernize even such an old aircraft as the Phantom G-4, a contemporary of our MIG-21, and made it a fairly modern aircraft by equipping it with a new radar and new missiles. The Su-35, with which we will acquaint readers for the first time today, is also the result of modernization. But this is a special case. The Su-27, an aircraft with very high performance characteristics that has by no means lost its distinctions, was modernized. But the modernization itself was so thorough and comprehensive that it resulted in a new fighter—new in configuration and equipment, new in goals and capabilities.

The Su-27 is known as an air-superiority fighter. All the onboard equipment and armament are subordinate to

accomplishing this mission. The Su-35 is a multipurpose fighter, able not only to prove its advantage over any air enemy but also to make a long-range, high-precision, and powerful strike against ground or naval targets. The Experimental Design Bureau imeni P. Sukhoy, headed by Mikhail Petrovich Simonov, created the aircraft whose combat potential and multipurpose characteristics will be talked about with respect even in the 21st century. Incidentally, it also was created with such a reserve.

The Su-35 prototype first flew in May 1985. Preserving the continuity with the Su-27, the new aircraft also remained similar to its outward appearance. Nevertheless, it is unique in its aerodynamic configuration. The Su-35 is the world's only series-produced unstable fighter with a "triplane" integrated configuration.

It is appropriate to use superlatives when talking about the new aircraft's armament. No fighter in the world can carry as many missiles in flight as the Su-35—14. Its combat payload reaches 8,000 kg. The Su-35 is equipped with super-long-range, medium-range, increased-range, as well as short-range air-to-air missiles. They have active, semi-active, and passive radar and infrared seekers. The pilot can make a strike against ground and surface targets using missiles with TV and telecommand guidance, guided or unguided aviation bombs, cluster bombs, and rocket-propelled projectiles. The pilot also has a built-in 30-mm aircraft cannon at his disposal.

#### Flight Characteristics of the Su-35

Maximum ground speed, km/hr	1,400
Maximum air speed, km/hr	2,500
Service ceiling, km	18
Maximum flight range, km	over 4,000
With inflight refueling, km	over 6,500
Type of engine	AL-35F
Thrust-to-weight ratio at takeoff	over 1

In responding to articles under the "Arsenal" rubric, some readers expressed doubts that we are able to equip aircraft with radars that are up to the level of western radars. It must be said that there are not traces of such doubts left abroad. They were dispelled after some of our developments were revealed at international air shows. It turned out that the West has nothing like the "Zaslon" fire control radar on the MIG-31 with a phased array, although it is already more than 15 years old. The "Zhuk" radar installed in the MIG-29 is not inferior to the best foreign radars and is superior to them in a number of crucial parameters. We also should tip our hats to the people who developed the multimode jam-resistant radar with which the Su-35 is equipped. It makes it possible to detect air targets at a range of up to 400 km and ground targets at a distance of up to 200 km, simultaneously track at least 15 air targets, and attack at least six of them simultaneously with missiles.



The Su-35's first-rate avionics, combined with its other qualities, makes it possible to make a preemptive strike on any hostile aircraft, including a low-observable, attack ground targets without entering the air defense zone, fly at low altitudes, bypassing obstacles, participate in group operations against air and ground targets, automate all phases of flight and combat employment, accomplish automatic system status monitoring, and identify malfunctions in minimum time periods... To put it more briefly: the Su-35 is trained to do everything that the best fighters in the world are able to do and things they have yet to learn to do.

The creators of this new multipurpose fighter made sure that it was easy and convenient to fly and that it was simple and easy to service this most complex aviation system. It will be very prestigious to fly the Su-35 and prepare it for flight. It is worthwhile for pilots, engineers, and technicians to know the name of the aircraft's chief designer: Nikolay Fedorovich Nikitin.

Visitors to the Farnborough Air Show will become familiar with the Su-35 this week.

#### Performance, Specifications of RLS 35N6 Radar

92UM1451A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
9 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Poroskov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The 35N6 Radar: A Network for 'Rusts'"]

[Text] An irony of fate: on the day that Mathias Rust landed his Cessna on Red Square, the chief of the Air Defense Radar Troops, Lieutenant-General Nikolay Sechkin, signed the document on completion of testing of the new 35N6 radar. With the development of low-powered aircraft and the appearance of cruise missiles and small remotely piloted vehicles, the air defense command authorities experienced a critical need for radars capable of "picking up" low-flying targets.

The predecessors to today's radar—the P-15 and P-10 "Tropa," created back in the mid-1950's and in service until the early 1980's, have become obsolete. In 1983, Vladimir Kopeykin, director of scientific research, was tasked to prepare a replacement and proposed a whole series of projects. He brought one of them, as defense workers say, "to the iron," but was he did not have time to breathe life into the apparatus—he died prematurely. Sergey Stepanov, chief designer of the system, finished the job.

The 35N6 radar is designed for airspace surveillance and determining range and azimuth of small airborne objects—aircraft, including low-powered aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles flying at extremely low altitudes. The radar "sees" targets clearly against a background of intense reflections from ground clutter and weather formations. When the three-channel moving target discrimination system is turned on, the screen, before this "jammed" with returns, becomes

clean. Only blips from airborne objects are visible on it, whose flight speeds range from the slowest to supersonic.

The radar station consists of two KamAZ vans. The first contains the electronic equipment (transmitter, receiver, control and communications equipment, operator position, and so forth); the second carries the antenna device and a diesel-electric unit for independent operation, as well as frequency converter for an external power supply. There is a spare electric power station on a single-axle trailer. There is also a removable operator position which can be set up at a command post 300 meters away from the radar. The radar can operate both with a regular antenna and with one mounted on a light portable mast with a lift height of up to 50 meters. This makes it possible to use the radar on wooded terrain, reduces the effect of surrounding terrain relief on the detection zone, and increases the range of detection of low-altitude targets.

The radar is reliable in operation (average mean time between failures is at least 300 hours) and has stable technical characteristics in harsh operating conditions: at temperature from -50 degrees C to +50 degrees C, wind velocity up to 25 meters per second, and in snow, icy conditions, and rain. The radar is simple to service, convenient to operate, and fairly comfortable: it has a reduced noise level, heating and cooling equipment, and individual and sanitary ventilation. The level of safety is high: there are no high-voltage power sources, and personnel exposure to x-ray and microwave radiation has been eliminated.

#### Basic Characteristics of the 35N6 Radar

Wave band	Decimetric
Operating limits:	
range, km	5-150
azimuth	360 degrees
altitude, km	6.0
Scanning period, seconds	5 and 10
Detection range of airborne objects flying at following altitudes, km:	
—100 meters	32-58
—1,000 meters	95-105 (depending on type of target)
Ground clutter rejection factor, dB	53
Average recovery time, hr	not over 0.5
Turn-on time, min	3.3
Deployment time when operating with standard antenna, min	not over 20
Size of operating crew (one shift)	2

The first 35N6 radars were installed in the troops in 1986 and were given a high rating by specialists. Not too long ago, the radar was tested at an air defense training range against our new low-powered aircraft, which was

flown by an experienced pilot. He was unable to penetrate the unique air "obstacle belt." The creators of the radar, headed by Sergey Stepanov, have been awarded the State Prize.

The possibility of creating a special-purpose coastal radar based on the 35N6 is being considered for detecting small vessels and combating illegal fishing in Russia's territorial waters.

## CIS: NAVAL FORCES

### Kravchuk, Morozov Announcements Mark Navy Day

92UM1363A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
28 Jul 92 p 1

[Text of announcements by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk and Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov]

[Text] **Sailors and Veterans of the Navy, Shipbuilders and Repair Workers, Workers of the Defense Industry!**

We solemnly commemorate Navy Day on 26 Jul 92 in accordance with the fine tradition.

The Ukrainian state assigns enormous significance to the Navy, which plays an important role in protecting its maritime boundaries and is an influential factor in ensuring security and peace.

Our people highly honor the history of the fleet and the heroic deeds of the sailors in the name of the Motherland.

The Black Sea sailors, under the difficult conditions of the formation of the Navy of Ukraine and the Navy of the Russian Federation based on the Black Sea Fleet, are persistently improving their naval proficiency and making efforts to rule out mutual conflicts and confrontation, and are fairly resolving the fate of the fleets of the two great naval powers in the interests of Ukraine and Russia.

The selfless labor of the shipbuilders and ship repair workers of the defense industry is creating a new generation of ships in the Navy of Ukraine that will take their worthy place as part of the fleet of our independent state.

All should be confident today that the rights and freedoms of citizens on the territory of Ukraine, guaranteed by the Constitution and legislation of our state, will be unwaveringly observed.

I greet and congratulate all sailors and veterans of the Navy and workers in the shipbuilding, ship-repair and defense industries on Navy Day.

I wish you robust health, happiness and success in service and labor in the fleets of both sovereign states—Ukraine and the Russian Federation—for the good of reinforcing friendship between our peoples, and in the

interests of their collaboration on an equal footing and peace and prosperity in every family.

*Respectfully,*

[Signed] *President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk*

**Sailors and Veterans of the Navy, Shipbuilders and Repair Workers, Workers of the Defense Industry!**

Navy Day is solemnly marked on 26 Jul 92 in accordance with tradition.

The history of the Navy is a history of selfless service to the Fatherland.

Ukraine, as a young independent state, understands the important role of the Navy in protecting its maritime borders, and it is making every effort for its fastest possible creation as part of its armed forces.

The Navy Day holiday is being marked this year during the difficult period of formation of the Navy of Ukraine and the Navy of the Russian Federation based on the Black Sea Fleet.

The Navy of Ukraine will be nuclear-free but sufficiently powerful to ensure security and peace on the Black Sea. A new generation of ships has now been laid down at the shipbuilding enterprises of Ukraine. These ships will enter the force composition of the Navy of Ukraine, however long the question of dividing the Black Sea Fleet may take.

I congratulate and greet all of the sailors and veterans of the Navy and the workers in the shipbuilding, ship-repair and defense industries on Navy Day.

I wish robust health, happiness and success in service and labor to all in the fleets of the two sovereign, independent states of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

I am confident that the Black Sea sailors and all of those who have linked their fate with the Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine will display endurance, understanding and prudence in the name of building our sovereign state and its Navy.

[Signed] *Minister of Defense of Ukraine Colonel-General K. Morozov*

### Morozov Announcement on Attempted Defection of Black Sea Fleet Warship

92UM1358A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA*  
in Ukrainian 24 Jul 92 p 1

["Announcement by Ukrainian Defense Minister Colonel-General Kostyantyn Morozov Concerning the Situation That Developed in the Black Sea Fleet"]

[Text] As has been reported, on 21 July an SKR-112 Black Sea Fleet patrol vessel, by the decision of its crew, headed from the Crimean Naval Base for the port of Odessa.

Once at sea, the crew hoisted the Ukrainian state flag. The chief of staff of the 17th Brigade of the water area defense ships and an officer of the brigade staff were on board.

During the more than eight-hour crossing, the ship was pursued by ships directed from the fleet command post with the aim of forcing the ship to turn back.

Everything was tried: artillery fire into the air and alongside the ship, dangerous maneuvering at close quarters with the aim of crowding the vessel and causing damage, and attempts to put a task force aboard to seize the ship.

Nevertheless, the patrol vessel did manage to make the port of Odessa and at 18:50 it was moored at the jetty of a brigade of Ukrainian border ships.

Lieutenant-Captain Nastenka, the commander of the ship, stated that what forced the crew to take this unauthorized action was the unlawful actions of the Black Sea Fleet command under conditions of the lack of decisions as to the Fleet on the level of state commissions.

On this basis, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry is forced to lodge a vigorous protest against the Black Sea Fleet command and to demand that an immediate stop be put to the unlawful actions against citizens of Ukraine who are fulfilling their military service in their own country.

Ukraine is systematically building its own Armed Forces, on its own territory, on a legal foundation.

According to the laws of Ukraine, no military formations not belonging to its Armed Forces are to be on the territory of our state.

On the basis of this factor, and in consideration that strategic nuclear forces of the former USSR are stationed on Ukrainian territory, it is a legacy that is unwanted by our people; by decision of the Supreme Soviet, their status has been defined as temporary. In a certain amount of time stipulated by the terms of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons, these forces are to be eliminated.

Until they are completely eliminated, Ukraine reserves the right to administrative control over them and to monitor their non-use in the territory of our state. The rights and liberties of the personnel during their service in units and formations of the strategic nuclear forces are guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine.

Ukraine takes the same principled approach to dealing with the so-called problem of the Black Sea Fleet.

Most of the personnel serving in the Fleet are citizens of Ukraine, who have the constitutional right to serve their own people and to defend the land of their forefathers.

The Fleet is based on Ukrainian land, is supported by the state, and is financed from its budget.

On this basis, Ukraine is examining the Fleet question on the basis of Supreme Soviet decrees reflecting the integrity, indivisibility, and inviolability of its territory and Ukrainian legislation concerning state property, reflecting the interests of the country's defense capability.

In the course of the Dagomys Treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, a Ukrainian state delegation negotiating the Black Sea Fleet question proposed some basic guidelines for resolving the problem which would result in basing the Ukrainian and Russian fleets separately on their own territories.

Despite the legal basis for Ukraine's examination of these guidelines themselves, the Russian side has been making claims to a portion of the Black Sea Fleet, including the infrastructure, and, refusing to agree to separate basing of forces, has brought negotiations to a standstill.

Under these circumstances, the Fleet's personnel have become increasingly unhappy with the course of the negotiations, and there are doubts as to the possibility of solving the problem by political means. There have been an increasing number of cases of officers and men of ships and units exercising self-determination. Personnel who have taken the Ukrainian oath have suffered reprisals; their rights and liberties, guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of their country, have been grossly violated on the land of their forefathers. As a sign of protest and the desire to draw attention to their problems, they have manifested insubordination and have quit ships' crews. This has resulted in an escalation of unlawful actions on the part of the Black Sea Fleet command.

In a telegram, Admiral Kasatonov warns about willingness to continue to apply vigorous measures and the possibility of appropriate actions by crews having opposite political goals.

An obvious standoff situation has developed, with the great likelihood of armed conflict breaking out.

It is urgently necessary that people who are involved in the Black Sea Fleet question review their positions, review them from the standpoint of their personal responsibility for heating up the situation and its possible consequences. Because they regard the status of the independent Ukrainian state as temporary (in connection with the alleged mistakes of its leadership), those who are forcing personnel to maintain the mythical unity of the Fleet on other people's land are making officers, warrant officers, petty officers and sailors hostage to their own political ambitions and are depriving them of their elementary rights, forcing them to raise their hands against one another.

Nurturing the idea of revanchism for the so-called mistakes which have resulted in Ukraine building the structures of its own Armed Forces, and relying on force, the mistake is being made by those who do not respect the rights of other states, and they are doing political damage to their own country.

We are not clinging to the Fleet—we are defending the integrity of our country.

Ukraine's position is just. Our servicemen, our people within the country and outside of it, are firmly convinced of that.

We make no claims on what is located outside the borders of our country; we respect the right of other countries to their own property.

We cannot just give away something which embodies the labor of millions of our citizens, who have earned the right to improve their lives. We are obligated to proceed on the necessity of building our own defense on land, sea, and in the air. This will require a reliable army made up of the citizens of our state to serve our people and defend our Fatherland.

We are not joining any military blocs, we are not stationing our own troops on the territories of other countries. And there should be no troops on our territory which belong to other countries. We will deal with this through negotiations.

We are ready to compromise; we are ready to manifest good will, but we will never divide Ukraine! It is inviolable and indivisible!

**Ukrainian, Russian Crews Readied for Same Ship**  
92UM1363B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
28 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Ukrinform correspondent Yuriy Skiba: "The 'Slavutich' Has Been Named the Flagship"]

[Text] *The crew of the Slavutich has been formed exclusively from volunteers, and moreover on a competitive basis. The crew is multinational, but each of its members has consciously taken the oath of loyalty to Ukraine.*

*A paradoxical situation has taken shape on the eve of the departure of the large intelligence-gathering ship Slavutich—built in the slips of the Black Sea Fleet Shipyard [ChSZ] Production Association in Nikolayev—for sea trials. Two combat crews have a claim on it at the same time—from the Navy of Ukraine and the Red Banner Northern Fleet. The deputy director of the ChSZ, Ivan Vinnik, however, has stated that the Slavutich is the first military vessel built for the Ukrainian Navy, and when it leaves its berth at the yard the state flag of Ukraine will be raised over it.*

All of the problems that were born of the prolonged rivalry on the score of dividing up the Black Sea Fleet and the creation of the Ukrainian Navy are reflected in the fate of the first-born of the Ukrainian Navy and its crew as in a drop of water. The background of the issue is as follows: the customer of the ship—the largest and most advanced in its class, by the way—was at one time the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR. Last year, when the order was half filled, a crew arrived in Nikolayev from the Northern Fleet—for which this intelligence ship was being built—and began to settle in on their future floating home. Frictions

began to arise between the customer and the yard, however, with the start of the divorce proceedings among the republics of the ex-USSR. The Ministry of Defense of Russia ceased financing its construction. It would have been absurd to cut the hull up into scrap, as had happened with the unfinished aircraft-carrying cruiser Ulyanovsk. Too much manpower and funding had been invested in it. The shipyard workers thus continued to work, while the executives of the yard sought out sources of financing. The government of Ukraine ultimately paid for finishing off the ship and its later support. The crew from the Northern Fleet had thus lost its right to the ship, and they were removed from it and deprived of their yard passes.

A new crew was meanwhile formed from among the officers, warrant and petty officers and sailors who had taken the oath to the people of Ukraine at the organizational center of the Ukrainian Navy in Sevastopol. It was approved by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Navy, Rear-Admiral Boris Kozhin, and today they are preparing the ship for sea trials and the further performance of its service together with the shipyard workers.

"We have ended up in a difficult position," relates Assistant Ship's Commander Captain 3rd Rank Yuriy Gavrilov. "The command of the Black Sea Fleet sees us virtually as traitors. We are getting no support in outfitting and supporting the ship and crew from the departments and directorates of the staff of the Black Sea Fleet. The Training Center for Junior Specialists in Naval Aviation, located in Nikolayev, and other units that have sworn their loyalty to the people of Ukraine have taken up our support and are helping us to the extent they can. But they simply cannot help us with the special armaments and the diving and chemical gear. The ambiguity of the situation is aggravated by the fact that the former, Russian crew of the Northern Fleet is still quartered in Nikolayev, and its command is preserving the hope that the ship will be turned over to them.

"There is another problem—the training of the team. Many training centers that train specialists for the naval professions have become closed to us. We have to organize the training, as they say, on the go. I would like to emphasize nonetheless that the greatest honor and main task for all of us—from the commander to the sailors—is to go out to sea under the flag of the independent Ukraine and be present at the origins of the creation of the national Navy. It is important, for peaceful and sound service, that a political solution be found as quickly as possible to the questions of the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine should and will have its own fleet, and there are no alternatives here, in our view."

A few lines in conclusion on the nature of the ship and crew. The large intelligence-gathering ship Slavutich, according to the classification commonly adopted in the fleet, is in the first rank of vessels. The largest, that is. There are none like it today in the whole fleet of the former Union. It is assumed that it will become a command and control ship and the flagship of the

Ukrainian fleet. The Slavutich, as Senior Assistant Commander Captain 3rd Rank Karen Khachaturov said, corresponds entirely to the tasks that could be entrusted to it in the zone of responsibility of the Ukrainian Navy.

### **"Pressure" on Oath Takers in Black Sea Fleet Continues**

92UM1411A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
13 Aug 92 p 1

[Statement by Ukrainian Navy Press Center]

[Text] The agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the principles of forming the Ukrainian Navy and Russian Navy based on the Black Sea Fleet of the former USSR, signed by the two presidents, Leonid Kravchuk and Boris Yeltsin, has opened up new opportunities for creating the fleets of the two great powers and their cooperation in resolving the most important questions of defense capability. However, in spite of this, the command of the Black Sea Fleet continues to supercharge the situation around collectives of servicemen taking the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine or supporting the position of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense in the issue of creating a navy.

Psychological pressure continues on those taking the Ukrainian oath at the Crimean Naval Base, in the brigade of submarines commanded by A. Kostkin, and in other units and subunits. Servicemen unable to endure such an atmosphere are forced to turn to the organizational group of the Ukrainian Navy in search for social protection. In recent days alone, dozens of fleet servicemen have sought such assistance. This is in violation of Article 6 of the agreement, which states that servicemen of Ukraine and Russia called upon to serve in the Black Sea Fleet take the oath of the state of which they are citizens. Personnel of the younger generation, as before, are administered the oath of the CIS. There are cases of insults and violation of the human rights of those who do not wish to take an oath to the CIS, but insist on observance of Article 6 of the agreement adopted at Yalta.

Purposeful manning of combat large units and units of the fleet with inductees from Russia or from citizens of Ukraine of the Russian nationality continues, which also does not help to normalize the situation, implement the adopted agreement, or strengthen friendship between soldiers of various nationalities.

They continue to "brainwash" personnel and involve sailors in resolving political issues. The fleet leadership pursues the idea of a victory won over the Ukrainian "roguish wise men and various emissaries." Contrary to the adopted agreement on creating two fleets, they instill the thought of the indivisibility of the Black Sea Fleet and that, as before, it is subordinate to the CIS Combined Armed Forces until determination of the status of the transitional period, although Article 3 of the agreement clearly states that for the transitional period the Black Sea Fleet is removed from the CIS Combined

Armed Forces and is directly subordinate to the presidents of Ukraine and the Russian Federation effective with the signing of this document. The Black Sea Fleet command's failure to observe this article, in essence, is a direct violation of the agreement.

Up to now, there continues to be articles in the FLAG RODINY newspaper aimed at undermining the authority of and trust in the commander and the organizational group of the Ukrainian Navy, which in the end does not help to strengthen friendly equitable relations between the two structures as partners.

Based on the situation that has developed and the requirements of the agreement, the Press Center of the Ukrainian Navy appeals to all personnel of the fleet for good sense, mutual understanding, civilized resolution of problems that arise, and precise and strict fulfillment of the understandings reached in order to prevent another round of tension and confrontation. This is the only way we can come to agreement and accomplish in a calm and businesslike situation the tasks facing the two independent states and turn the Black Sea into a zone of peace and harmony.

### **Naval 'Undersea Navigation' Facility Located in St. Petersburg Church**

92UM1471A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian  
22 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Captain 2d Rank Gennadiy Dianov: "The Cathedral of the 'Underwater Virgin'"]

[Text] Under the Orthodox crosses on this temple the letters UTS—Education and Training Station—stand out. After ending up on the territory of the Training Red Banner Submarine Detachment—a site closed to Leningrad, now St. Petersburg, residents—the cathedral, built in 1888, disappeared for a long time from reference and guide books on the city of Peter the Great.

Still, luck held for the temple. Though losing the crosses from its domes, it generally retained its original appearance. And even became to a certain degree a patron of submariners. I do not know whether they thought of God when they scrambled through the 26-meter-long pipe mounted inside the cathedral in imitation of an escape through a submarine torpedo tube. Still, during the almost six decades since the UTS became operational in 1933 one could find quite a few submariners who would gladly light a candle in this unusual Cathedral of the Underwater Virgin in gratitude for their saved lives.

Perhaps it would make sense today to return this temple to the church, as is being done everywhere. Except who will then protect the seamen from the misfortunes stalking them in the depths of the sea? There is only one such center left in Russia, and, alas, there is no replacement for it.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

**Ministry Denies Transfer of Tanks to Azeris***92UM1340B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 15 Jul 92 p 1*

[Article from the Press Service of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense: "An Armored Canard"]

[Text] The telegram received from Armenia last week by certain information agencies would affect any sensible person. Judge for yourselves, for how long have we painfully been watching the alarming events developing in the land of Nagorno-Karabakh and it turns out, if one accepts the text of the telegram signed by the co-worker of the Department of External Relations of the Armenian Ministry of Defense, Ukraine does not want to halt the conflict. Moreover...but for goodness sakes let us not make any distortions and so we shall quote.

"Several days ago two trains carrying tanks (about 80 tanks) were dispatched from Ukrainian territory toward Azerbaijan. As we learned, in the near future these combat vehicles will participate in military operations against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

"In this situation we are concerned by the fact that a similar instance of sending equipment to Azerbaijan occurred several months ago. Although official circles in Ukraine at that time repudiated this, the fact was confirmed."

A truly terrifying and monstrous fact. For this reason we, naturally, hurried to check it out. For this, we got in touch with the acting chief of the Armored Service Under the Armament Directorate of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Colonel Vladimir Medvid. He informed us that over the last six months while he has headed the Armored Service of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, he has not signed a single order for sending equipment to Azerbaijan, Armenia or Russia. Without his signature, Colonel Medvid stated, not a single unit of military equipment could be dispatched outside Ukraine, let alone two trains. We can only conclude that the announcement of the Armenian Ministry of Defense is nothing more than another "armored canard."

**Belarusian Pilots to Train in Ukraine***92UM1410D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 1 Aug 92 p 1*

[Article by Ukrinform Correspondent Aleksandr Oley-nik: "Pilots for Belarus"]

[Text] Chernigov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots, the personnel of which swore an oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine during the first days of January 1992, has not become closed for the envoys of the Commonwealth countries.

Seven representatives of Belarus are among the young men who have successfully passed the entrance exams

and who have enrolled at the institution. There are no flying schools in that republic but cadres for military aviation are needed. The Belarusian lads will receive passes into the sky in the ancient Ukrainian city. As Acceptance Commission Chairman Colonel Yuriy Sidorov reports, training will be conducted on a contract basis in accordance with an interstate agreement. The oath which they take during the first year does not affect the Belarusian cadets. After graduation from school, they will be sent back to the Belarusian Ministry of Defense where they will receive their first officer ranks and assignments in service.

**Second Round of Russia-Moldova Talks Deal With Withdrawal of 14th Army***92UM1483A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Sep 92 p 1*

[Article by Aleksandr Tago under the rubric "Moldova": "Passions Surrounding the 14th Army Are Not Subsiding"]

[Text]

**Second Round of Russian-Moldovan Talks Begun in Chisinau**

Following an extended break talks between Moldova and Russia to define the status of the presence of the Russian Federation's 14th Army and the schedule for its withdrawal have been renewed in Chisinau. This is the second round of Moldovan-Russian talks, of course. The first took place in Moscow. The government delegations at the talks are headed by the ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiaries: Russia's Vladimir Plechko in Moldova and Moldova's Petr Luchinskiy in Russia. Upon arriving in Chisinau, the latter stated that the main objective of the second round of talks is to define the status of the Russian army's presence on the territory of Moldova. The head of the Moldovan delegation does not conceal the fact that the debate in the talks will be difficult. According to him, one should not expect formations of the 14th Army to be transferred to Russia within a few weeks. This is a complex process, since it will entail considerable outlays and, most important, the need for housing for the officer corps at the army's new station. In one of his interviews for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Petr Luchinskiy said that, unlike the Baltic republics, which are demanding the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops, the Russian Federation's military subunits could remain in Moldova for a longer time. At the same time the ambassador asked that a definite schedule be established for the army's removal from Moldova. On the eve of the second round of talks Moldova's President Mircea Snegur put forth a proposal which took many people by surprise. It involved the possibility of Russian officers residing in the eastern regions of Moldova—and this is mainly the cities of Tiraspol and Bendery—continuing their military service in the National Army of Moldova. Moldova has never had military units on the left bank of the Dniester, to be

sure, but, according to the president, military units of the National Army will soon be stationed also in the eastern regions of Moldova. In the opinion of Mircea Snegur, who has advocated the 14th Army's rapid withdrawal, giving Russian officers the opportunity to serve in the National Army of Moldova could prevent unlawful actions on their part. Some political observers in Moldova view Mircea Snegur's proposal as a new compromise by official Chisinau in the talks on the 14th Army's withdrawal from the Dniester region. The opposition forces, however, regard the 14th Army's presence in the Dniester region as the main factor preventing restoration of "the legal authorities: the prosecutor's office, the courts, the military commissariats and the police" in the left-bank region. It is their opinion that the withdrawal of the "foreign army of occupation" will make it possible to establish law and legal order in the Dniester region. The population of the Dniester region, and particularly the leaders of the Dniester Republic, believe that the 14th Army's presence in the left-bank region of the Dniester is the only restraining factor which will prevent Chisinau from reestablishing Moldova's constitutional authorities in the Dniester region by force. Grigoriu Marakut, chairman of the Armed Forces of the Dniester Region, and Minister of Defense Stefan Kitak have stated publicly more than once that a decision to remove the 14th Army from the Dniester region will only involve the withdrawal of the army's commander along with its colors. According to Tiraspol, from 60 to 70 percent of the officers and warrant officers live in the Dniester region. It will not be so easy or simple to get them to agree to abandon their houses and apartments and depart for Russia, where there are already so many military personnel without a roof over their heads. "This is our army. We feed and cloth it, after all," Major-General Stefan Kitak, minister of defense of the unrecognized Dniester-Moldovan Republic, said in an interview conducted by a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent. "The 14th Army must not be withdrawn. It can become an army of the Dniester region."

Such greatly conflicting approaches to the fate of the 14th Army deployed in the Moldova's eastern regions are further proof that the Moldovan-Russian talks renewed on 16 September will not be easy.

#### **Oovel on Russian Troops, Border Patrols in Estonia**

*WS2309130092 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN  
in English 1545 GMT 21 Sep 92*

[From 21 September RAHVA HAAL, PAEVALEHT, p 8, 2]

[Text] Monday, September 21—Minister of State Uno Veering and General Director of Border Guard department Andrus Oovel held a news conference yesterday. According to Veering there are less than 15,000 Russian troops in Estonia. "We have asked at each of the six rounds of the negotiations, how many troops are here. Our negotiations partners have never answered",

Veering said. Estonian government and delegation adheres to the deadlines mentioned earlier: assault units and troops based in Tallinn will have to leave within this year, the rest during the first half of 1993, Veering assured. The border discussions have been hindered by both sides' different understanding of the succession of the negotiating states. "The Russian side claims that two totally new states were formed in 1991—Russia and Estonia, whose relations must be determined by new treaties. Our position has not changed: the Republic of Estonia, formed in 1918 was meanwhile incorporated in the USSR against the will of the people, but the legal status of our state has not been interrupted", Veering told the news conference. He stressed that the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 is the only international document determining Estonian-Russian border. Yet Veering admitted the possibility of "certain compromise". According to PAEVALEHT, Russia has also shown some willingness to compromise. The new border line is expected to run between the present economic border and the one determined by the Tartu Peace Treaty. The Treaty will be observed by the new delegation as well as it has not been invalidated by any legal acts, Veering added.

Andrus Oovel stressed the lack of personnel that makes normal border service impossible. Instead of 3,048 men necessary there are only 1,100, he said. "The state will have to consider the necessity of all defence expenses", Oovel said. "Are we afraid of a foreign aggression or trying to hinder the entry of organized crime, drug trade and illegal refugees into Estonia?" he asked. He also mentioned lack of equipment and insufficient legislation which makes it difficult to punish lawbreakers.

2.2 million persons crossing Estonian border have been registered since July 1 when the visa regime was introduced. 12,000 have been turned back at the border, 3 wanted criminals and 582 owners of forged passports have been arrested. Border Guard has presented 31 cases to court but no one has been tried yet, Oovel pointed out. Estonian Border Guard has registered 143 cases of Russian troops violating Estonian laws. The Foreign Ministry has protested in four cases.

Estonian Border Guard uses one patrol boat presented by Sweden, three more are to arrive from Finland. Estonian Border Guard has taken over 18 former Russian guard posts, most of which have been looted and need repair. Oovel stressed as exceptions the guard stations in Baaremaa and patrol boat base in Haapsalu which were handed over in excellent order. 8 Estonian border guards are presently stationed in Paldiski, Oovel said.

#### **UKRAINE**

##### **Defense Minister Morozov Visits France**

*92UM1469A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
8 Sep 92 p 1*

[Report under the rubric "The Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Reports": "On Paths of Cooperation"]



[Text] The minister of defense of Ukraine has wound up a three-day visit to France. During a meeting in the French Ministry of Defense K. Morozov talked with French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe one-on-one and as a member of the delegation.

Issues pertaining to cooperation between the two ministers were discussed in the talks. The issues included an exchange of delegations of military specialists for training in the forces. Areas of cooperation in military education were defined.

The delegation from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine visited the Operations Center of the Armed Forces of France. They discussed the situation in the former Yugoslavia, where Ukrainian and French battalions are performing their missions shoulder to shoulder as part of the UN peacekeeping force.

Members of the delegation were introduced to the organization and the practical operations of a special-purpose subunit of the National Gendarmerie at Sator and with the organization of the training process while at an Air Force school at Salon and a school for armored troops at Carpiagne.

The delegation from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine was accompanied by Yug Perne [transliteration], France's ambassador to Ukraine.

The visit is regarded as the beginning of cooperation between the military departments of the two European countries in the development of a treaty between France and Ukraine signed by the presidents of the two countries in June of this year.

### Market Creates New Difficulties for Construction Units

92UM1340C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
9 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Georgiy Verves, instructor at the Simferopol Higher Military Construction School: "The Ukrainian Military Construction Complex: Development Prospects"]

[Text] Difficult problems confront the military construction workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The liberalization of prices, the broken economic ties, difficulties with the delivery of building materials and preassembled products, unskilled manpower and future unemployment. What should the soldiers with a trowel in hand do in this situation? What is their future? These and other questions, I am certain, will be asked by each officer, warrant officer ["praporshchik"], worker and employee of the military construction units.

What ways do I see for reorganizing them? Undoubtedly, under the conditions of well established market relations it will be better for the Ministry of Defense to conclude contracts for carrying out work with highly skilled

civilian builders. Under the condition that the construction corporation or trust assumes a contract for putting up one or another project on time and of high quality. But this is already the future. At present, clearly, over the next few years the military construction workers will find it hard going. Because there is not an extensive market for labor resources and there are not the funds for the social and service facilities for the workers. This, naturally, is one of the reasons for the necessity of keeping the military construction units. We also must not ignore the situation which has arisen around the Ukrainian Army and Navy. There is a catastrophic shortage of apartments for officers, warrant officers and their families. The local authorities in certain areas refuse to provide housing for this category of personnel. At present, there is the acute question of the transferral of officers and warrant officers from other states to Ukraine. And this again means housing.... Here we must not forget that the combat readiness of our Armed Forces must be maintained on a high level. For this special facilities must be built. Would the civilian construction workers be capable now of handling such an amount of work? Hardly.

It is essential to bear in mind that the military construction units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces possess great scientific-technical and production potential which for many years now has carried out tasks in the interests of the Army and Navy. At present it certainly would be unreasonable to break this up.

Hence, the reality is such that the labor of the military construction workers is essential over the next few years. Hence, the question of eliminating them cannot be posed. Hence, changes in the military construction units are at hand and are knocking directly at the door.

It is essential to incorporate the military construction units in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, renaming them the engineer-technical units and entrusting them with the tasks of engineer support for major defensive operations in the event of military operations on Ukrainian territory. This measure will eliminate that negative syndrome which the military construction units currently have.

Here, the changes in the military construction units cannot be one-sided. They should encompass the entire range of organizational, scientific-technical, social and personnel questions. As for reorganizing the structures, the focus should be on the end result. Only this decides what military construction organization is capable of carrying out the tasks under the conditions of market relations.

There is the viewpoint of certain specialists who propose setting up territorial self-financing associations. This merits attention. What do we have now? The scattering of the military construction organizations over Ukrainian territory and their often narrow specialization. This naturally impedes manageability and leads to the subcontracting of labor.



Territorial self-financing associations based on the three military districts and the fleet would have advantages. The command of such associations could effectively settle problems arising before the inferior military construction organization. A common territory would make it possible to simplify and at the same time establish stable ties with the suppliers of building materials and equipment, and dependably organize material-technical supply and routine for the personnel of the units. Finally, there would be a master who would take an interest in the prompt and high-quality erection of projects and be concerned for the personnel. The staffs of the Central Capital Construction System of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense would not be so large. This, in turn, would make it possible to focus all efforts in the primary elements of military construction, where the basic task is carried out.

As for the inferior structure of the military construction units—the UIR (directorates of engineer work), the UNR (directorates of work superintendents) and the military construction detachments, the repeated experiments which have been carried out recently to reorganize them have shown that they very rarely submit to changes. Why? Here one feels the conservatism and reticence of individual military officials to work in a new quality, the fear of losing a position and the poor skills of the military construction workers. At the same time, one must recognize this, an attempt has been made to set up a more advanced structure with a single directorate of military construction work (UVSR). In what crucial way does this differ from the old? In the fact that it has brought together the interests of everyone: the engineer-technical employees and the command personnel of the military construction detachments. That is, it has created positive motivation for the labor of the officers, warrant officers and military construction workers for the high-quality execution of construction-installation work and for fighting to strengthen military discipline.

Such an establishment structure, in my opinion, will be acceptable for the military construction workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

At present, a solution must also be found to the problem of supplying the military construction units with officer personnel. We know that in Ukraine there is one special military construction institution, the Simferopol School. In truth, it is a former political school. But after its reorganization as a command-engineer school, in the immediate future it would be possible to train here highly skilled military construction engineers, officers of the company level who would be capable of heading military construction work as well as training and educating the personnel. The school has the required scientific-pedagogical potential as well as a fine training base and physical plant.

It is essential to alter the functions and tasks of the client organizations. At present they basically distribute the funds, they provide the construction plans and monitor the course of construction. That is, they bear limited

responsibility for construction and here do not have an economic interest in increasing the efficiency of their work. For this reason, one of the ways for increasing their effectiveness could be providing bonuses to the client organizations for the prompt erection of the projects, for providing the construction workers with high-quality plans and the prompt approval of all unforeseen work with the designers.

The system of wages and incentives for military construction workers also requires a substantial change. There must be real material and moral interest in all categories of military construction workers. In military construction there should be leased and stockholder societies and production cooperatives.

As is known, the quality of labor by a military construction worker is directly tied to his skills and the state of the production facilities at the construction complex. At present this is in a lamentable state in military construction. Here one of the areas for improvement could be the encouraging of the technical reequipping of the enterprises producing construction projects by drawing on their own assets through the primary supplying of them with new equipment and technology. I also support the idea of manning the military construction units with the graduates of construction schools, technical schools and workers in construction specialties. In these institutions of learning it is essential to set up vocational centers where the pupils at their discretion could learn one or two construction specialties. At present one can also hear the opinion that the service in military construction units should be made a type of alternate service. Anyone who knows about military construction realizes that the construction project needs highly-skilled specialists first of all. Alternate service envisages that a citizen would basically engage in auxiliary jobs. Although I do agree that the labor of draftees sent to alternate service could partially be employed at a military construction project. We must try to induct men into the military construction units on a contract basis. I am certain that young men would be happy to serve as military construction workers. Good publicity is needed for this. What is happening now? Basically we read and hear only negative things about the military construction workers. But certainly they also have good features.

It is important to set up a system of benefits in the area of education and housing supply for those who have served in the military construction units. Why not send such fellows without entrance exams to the construction institutes and technical schools?

At present the need has arisen also of changing the everyday uniform and work clothes of the military construction workers. It should be convenient, strong and good looking.

### Open Military Press Essential to Protect Rights of Servicemen

92UM1340D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
9 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel Just Vyacheslav Chaginskiy, senior instructor and deputy chief for Legal Work of the Lvov Higher Military School: "Let Us Not Fence Ourselves Off with an Iron Curtain, or Will the Information About the Army Be Open and Just?"]

[Text] Recently the mass information media have begun more and more often to take up the increased activities of public organizations. These have penetrated virtually all spheres of state life, including the Ukrainian Armed Forces. For many years, the Army was fenced off from the people by an iron curtain and when this curtain, held firmly by the military political bodies, was raised, an enormous flow of negative information flooded into the public eye. The people learned the truth about the cruel and cynical reprisals in the military collectives, the humiliating of the honor and dignity of the soldiers, the flaunting of their constitutional rights and liberties and all of this led to the maiming and death of the personnel, to a decline in military discipline and to increased crime.

The Army's prestige has been strongly shaken in the eyes of the people. As a result, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers has been established and this up to the present has fought not only for the life of their sons but also as a whole for the social protection of the servicemen. Yes, they can be understood and forgiven to some degree for excessive emotionalism, incompetence due to well-meant confusion, for they frequently receive information from not completely reliable sources.

Why has it happened that our citizens have begun to receive information about the Army initially from the overseas and not our own mass information media? Why did the mentioned Committee begin to carry out the functions of the military bodies the duties of which included the educating of law-abiding servicemen, the elaborating of social and legal measures to prevent anomalous phenomena in the conduct of the soldiers and the disclosure of reasons and conditions contributing to the committing of crimes? And all of this at a time when the military journalists and lawyers possessed such information but were unable to get it to the broad strata of the public. There are many factors which gave rise to the given phenomenon, but I would like to take up just one, a very crucial one, concerning the degree to which both the servicemen as well as the public as a whole are informed on sociolegal questions.

The military reforms being carried out in various areas, each of which in one way or another has been given legal reinforcement. An active process of legal support for the military reform demands respectively a strengthening of the amount of legal information and education for the servicemen. Under the conditions of democratization, glasnost, the strengthening of legality and law and order, on this level the activities of the mass information

media, that is, the press, radio, television and movies, are of particular importance. Previously, the former party-political bodies in the Army and Navy, in creating apparent well-being, carefully monitored the press so that information of a criminal nature did not make its way into it. The concept of glasnost was replaced by the revealing of military secrets. If our military mass information media had taken up these questions in a prompt and objective manner, without restricting themselves to a mere statement of facts, if they had investigated the social causes and conditions which gave rise to these phenomena, much could have been prevented.

Everybody understands that under Army conditions there are definite limits to glasnost and in no instance should this harm state security, as was mentioned in the draft Ukrainian Law on the Press. However, in the author's view, such boundaries between the admissible and the inadmissible should be clearly set, otherwise the basic purpose of glasnost is lost, and again executive activities will be outside the perusal of criticism, as the interests of secrecy can always be used even where this does not actually exist. In this context and because of the increased role of the mass information media in providing social control in the Armed Forces, we can side with those authors who see the Army press, radio and television as an independent mass information body free of the existing subordination.

The idea of granting the military mass information media greater independence is also timely in light of historical experience (unfortunately, negative) of the former Union during the repressive period of the 1930s and the period of stagnation in the 1960s to the mid-1980s. The most flagrant violations of legality and the distorting of the principle of social justice became possible due to the curtailment of democratic processes and the paralyzing of glasnost. A legal negativism was formed and this was apparent in the broadening crime and other antisocial actions, including in the troops. Here we still observe no improvement in the criminogenic situation, a lack of legal culture, the legal nihilism of the officials and legal savagery have not been overcome. These have led to the replacing of legality by expediency and by telephone law. While justice has in practical terms been relegated to the backwater of social life. As a result of this, the issuing of thousands of illegal orders and the encroaching on the rights and legitimate interests of the servicemen.

The military lawyers are not free of those negative phenomena which exist in the troops, and undoubtedly personal oversights stand behind these at least distantly. But until the servicemen begin to gain proper information about their rights and the guarantees of their realization, passivity and apathy will be apparent, in encountering instances of an unjust attitude toward them, it will be difficult to achieve a strengthening of law and order. It is possible to make them active in legal terms only through the joint efforts of all levels of commanders, the sociopsychological service, the law enforcement bodies and the mass information media,

under the condition that the last two structures possess greater independence and autonomy.

The authors conclusions and proposals are based upon materials from a study of published articles and sociological research conducted among the military lawyers, journalists and personnel of the military districts and the fleet of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The results of the research, in particular, have shown that a majority of those polled views the media highly or effectively in the legal education and informing of the servicemen, but this view applies more to the possibilities of the media than to the actual state of affairs. This view was supported by 83.5 percent of the journalists, 66 percent of the military lawyers and 70 percent of the personnel. The research showed that there was an urgent demand to obtain information systematically (both positive and negative) about the professional activities of the military procurators, investigators, judges, and legal service workers. The problem is far from idle, as to what degree military justice is accessible for the personnel and all citizens will determine the degree of their trust in military justice and legality.

We must have clearer and more coordinated actions by the military justice bodies and the media in collecting, issuing and implementing information, and for this, I feel, we must have special bodies or individuals, as the command is not always willing to give out particularly negative information. Such a body or person could function, for example, at the press centers under the military districts and in the fleet. However, the given question requires additional work and study.

A portion of the given data, regardless of their limited nature, indicates that in the troops there is a little studied and little used reserve for improving sociolegal information for the personnel through the military mass information media. The conclusions in and of themselves show the subjective opinion of the author. They cannot be indisputable proof as to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the use of the media in the social and legal protection of the servicemen, since this task is diverse and requires an integrated approach to its solution. One thing is clear. A decisive turn toward a higher level of legal information on military questions is an imperative of the times.

#### **Carpathian Military Commissar on Spring Call-Up**

92UM1340F Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
14 Jul 92 p 1

[Interview with the Oblast Military Commissar, Colonel Nikolay Ivanovich Moroz, by Vasilii Goshko, *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* correspondent: "How Has the Spring Call-Up Gone?"]

[Text] My official mission to Ivano-Frankovsk coincided with the last days of the call-up of young men from the oblast into the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. I

phoned the Oblast Military Commissar, Colonel Nikolay Ivanovich Moroz, and asked him for an interview for our newspaper.

[Goshko] Nikolay Ivanovich, you have a middling office and the building in which the oblast military commissariat is housed is cracking. I have in mind the cracks which have appeared, particularly in the ceiling. Who will repair the offices? But this is incidental. The main question is how has the call-up been carried out?

[Moroz] Believe it or not, without a hitch. The plan for the call-up was overfulfilled. Don't be surprised, there is a plan. So, we inducted 100 men more than was supposed. And a reserve remains. We were short just 68 drivers, but we will ascertain who has driver licenses and send them to the units.

Here I would like to emphasize the following detail. While in previous years some draftees were sent notice after notice, and it took almost the aid of a police detachment to bring the future soldier to the assembly point, at present the picture is different. There have been numerous examples when a young man, having received a deferment on the basis of the law, reports to the rayon military commissariat and petitions to be sent to the Army. Many have arrived with their parents who requested out of the purest reasons that their sons, as they put it, be "taken off." I cannot help but mention these, these were Yuriy Ivanyuk, Stepan Knignitskiy, Mikhail Nazaruk, Mikhail Pavlyuk and scores upon scores of others. True patriots of their motherland live in Ivano-Frankovsk, Bogorodchanskiy, Kosovskiy, Rozhnyatovskiy and other rayons of the oblast.

[Goshko] On this level, certainly, good work has been done by the officers of the rayon military commissariats.

[Moroz] Of course. It was explained to the draftees that from now on they will serve in Ukraine, that essentially a new Army is being organized and each person should consider it a matter of honor for himself to do his military duty. Let me give a small example. Previously, not everyone agreed to serve in the Navy. Even now, the service of a sailor is six months longer than, for instance, an artilleryman, motorized rifleman, to put it briefly, the ground forces. We have followed the principle of volunteering. That is, we have asked before the formation who would want to serve in the Black Sea Fleet? Many fellows took three steps forward without hesitation or vacillation. Of these we later chose those who were most suited in terms of health and other demands. In a word, 290 men have already put on their sailor's cap. This is very gratifying.

This has been accomplished due to the efforts of Colonel Valeriy Fedorovich Shapovalov, Lieutenant-Colonel Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich Dyuzhin, Major Mikhail Alekseyevich Slyvotskiy and other military commissars. I would particularly like to mention Slyvotskiy. He was recently appointed to this position, but regardless of the existing difficulties he has successfully handled his duties.

[Goshko] Generally then, things have gone swimmingly.

[Moroz] In no way. Among the inductees there have been cases of AWOL and they fled the assembly points to go home, hiding in their parents' homes. But these were isolated instances. In particular, Vladimir Gibel who lives in the village of Goshiv in Dolinskiy Rayon fled, as well as Vasiliy Babinyuk from the population point of Lesnaya Slobodka, Miron Yakubyak who was inducted in Nadvornaya. It is a shame, but criminal proceedings had to be instituted against some. The reasons for their actions are not known, but most likely the fellows are involved in business and for this reason Army service simply terrifies them. It is easier to earn money.

[Goshko] Forgive me, Nikolay Ivanovich, but possibly they did this out of religious convictions. Certainly it is no secret that many are in different sects, and they are forbidden to take up weapons.

[Moroz] This cannot be excluded. But we have from the draftees on the order of 30 requests for sending them to alternate service. Incidentally, everything is established in these requests.

[Goshko] But did you induct them?

[Moroz] No, we gave them a deferment until autumn. But only for the reason that the very mechanism of alternate service has not been worked out. No one can say where the fellows might be sent. For this reason, we decided to wait a bit.

[Goshko] Have there been other problems with induction? Possibly, you, as a military commissar, have your own views?

[Moroz] I am inclined to have just one induction a year, and only an autumn one. Let me give my reasons for this viewpoint. By autumn, each person who will serve in the Army will have clearly established his future. In other words, a 10th grader will not wonder and fear whether he will be called up or not but will begin calmly, if he has planned for this, to prepare for the institute. If he gets in, well and good. If he is not admitted, he will begin to get ready for Army service, and can change his plans in time. Furthermore, everyone at present knows about the complexity of the equipment. We must not consider the motorized rifleman and the missileman as equal. In using sports terminology, they are in different weight categories. For a young man who has gotten into a motorized rifle unit, possibly a year would be enough, with a conscientious attitude on his part, to master the combat specialty. But what about the missileman? Eighteen months will scarcely suffice for them. I myself am an artillery officer and I know how complicated science is here. So, thought must be given on how we can make the service of the soldiers more flexible and beneficial to the motherland.

[Goshko] Where are the Carpathian natives serving now?

[Moroz] In various oblasts of the Ukraine. Some, it can be said, are almost at home. If not in their population point, then right nearby.

[Goshko] In such instances do the fellows not run off to their mothers to have a good meal?

[Moroz] Everything depends upon the parents. If they have given their son orders to serve without problems and hitches, he does this. Those who stroke their boy's head, slip him an extra hundred rubles, do him a bad turn. Let me refer to facts. A soldier was serving at the oblast military commissariat. The father lived in the town of Kosovo and repaired motor vehicles in a cooperative. Once he visited his son and left him a handful of money. The son spent this wildly. He styled himself a rich man, his fellow servicemen in the squad worked but he stood with his hands in his pockets. The officers noticed this and there was a rebuke. I told the father that his son was not toeing the line. The father begged that we forgive what had happened and that this was the last time. But as soon as he drove off, his heir again slipped into his old ways. Naturally, we had to dismiss such a soldier. If he is tired of serving at home, let him go farther afield.

[Goshko] Now, Nikolay Ivanovich, let us return to the cracks in the corridor....

[Moroz] We must have a major overhaul but no one is allocating any money. And so we watch the ceiling carefully. Although in essence we are a department of the oblistpolkom, but the local authorities, let me say frankly, are not very concerned for us. A number of officers from the rayon military commissariats has been waiting for apartments for years. I myself for a long time have not had a roof over my head. Although everyone understands perfectly that we are carrying out a task of great state importance. So, we will endure the difficulties steadfastly in the future, and we are not alone here.

[Goshko] In principle, the fellows from Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast are serving well, aren't they?

[Moroz] Quite right. A predominant number of the young men shows an inherent feeling of patriotism. And now all the more when they will be serving under the blue-yellow flag for which their grandfathers gave up their lives.

[Goshko] Thank you, Nikolay Ivanovich, for the conversation. I feel that this is not our last meeting, and our newspaper will be writing periodically about the fellows from the Carpathian area and how they are serving.

[Moroz] Thank you, this will be the best incentive for those preparing for induction in the autumn.

**Instructions on Purchase of Military Property  
Through Commercial Center**

92UM1337B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
17 Jul 92 p 4

[Instructions on the Procedure for the Sale of Equipment, Property and Other Materiel Through the Commercial Center Under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Also the Distribution of the Received Profits]

[Text] To the attention of the leaders of enterprises, organizations, collective farms, business people, merchants and farmers!

In order to reply to your numerous requests by telephone and letter about where, how and under what conditions it is possible to purchase military equipment and property being sold by the Commercial Center under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Department of Advertising and Announcements of NARODNAYA ARMIYA, the central body of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, has published for all interested persons the "Instructions on the Procedure for the Sale of Equipment, Property and Other Materiel Through the Commercial Center Under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense..." In this you will find the answers to all the questions concerning you.

[Text of Instructions.]

1. The current Instructions define the procedure for the sale of real estate, goods and chattels as well as the procedure for leasing housing and nonresidential quarters, plots of land and other materiel on the balance sheet of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

2. The sale of the real estate, goods and chattels as well as the leasing are to be carried out through the Commercial Center, subsequently the Center, established under the Decree of the Ukrainian President No 28 of 31 Dec 1991 and the Order of the Minister of Defense No 5 of 24 Dec 1991, as well as its affiliates and agencies. The affiliates are to be organized under the Order of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense No 45 of 3 Apr 1992 in the cities of Lvov, Odessa, Vinnitsa and Sevastopol. Agencies are organized at the major garrisons distant from the Center and its affiliates under a decision by the Center and are closed down by an order from the garrison chief with the Center providing him with a statement on this.

3. The procedure for selling military-technical property and other materiel.

3.1. The troop unit, dump, base or facility, subsequently the troop unit, as well as the self-supporting enterprises and organizations of the Ministry of Defense each quarter submit lists for the goods to be sold to the supply body of the district, fleet, Air Forces, Air Defense RVSN [Strategic Missile Forces] and so forth, subsequently the district.

The district supply body, having checked the soundness of the lists for the sale of goods and making the required corrections, submits them in two copies over the signature of the district commander to the appropriate supply body of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. The lists contain a brief description of the goods. For example, for motor vehicle and tractor equipment: year of production, number of kilometers travelled, condition of vehicle and initial cost. After the approval of the lists by the chiefs of the supply bodies of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the first copy of the lists is turned over to the Center and the second is returned to the district supply body for transfer to an affiliate of the Center and is the basis for issuing the orders for the sale of the goods through the Center and its affiliates.

The Center's affiliates, having received the lists from the appropriate supply bodies, plan their operations in accord with them.

3.2. Units under central authority operate in accord with Point 3.1., but without the intermediate district element.

3.3. The lists of goods to be put up for sale should be approved and turned over by the supply bodies of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the districts to the Center and its affiliates by the 15th of the month preceding the future quarter.

3.4. Under the approved lists, the troop units no later than the first of the current month submit to the Commercial Center and affiliate statements for the equipment and motor-tractor equipment giving their technical state and estimated worth. In these statements, the unit's commission determines the degree of fitness considering the actual state and quality. Here they should establish the year of production, the periods in operation or storage provided in the technical conditions (GOST [State Standards] and specifications) and the time of actual operations (storage) indicated in the logs (specifications). In addition they are to show without fail the condition and the amount of wear in percents. The Commercial Center or its affiliate, on the basis of the received data, determines the residual value of the goods, proceeding from the prices in effect on 1 January 1992 and the increase factors set by the joint instructions of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Finances of 16 January 1992, Nos 03-301 and 31-12/93 and of 15 May 1992, Nos 07-301 and 32-14/6 considering the wear. Here, for motor vehicle and other equipment, the degree of wear should be not more than 70 percent. The procedure for assessing the military technical property and other valuable materiel is to be worked out by the supply directorates of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for the assigned product range and prior to 20 June 1992, is to be approved by the Ukrainian deputy ministers of defense for weapons and rear services as well as the Financial Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

The supply body draws up in 4 copies payment orders for the goods and these also give the address of the troop

unit and the telephone number for information. These are submitted prior to the fifth of the current month to the Center (its affiliates).

3.5. The analytical service of the Center, proceeding from the market conditions and the quality of the goods, set the commercial price for the submitted goods and find a buyer, as a rule, on a competitive basis. Here the commercial price cannot be below the price given in the corresponding order with the inclusion of the surplus value tax and 10 percent overhead. In exceptional cases, the selling price can be reduced with the approval of the Financial Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, but not lower than 50 percent of the price previously set by the appropriate supply body.

3.6. The buyers should provide for the loading and delivery of the valuable goods using their own or outside transport and at their own expense.

3.7. The Center, on the basis of the received order, draws up with the buyer a statement showing approval for the contractual price for the goods. After this, the buyer, on the basis of an authorization issued to him by the Center (when necessary approved by the appropriate supply body of the Ministry of Defense) obtains the right to inspect the goods at the troop unit.

3.8. The actions provided by Point 3.6. can be carried out by the Center's affiliates and agencies correspondingly in their own districts, if the prices agreed upon with the buyer are equal to or higher than the prices actually in effect in the Center. For this at least once a month, the affiliates (agencies) check the selling prices with the Center's Commercial Department.

3.9. After the documents have been delivered to the supply body for the sale of the goods, by an order of the unit commander, responsible officials are designated for ensuring the total safekeeping and completeness of the sold goods and they bear material liability for their safekeeping until received by the buyer.

3.10. Having received the agreement of the buyer after the inspection of the goods (or without inspection) for their purchase, the bookkeeping office of the Center, its affiliates and agencies, issues him a bill for paying for the goods. Upon the receipt of notification from the bank that the money has been received to pay for the goods, the bookkeeping office draws up for the buyer payment orders for receiving the goods in the unit and here the surplus value tax is shown in a separate line on the bill. Two orders are issued to the buyer in a printed envelope with the stamp of the Center (affiliate). These are received from the supply body and on the back the bookkeeping office of the Center (affiliate) puts the commercial price considering all the surcharges, and the entry is confirmed by the leader of the Center (affiliate) and the bookkeeper. Notes on the payment for the goods and the signature are affirmed by the seal of the Center (affiliate). The given order serves as the basis for the troop unit to issue the goods. The first copy of the order

remains with the troop unit while the second is dispatched by the unit to the supply body for recording the sale. The envelope can be opened only by the person which has been granted the right to issue the goods at the troop unit.

In addition, the buyer is personally handed an order drawn up by the bookkeeping office of the Center (affiliate) and this gives reference to the order of the supply body which serves as the basis for this. This order gives only the commercial price of the goods and the figured surcharges and in addition notes are made on the payment for the goods at the bookkeeping office of the Center and its affiliates. The troop unit makes a notation on the issuing of the goods. The given order belongs to the buyer and serves as receipt for the purchase of the goods.

3.11. The supply bodies should draw up orders for the sale of the goods through the Center for each type (sort) of good individually. In those instances when the order has been written out for a larger amount of goods than the batch which the purchaser takes, the basis for the troop unit to issue the goods is the order of the supply body for the entire batch of goods which the recipient produces and an order from the Center and its affiliates written out on the basis of a part of the goods. The troop unit dispatches one copy of the general order to the supply body after the buyers under the order of the Center have received the parts of the entire goods indicated in the general order of the supply body.

3.12. With the submission of valid claims by the buyer as to the quality and condition of the property and equipment which had previously been appraised and stored in the troops, the appropriate comments are entered on the order and a repair list is drawn up in three copies. This is the basis for their reappraisal in the supply body and for reviewing the question of holding the guilty parties materially liable according to the current legislation.

3.13. Each month the Center, proceeding from the actual commodity sales turnover, no later than the 15th of the next month transfers to state income the surplus value tax at the established rates and the remaining total is distributed in the following manner:

—ten percent remains at its [the Center's] disposal;

—ten percent each month or 80 percent quarterly is transferred to the special accounts of the Financial Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, where a fund is formed for the economic development of the troop units and for material incentives for the personnel, as well as a social protection fund for the servicemen. To the totals forwarded monthly, a list is appended indicating the names of the troop units, the numbers and dates of the orders, the bodies which issued them, the types of sold equipment (property), the selling price and the deposited total. With the presence of contests by the buyers, the appropriate notes are made in the list.

4. The procedure for distributing the funds received from the sale of the goods.

4.1. The money received as a result of the sale of the goods is distributed in the following manner:

—eighty percent to the Financial Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to the account of the servicemen social protection fund. The procedure for the spending of this fund is set by the Ukrainian minister of defense with the agreement of the Ukrainian Ministry of Finances and the Economy;

—ten percent at the disposal of the Center for use in accord with the Regulation on the Commercial Center under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense;

—ten percent to the Financial Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense or the district (if the sale has been by the Center's affiliates) for assignment to the supply bodies (2 percent) and the troop units (8 percent) which are the owners of the sold materiel. These funds are deposited with the troop units under form No 101 of the nonbudget funds. Up to 50 percent of this amount is used to pay bonuses to the servicemen, the workers and employees of the troop units who took an active part in selling the military-technical property and other valuable materials and the rest goes for administrative and housekeeping needs.

4.2. If goods have been acquired or turned over to the balance sheet of a self-supporting enterprise of the Ministry of Defense or have been produced from materials (allocations) of the Ministry of Defense, their sales are carried out only through the Center or with its approval. In this instance the Center deducts from the sales price the established amount of the surplus value tax as state income, with the remaining total distributed in the following manner:

—ten percent for its own running costs;

—the wholesale price of the sold products is returned to the enterprise;

—The remaining total in equal parts is transferred to the account of the servicemen social protection fund and to the enterprise which supplied the product.

5. In the event the Center concludes a contract for having the unit (facility, base or dump) carry out any work for outside organizations or private individuals, the contract is valid only after approval from the unit commander and the appropriate supply body (if this involves the use of fixed capital or military technical property).

6. Any facilities of the troop units are leased solely in an instance where this does not influence the carrying out of the tasks confronting the unit and does not violate the internal order and the schedule of the unit. Any facilities can be leased solely through the Center or its affiliates with the agreement of the unit commanders and for specific facilities after the approval of the appropriate

supply bodies. The Center gains the approval of the lease fee from the Directorate for Capital Construction and the Billeting of the Troops, while the lease conditions are set out in a contract by the Center or affiliate.

7. The income obtained as a result of the activities indicated in Points 5 and 6 is to be distributed in the procedure set forth in Point 4.1. of the current instructions.

8. In the troop units the sold military-technical property and other materiel are accounted for in a book which shows their name, the unit of measurement for quantity, the selling price, the number and date of the payment orders for issuance, the recipients with the giving of addresses as well as the date of issue. All valuable materials sold through the troop units are subject to reporting.

9. Each month the troop units submit to their proper superior bodies on the dates set by the superior command information of the volumes of sold military-technical property and other materiel.

10. Supervision over the correct setting of prices for the sold military-technical property and other valuable materials and the observance of the established procedure for the sale, distribution of income and the legality of the use of the money and materials are carried out in accord with the Regulation on Financial Control and the Regulation on Monitoring Economic Activity in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

#### **Military Pilots Propose Creation of Commercial Aviation Company**

92UM1363D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
28 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Major Ivan Bilinskiy, Odessa Military District, under the rubric "The People's Army": "'Freight Airlines of Ukraine' is Preparing for Start-Up—From Combat Flights to Commercial"]

[Text] *The bright July sun, moving up from beyond the horizon, quietly dissipated the pleasant morning cool. The military airfield, which had rested a little overnight, was preparing for the start of a conventional day. It was somehow reminiscent at those times of a concert hall before the start of a symphony. Muffled sounds coming from somewhere far away were akin to the somewhat mysterious tune of familiar musical instruments being tuned to the necessary key.*

*These early moments always brought great satisfaction to Major V. Vishnevskiy, helping him—a navigator 1st class—get attuned to the flight and think it through to the smallest details. And there were no instances where Vladimir Stepanovich erred in his calculations. He thus always acted precisely and cooling in the course of his flights.*



*Today, however, Major V. Vishnevskiy did not quite notice the charms of nature. Encountering his fellow servicemen, he exchanged a few words that had no meaning at all.*

Could it be otherwise? Undoubtedly not. The course of interests of Vladimir Stepanovich did not now correspond to the problems that are troubling his colleagues. Having served honestly and conscientiously for 19 years in military-transport aviation [VTA], he would soon become an officer in the reserves. Life's circumstances had shaped up in such a way that he, a military navigator, had to part with the profession that he had chosen, it seemed, for life.

There are many similar examples in the aviation unit where Major V. Vishnevskiy has served. Such experienced pilots as V. Osipov, V. Gryaznov, N. Kurganov, A. Kuzmin and many others are preparing to change the fields of their activity. Young officers losing hope are not far behind them. There are doubtless various reasons impelling them to this extreme step. But facts remain facts. People are leaving aviation.

This is unfortunately typical of many aviation units and formations in the armed forces of Ukraine. The forces and assets of the Air Forces, in accordance with a decision by the parliament and government of our state, are being brought to a level that will ensure the reliable defensive capability of Ukraine. The process that has affected the flight and technical personnel is thus an objective and legitimate one.

Well then, no one is arguing with that. But the entirely legitimate question arises, "What will Major V. Vishnevskiy and many others, who have been 'fans' of aviation since childhood and have devoted their entire conscious lives to it, do now?"

This undoubtedly touches on a broad spectrum of human and life problems. Let's talk, however, about the purely economic aspect of this difficult issue.

Every person who thinks even the slightest bit understands that certain efforts and funds have been expended to train any aviation specialist. To this must be added the wealth of practical experience accumulated over the period of service of the flight and technical personnel, which also has its own numerical expression. It is possible to state without exaggerating that a quite impressive figure is obtained, even for a state as developed in an economic regard as Ukraine. Are we really so rich that we can calmly "toss around" such a substantial and actually existing economic potential as is possessed by the flight and technical personnel that are subject to discharge into the reserves? Undoubtedly not. This squandering will bring irretrievable harm to our not-yet-strong Ukrainian statehood. An insistent search for ways of resolving this difficult task is thus underway in many military collectives.

Interesting experience that merits attention has been accumulated in the military-transport unit, where Military Pilot 1st Class Colonel E. Zaytsev serves. A group of officers being discharged into the reserves, including Eduard Alekseyevich, has carefully thought everything out and proposed the creation of a commercial aviation company on the basis of the units subject to cutbacks.

They proceeded in their calculations and conclusions from the fact that the skilled re-organization of VTA promises to have a palpable economic impact. A significant number of aircraft freed up from the military sphere will make it possible to raise the efficiency of freight traffic on the country's airlines, as well as successfully solve the problem of job placement for servicemen discharged into the reserves, in the shortest possible time and without excessive capital spending on the part of the state. The military pilots have substantiated their proposal with the necessary economic computations. They have thus found support at the Commercial Center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

"It was kind of tough for us in the preparatory stages," recalls Colonel E. Zaytsev. "Frankly speaking, we felt like first graders at the first classes of our lives. But we worked at grasping the rudiments of economic science with pleasure, training ourselves to think using the somewhat unfamiliar terms and concepts. But we slowly improved."

In confirmation of his own words he got out of his pocket ten sheets filled with tightly-spaced typewritten text and various graphs. A cursory glance was enough to become easily convinced that the officers have gotten thoroughly involved with this matter.

"We understood, however, that the company could not exist for long without appreciable material support. We thus had to seek out, as they say today, sponsors," continued Eduard Alekseyevich. "We had to prove, convince and urge over and over. The efforts we expended, however, had the desired result. Members of the Krivoy-Rog Executive Committee of the city council became our allies. Twenty-two enterprises of the city became founders of our aviation company—which is called Freight Airlines of Ukraine today—thanks to their help. The fund will number something on the order of a hundred million rubles by their decision. I would also like to note the support that was rendered by a group of deputies from the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine from the Krivbass. Close contacts with them allowed us to find mutual understanding at state institutions. The company thus obtained the commercial right to make flights abroad in the interests of Ukraine."

"Listening to you, I involuntarily thought that you were helped by some magic wand."

"Why?" asked Colonel E. Zaytsev, looking at me somewhat in surprise.

"You haven't uttered a word about the difficulties that you doubtless had to encounter."



Eduard Alekseyevich smiled enigmatically. "You can't take a step without them today, as they say. The basic problem was that not all leaders assess the usefulness of our company from the standpoint of its economic advantage. We thus had to display a great deal of diplomacy. It is, after all, always easier to gain enemies than to obtain solid allies," answered the officer candidly.

"The creation of our airline company and others like it will make it possible to reduce considerably the acuity of the problem of the air garrisons, since it will entail the investment of considerable funds—including hard currency—in the construction of housing and the development of the social and cultural infrastructure. A number of financial issues that have perplexed the aviation units and formations of the armed forces of Ukraine will be solved in the same way," continued Colonel E. Zaytsev. "Our calculations show that we are able to pay a certain portion of the expenses to maintain and service the aviation of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine."

The officer's stance, frankly speaking, seemed somewhat self-confident. I did not believe that the company being created was up to "pulling through" the solution of these issues. Picking up on my somewhat skeptical attitude, Eduard Alekseyevich showed me a sheet of paper with several columns of figures.

"This is a calculation of the financial activity of our company in the future. We composed it relying on foreign experience, carefully counting everything, naturally, in world prices. It confirms the fact that we will be able to achieve the projected target."

The officer's arguments were more than convincing. Continuing his idea, Colonel E. Zaytsev was speaking genuinely and interestedly. Confidence in the correctness of the path chosen was accentuated in his voice.

"The careful choice and placement of personnel is currently underway. We are also glad of the fact that people are coming to us with the desire to work," noted Eduard Alekseyevich with satisfaction. "And we will strive to help them to the extent of our capabilities. We are guided in our work by the principle of high professionalism. We are profoundly convinced that it will make it possible to provide for the clear-cut functioning of all of the subdivisions of the airline company under conditions of market relations."

The question of technical support for the aviation company is on the agenda today. That includes both the fleet of aircraft and the equipment necessary to support the flights. Three variations have been proposed to resolve this issue. The first is a lease of the necessary technical equipment from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the second its acquisition from the same agency, and the third—the most acceptable—is its uncompensated transfer. It is still too early to speak conclusively of the specific variation today, however, since there is no uniform opinion there.

The conversation with Eduard Alekseyevich lasted for quite a long time. We discussed many aspects of both the current and the future status of the Freight Airlines of Ukraine commercial company. Our opinions coincided on some things, and differed on others. We were allies on the main thing, however—such initiatives have a complete right to their existence. The proposed variation is doubtless not the sole prescription for treating the ailment that has stricken the VTA of the armed forces of Ukraine. Further practical activity will suggest other ways as well. But one thing is obvious—the work that is being done by Colonel E. Zaytsev and his colleagues will make it possible for Major V. Vishnevskiy and other officers being discharged into the reserves to gain confidence in tomorrow. Well then, we wish them success in their difficult commercial field.

#### **MD Conception of Duties of "Social-Psychological" Service in Armed Forces**

92UM1358B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in  
*Ukrainian* 29 Jul 92 p 3

[Unsigned introduction and article "Conception of the Social-Psychological Service of the Ukrainian Armed Forces"]

[Text] The level of reliability and effectiveness of ensuring the combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces of any state depends largely on the social-political and social-psychological atmosphere, the moral-psychological climate in the Army and the Navy, also the spiritual and psychological readiness of every serviceman to take up arms and defend his people, the freedom and independence of his country.

These propositions are of special urgency for the Armed Forces of a sovereign, independent Ukraine, which are being created under difficult political and social conditions by means of reforming the units and formations of the Army and Navy of the former Soviet Union which are stationed on Ukrainian territory.

The uniqueness of the conditions and means of building the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian state's efforts to have its own army, dictate the necessity of creating a fundamentally new structure within the Armed Forces, one which will provide regular social-psychological support for the vital activities and development of the troops, exert a humane and cultural-educative influence on troop collectives and on every serviceman in all stages of his service, foster national-cultural interests, meet and develop military servicemen's spiritual/intellectual needs, also those of workers and employees in all military formations, organizations, and establishments serving them.

This is the kind of structure that the Social-Psychological Service of the Ukrainian Armed Forces should become.

**THE PURPOSES OF THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICE**

The Social-Psychological Service (SPS) is a component part of the organs of military administration of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, whose activity is designed to ensure high combat and mobilization readiness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, to create a favorable moral-political and social-psychological climate in the Army and Navy, to shape and develop military servicemen's humane worldview, profound understanding of the laws governing the historical processes of the rise of the independent Ukrainian state, instill a feeling of love for Ukraine, its people, traditions, and sacred places, to inculcate the spiritual and psychological readiness to take up arms to defend the Fatherland, and stand guard over its independence and liberties, and to develop servicemen's personal qualities necessary for their military service and future successful activity in civilian society.

The SPS of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is departyized and is not a military political organ in the former CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] sense of that word—indeed, it is called upon to provide social-psychological support and constantly foster the departyization and depoliticization of the armed forces, in the sense that it shall be forbidden to convert it to a self-sufficient political force or to allow units of the Army or Navy to take part in any struggle for political power using violent methods; it is called upon to provide for non-violent solutions to problems which arise in troop collectives, foster non-violent social relations and non-repressive interaction among servicemen, utilizing appropriate active social-psychological training, role-playing drills and necessary organizational measures; it is called upon to overcome and then to prevent the revival of "dedovshchina" [bullying of recruits by senior servicemen] and other illegal relations and negative phenomena which the Ukrainian Armed Forces have inherited; to provide social-psychological support in the Armed Forces for high discipline and proper order, peace, understanding, concord, harmony, and comradesly, friendly relations among servicemen of all nations, nationalities, and ethnic groups, all faiths, churches, and religious groups and organizations, equal opportunities for their self-realization and meeting of their needs, fair treatment of them, the self-assertion and development of the characteristics of every serviceman and employee of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In its active efforts to fulfill the formulated purposes, the SPS of the Ukrainian Armed Forces proceeds on the basis that a person comprises that person's world and his activity, and universal human values are truly national while truly national values are universally human.

**DIRECTIONS OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICE**

The basic directions of the activity of the Social-Psychological Service of the Armed Forces shall be:

- to provide sociological support for the functioning and development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, to develop and constantly foster non-violent social relations among servicemen;
- to provide social-psychological support of the combat readiness and professional activities of servicemen and foster non-repressive interaction among them in all stages of their service;
- to provide humanistic training of the personnel, organize and provide for their leisure time, and carry out cultural-educative and spiritual/intellectual-educational work in the Army and Navy.

**TASKS OF THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICE**

The organizational structures of the various levels of the SPS service shall accomplish the following generalized tasks:

- to determine social problems arising objectively in the process of the building and development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as social contradictions among the different aspects of the life activities of military organization, society, and the Armed Forces, and work out social-psychological ways to resolve them;
- to plan and carry out military-sociological research, develop predictive models of the development of social processes in troop collectives, and provide social-psychological support for implementing them;
- to design and organize the implementation of goal-oriented integrated programs of the social development of the Armed Forces, a system for the planning and management of social processes and phenomena in the Army and Navy;
- to work on scientifically substantiated recommendations with regard to optimizing administrative decisions on all levels of the management of the Armed Forces, taking account of actual social-political, social-psychological, and inter-faith circumstances;
- to provide military-technical guidance to young people, shape and develop young men's motivational sphere, oriented toward training for the defense of the Ukrainian state and service in the Armed Forces, to create the necessary competition for candidates for schooling in the military training institutions of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry;
- to undertake professional psychological selection of draftees and candidates for obtaining various levels of military training, and servicemen of all categories, depending on their personal psychological qualities, the character of the service, and the characteristics of each military specialty;
- to take part in the manning of military subunits (crews, teams, platoons, headquarters departments and administrations, and so on), taking account of the technical skills and psychological and religious compatibility of the servicemen;
- to train and provide social-psychological support to shape and develop servicemen's professional qualities on all levels of instruction and stages of service;

- to determine optimal directions in the service activity of every serviceman depending on his psychological qualities, and take part in certifying military cadres;
- to study and correct the social-psychological climate in military subunits;
- to overcome the stereotypes of the ideological class struggle, which has proved to be the most lethal and ruinous in all the history of mankind and has shaped in society a repressive style in interaction and in dealing with problems;
- to work with personnel in regard to affirming the priority of highly moral, humane norms of behavior in relations among servicemen, especially between superiors and subordinates, between senior and junior personnel, complying strictly with the requirements of military statutes, directives, orders, and instructions;
- to foster the social-psychological adaptation of all categories of servicemen in accordance with their military technical skills, individual psychological-mental characteristics, and the conditions under which they serve;
- to provide methodological support to the psychological training of servicemen in all branches of the Armed Forces in order to ensure successful professional work during emergency conditions in peacetime and under combat conditions;
- to do work designed to improve the social-psychological competence of commanders (chiefs) and military instructors; to provide psychological aid to all categories of servicemen and protect their mental and social-psychological health;
- to exercise social-psychological tutelage [opika] over alternative service units;
- to provide social-psychological and ethical evaluation of drafts of legislative and normative acts for the Armed Forces;
- to shape servicemen's ability to resist any psychological and moral influence on the part of the enemy; to provide moral-psychological and spiritual/intellectual training and support to troops during times of combat and troop operations;
- to study the social-psychological, and religious situation among the troops (forces); to draw up recommendations with respect to psychological defense for commanders (chiefs) and staffs, taking account of the moral-psychological factor and the specific situation;
- to organize humanistic training for all categories of servicemen and provide program-methodological and psychological support for it;
- to shape and develop servicemen's universal human value orientations, national dignity and pride, cultured interethnic relations, patriotism, and readiness to defend the Ukrainian state and people;
- to create the necessary conditions to meet the religious needs of believers; to support peace and reconciliation efforts; and to carry out measures to restore calm;
- to instill legal consciousness in servicemen and inculcate personal qualities that are necessary for military service and further successful activity in civilian society;

- to explain to the personnel the conceptual postulates of the building of the Ukrainian Armed Forces with respect to the impermissibility of creating party structures in troop collectives or the participation by Army and Navy units in any struggle for political power using violent means;
- to study and satisfy the spiritual/intellectual needs of servicemen and members of their families; to supply the necessary conditions for the revival and growth of national self-awareness;
- to organize service personnel's leisure time and develop amateur artistic and creative activity for servicemen and members of their families;
- to take part in the development of new gear, symbols, and military rituals in the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
- to analyze and provide social-psychological evaluation of the conditions of service, daily life and leisure time of servicemen and prepare proposals on how to improve them;
- to carry out scientific research and draw up informational-methodological materials to ensure high effectiveness in the work of specialists of the social-psychological service;
- to collaborate with state organs of authority, creative, civil, and religious organizations, and the mass media on matters of the social development of the Armed Forces, the training of young people for service in them, and the psychological adaptation and social-legal protection of servicemen and members of their families.

#### GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICE

For purposes of accomplishing these tasks, basic and auxiliary structural units (elements) of the Social-Psychological Service are to be set up in all links of the administration of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in basic training institutions and training centers, and in military commissariats.

The following shall belong to the basic structural elements of the SPS:

The Social-Psychological Administration of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry;

The Social-Psychological Services of operational troop commands (forces), units, and formations (training centers);

SPS groups of units and subunits;

The SPS of the administration of military education and military training institutions;

The Social-Psychological Services of military commissariats of all levels.

The following shall belong to the supporting structural elements of the SPS (with a separate additional staff):

The Military Institute of Culture;

The Scientific-Research and Methodological Center of the SPS of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry;

Higher methodological courses of the SPS and the faculty of methodological training of SPS specialists;

Center of Culture, Education, and Leisure Time of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

Centers of culture and leisure time in units, formations, garrisons, and separate outfits;

Museums of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

The military band service;

The Song and Dance Ensemble of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

Unit song and dance ensembles;

The Central Library of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

Theaters of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

Editorial boards and publishing houses of newspapers and journals of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;

Military publishing houses;

Military printing plants;

Radio stations, television studios, radio studios, and movie studios;

The Center for Technical Equipment and Printing; warehouses and plants for cultural and educational goods; repair shops.

#### **ADMINISTRATION OF THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICE**

In its activities, the SPS is to adhere to the laws of Ukraine, normative acts of the Supreme Soviet, the President, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and orders and directives of the Ukrainian Minister of Defense.

The SPS of the Armed Forces is subordinate to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, while its subunits on various levels of military administration are subordinate to the corresponding commands, commanders, and chiefs.

Immediate and direct supervision of the SPS shall be exercised by the head of the SPS of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, who shall be directly subordinate to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense and shall be directly in charge of all personnel of the Armed Forces dealing with social-psychological work.

The organization of the work and monitoring of the activity of the SPS shall be the responsibility of the Social-Psychological administration of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

The heads of the SPS in all links of the administration of the Armed Forces up to the battalion (kurin) level and

subunits equivalent to it, inclusively, shall be deputy commanders (commanders, chiefs) involved in social-psychological work.

SPS methodologists and organizers working in companies (sotni) and subunits equivalent to them shall be chosen from the SPS group of the battalion and shall not be subordinate to the company commander in their service.

#### **TRAINING OF CADRES FOR THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICE**

The activity of the SPS of the Ukrainian Armed Forces shall be carried out by military specialists in the field of sociology, psychology, psychophysiology, jurisprudence, nationality problems, religion, culture, upbringing, and education, and also SPS methodologists and organizers consisting of officers who have a higher military education not lower than the third level, have proved their abilities in working with personnel, and who have received additional humanistic and social-psychological training.

The training of specialists for the SPS shall be provided in the appropriate higher educational institutions of Ukraine, higher military training institutions of the Ministry of Defense; and the upgrading of specialists' scientific-methodological level shall be provided in the Higher Methodological Courses of the SPS and in faculties of methodological training of specialists of the SPS.

SPS specialists shall be obliged to undergo retraining and upgrading of their specialist qualifications at least once every two or three years.

**General requirements on the training of specialists for the SPS of the Ukrainian Armed Forces shall be:**

- high competence in matters of the specific specialty;
- a thorough knowledge of the history of Ukraine and its Armed Forces, and the ideological, legal, and historical basis of the sovereignty and independence of the Ukrainian state;
- fluency in the Ukrainian and Russian languages.

The most important conditions for the high effectiveness of the SPS are:

- the social-psychological competence and humanistic education of everyone who takes part in the education and training of servicemen, their personal level of education, intelligence, humaneness and goodness, honesty and fairness;
- a deep understanding by SPS specialists, commanders (chiefs) and military instructors of the necessity of constant professional interaction within the unified system of troop education and training;
- personal example and model behavior on the part of SPS specialists in carrying out their military and professional duties.

#### **BRIEF NOTICE**

The ideas of the necessity of a special Social-Psychological Service both in society and in the Armed

Forces were argued for by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences and Docent V. S. Mulyava in February 1986, and were set forth conceptually on 14-15 February 1988 at a conference of heads of debate clubs. The question of such a service was raised at the First and Second Congresses of the Ukrainian People's Rukh [Movement], on 2-3 February 1991, at the scientific-practical conference "The Internal and External Security of Ukraine: A Conception of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Search for Ways To Revive Them," and at the First Congress of Ukrainian Officers in July 1991. V. S. Mulyava submitted a first draft of the Conception of the SPS of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the Ukrainian Defense Minister on 4 September 1991, the day after General K. P. Morozov was appointed Minister. The basic postulates of the draft were published in *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* on 11 October 1991, No 198.

A program of active social-psychological instruction, role-playing drill with non-repressive interaction, the search for optimal solutions to problems, and other practical documents of an SPS were tested jointly with Psychologist M. Ya. Horbovykh in 1987-1989.

In early January of 1992, Colonel V. S. Mulyava organized an initiative group on a voluntary basis to do further work on documents for an SPS, the nucleus of which consisted of scientists and staffers of the scientific-research laboratory of the Kiev Higher Military Communications Engineering School (Lt Col S.O. Borysov, head of the scientific-research laboratory; Colonel Yu. M. Dolenko, Medical Services Major V. I. Viter, and Major M. M. Malyovanny, researchers). Somewhat later, the membership of the initiative group came to include Psychologist M. Ya. Horbovykh, Captain Third Rank Ye. B. Hozdachenko, reserve officers I. M. Adamenko, Yu. O. Kryvoruchko, and M. M. Chevelcha, Lt Cols L. V. Snyehiryov, V. I. Ovchynnikov, V. I. Fedoryshkin, V. S. Kornilov, and other specialists of higher military schools and academies, the Psychology Institute, and higher educational institutions of Ukraine. By late January of 1992, the working materials of the Conception and General Structure of the SPS of the Ukrainian Armed Forces had been prepared, undergone preliminary appraisal, and had been discussed many times by scientists and military men. The materials were approved, yet a number of useful comments and proposals were made and the issue was debated. In addition, in order to perfect the Conception and General Structure of the SPS, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense ordered (No 5, dated 30 January 1992) the creation of a commission consisting of 18 members. Colonel V. S. Mulyava was appointed chairman; his deputy was Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel (Retired) Yu. M. Dolenko. The intellectual nucleus of the Commission consisted of philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, psychophysicists, specialists in military administration, specialists in Ukrainian history and Armed Forces, and culture and religion specialists. Providing the necessary conditions of the Commission was the constant job of Lt Col V. S. Servyn and Senior Lt A. Yu. Haysynskyy.

The Ukrainian Minister of Defense approved the Conception of the SPS on 5 March 1992, and the General Structure of the SPS on 22 April 1992. In accordance with it, the Administration of Mobilization and Manning of the Main Headquarters has been engaged in drawing up personnel staffs; after they are ready, the Social-Psychological Administration of the Ministry of Defense is to immediately and directly prepare the appointment of cadres on a competitive basis and form the structure of the Social-Psychological Service of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

#### **Deputy Defense Minister Blasts Kasatonov on Involvement in "Political Struggles"**

*92UM1340A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian 15 Jul 92 p 1*

[Interview with Lt Gen Ivan Bizhan, Ukrainian deputy minister of defense, by Lt Col Vasiliy Bilan, editor-in-chief of *NARODNAYA ARMIYA*: "It Is Impossible to Prohibit the Taking of an Oath to One's People by Any Orders and Moratoriums"]

[Text]

[Bilan] Ivan Vasilyevich, as before there is the acute situation on the Black Sea Fleet among the problems which you must encounter and resolve in organizing our own Armed Forces. And this in spite of the agreements reached in Dagomys. In your view who is to blame for the continuing tension over the Black Sea Fleet?

[Bizhan] On 23 June in Dagomys during the meetings of the Presidents of Ukraine and Russia on the Black Sea Fleet a political decision was taken: on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet the Ukrainian and Russian Navies were to be organized. In considering the arising situation, the parties also agreed to settle the question of the procedure for using the infrastructure, on logistic support, basing, that is, work out the corresponding individual agreements. Point 15 of the Agreement formulated an unique solution to the question of the oath: the Presidents agreed that wherever anyone served, each would take the oath of loyalty to the people of that state of which he is a citizen. In other words, the absurd question of oaths in the CIS was eliminated and so forth.

[Bilan] Thus, now it is already against the law to prohibit a serviceman from taking the oath to his motherland.

[Bizhan] Quite right. Moreover, this is a voluntary, strictly personal act of each person.

Immediately after the Dagomys talks, we worked out a whole series of draft documents on carrying out the adopted agreements on the Black Sea Fleet. The other side, as it was to turn out, was not in a rush to take such steps. From 2 through 4 July, prior to the conference in Moscow for the heads of CIS member states, upon orders from Col Gen Morozov, I participated in the defense ministers' meetings. And when I inquired among the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces, in particular,

the Chief of the General Staff, Col Gen Dybynin, how things were going in carrying out the political decision adopted in Dagomys, I did not notice any progress in their actions. Moreover, it was not hard to notice that many still had their former position as prior to Dagomys that Ukraine did not need a Navy.

Also about the oath. When, finally, this question was resolved, in certain formations and units of the Black Sea Fleet, the sailors themselves began to decide and take the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people. We received a whole series of telegrams with reports on this question with requests to incorporate one or another subunit in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Let me repeat: the men took this choice themselves.

But on behalf of the Black Sea Fleet Command, and particularly Adm Kasatonov, immediately a number of illegal actions was taken, relating primarily to those who took the Ukrainian oath: some were removed from position and others were submitted for discharge.... The admiral stubbornly resisted considering the new realities, as he did not carry out and would not endeavor to carry out the laws of the Ukraine on the territory of which he was serving. Moreover, in his almost daily protest telegrams which he sent to the Supreme Council, the State Commission on Talks Over the Black Sea Fleet and to the minister of defense, he went beyond any limits. For example, he did not hesitate to threaten that the Fleet would be brought to full combat readiness, and that the representatives of the Ukrainian Navy and Ministry of Defense in turning up at the dispositions of the Black Sea Fleet would be arrested. In one of his protests, he even went so far as to state that the Black Sea Fleet would be included in the preparations for a Crimea-wide referendum. All of this shows that the fleet commander had taken an active part in the political struggle which would be difficult to call any other way but anti-Ukrainian.

[Bilan] In my view, it is becoming an evermore apparent fact that Kasatonov with his team is forming an independent political force the actions of which could be unpredictable....

[Bizhan] What are his statements worth, for instance, the Agreement signed in Dagomys, in particular, Point 15 on the oath, as these are not the law for him. How can we understand the admiral? What can the law be for him, if the decision of his own President is not a law? The leaders of both states have determined that Ukraine will establish its own Navy, while Kasatonov continues to assert that the Black Sea Fleet has been, is and will be unified.

Considering this new situation, last week a decision was taken to hold a session of the state commission established by the Presidential Ukase on the talks on the Black Sea Fleet. We most carefully discussed the situation arising in the Black Sea Fleet, and drew up a whole series of corresponding instructions. In particular, a group was sent to Sevastopol from the delegation for carrying out

explanatory work and for monitoring the observance of the moratorium reached at the Odessa meeting. The chief of the Main Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, turned to the chief of the Main Staff of the Russian Armed Forces with a proposal to meet immediately on the expert level and begin the actual implementation of the Dagomys decisions.

[Bilan] Our correspondents have just arrived from the Black Sea Fleet and have reported on many infringed rights of the sailors. One point here is that the men are being dismissed, released from their positions, but how can we protect them, return them to service and so forth?

[Bizhan] You have asked a very serious question. In this context I would like to appeal through your newspaper to the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet with a request not to become alarmed, if someone has been dismissed or removed from his position for taking the oath to the Ukrainian people. You are all under the protection of the Ukrainian state. No one is to suffer, and we will allow no one to be insulted. You will all be returned to your positions with your military ranks. There should be no grounds for alarm.

[Bilan] The statement on the results of the session of the state commission mentioned that facts had been analyzed of numerous violations of the Ukrainian laws on the Black Sea Fleet. These included the shipping of weapons, equipment and ammunition outside our state, and attempts to man the fleet exclusively with Russian citizens.... Is it possible ultimately to put a reliable end to all these disorders?

[Bizhan] In fact, the information confirms the presence of such violations. It would be possible now to give many specific figures and addresses. As for the call-up, it is worth mentioning to those who take their own view of the solution to this important question that there is an Agreement signed within the CIS on manning the joint and strategic armed forces on the territories of the states in accord with the legislation of these states. For this reason, as concerns the Black Sea Fleet, there should not be any question here as the fleet should be manned only with Ukrainian citizens. Moreover, we have also found a solution to the problem of training the required specialists from outside the fleet, certainly, from Ukrainian citizens who after completing their studies have returned to the territory of their state. There would not be any problems. But the attempt to man the fleet by such thieving methods, through Novorossiysk, with the use of deceitful methods of delivering people to the Crimea causes in us not only confusion but also alarm. There were moments which could have led to rather serious incidents: when our border troops endeavored to stop the ships moving to our coast and to check what was being carried on one or another transport, often prerequisites were created for major conflict situations. Undoubtedly, the hope was being made of impunity. But I am certain that this is for the time being....

[Bilan] How would you generalize the contents of the appeals of the sailors and inhabitants of Crimea to the Ukrainian Supreme Council and Ministry of Defense? In them do they speak about the mood and morale of the men?

[Bizhan] There have been many such appeals. The men are indignant primarily over the fact that they are being forced, and let me emphasize, forced to take the oath to the CIS. For example, in one of the units such pressure was justified by the fact that there was supposedly no Ukrainian oath, and that it supposedly did not differ in any way from the CIS one. We are certain that the sailors correctly understand the situation and are waiting for the political decision to be embodied as quickly as possible in actual practical deeds. The men are tired of threats and pressure and of the encroachments on their civil rights. If a person has clearly decided what state he is a citizen of, in what Armed Forces he will serve and to what state he takes the oath, who can prevent him from doing this? This cannot be done by any orders!

[Bilan] In conclusion, Ivan Vasilyevich, a few words please on the results of your last foreign trips. In this context I would like to establish two important aspects: how do they relate there to the very fact of organizing Ukraine's own Armed Forces and how do they judge the accusations against Ukraine that it supposedly wants to become a nuclear state?

[Bizhan] A majority of my trips have been to the former Soviet republics. In Amsterdam, where I happened to visit recently, I participated in a scientific conference on "Europe and Nuclear Security." My paper dealt with the attitude of Ukraine to nuclear weapons and security questions. These questions were constantly raised during meetings with foreign delegations which have visited us and recently similar contacts were made with a group of the NATO leadership. Everywhere here we try to provide real, truthful information on the attitude of Ukraine to nuclear weapons generally and to the strategic nuclear forces located on its territory, in particular. And we have not encountered miscomprehension on their part. Certainly the position of our state remains unchanged: in the future, Ukraine will be nuclear-free. But for now the actual situation is that such weapons are located on Ukrainian territory and these cannot remain uncontrolled by Ukraine or be mechanically removed, for example, to Russia as a decision was taken to disassemble and destroy them. Ukraine must be involved in all of these most crucial processes.

Another problem. In visiting these units you often hear from the men: to whom do we belong, of what state are we citizens? Who will pay our pension and build housing?

Certainly is this not a real situation which requires specific decisions by us?

One other thing. Last year in Alma-Ata a decision was taken that the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed

Forces, Mar Avn Shaposhnikov, should within a one-month period provide a technical capability for the Presidents, including of Ukraine, to block the use of nuclear weapons from the territory of the states, including Ukraine.

A half year has already passed, but nothing has been done. In considering these realities, we are searching for constructive solutions. In the first place, to maintain unified control over the nuclear weapons, as was decided on 30 December in Minsk; that the Ukrainian President has an opportunity to block the use of these weapons from Ukrainian territory; to carry out the Protocol signed in Lisbon and which stated that Ukraine is an equal party to the Treaty on reducing nuclear weapons. Secondly, to determine the state legal status of the people serving in these forces on Ukrainian territory. For this reason, the draft agreement proposed by us on dividing the functions of operational and administrative command and control over the strategic nuclear forces on Ukrainian territory provides precisely for a solution to these problems. There is nothing prejudicial, let alone concealed in our proposals. This is understood even in the West.

But no, it has been proposed to us that within 12-18 months the warheads are to be removed from the carrier missiles and they should be withdrawn to Russian territory and then all the remaining problems will be solved. But even a nonspecialist would understand that if the warhead is removed from an ICBM, the missile becomes extremely dangerous. For this reason, there is one solution: if the warhead is removed, then the fate of the carrier missile filled with fuel that is extremely dangerous primarily in ecological terms should be decided. Another aspect: we have taken a decision not to remove but rather destroy the strategic nuclear weapons. Regardless of the complexity of the present situation, I am certain that we will find ways to resolve this problem as well.

[Bilan] Thank you for the informative replies.

#### **Ship Crew Relieved by Kasatonov Finds Place in Ukrainian Navy**

*92UM1340E Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
14 Jul 92 p 1*

[Article by Major V. Knysh, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent from Sevastopol: "How They Settled the Score With the 'Signalshchik'"]

[Text] One of the previous issues of the newspaper already announced the events which had happened on the sea-going minesweeper Signalshchik.

The fact of the existence of orders for the dismissal of WOs ("michman") Leonid Ryabovoy and Aleksey Nakalyuzhnyy from the fleet was completely confirmed. The personnel officers this time worked with enviable efficiency. They thoroughly "investigated" the commander



of the "rebel" minesweeper, Captain 3d Rank T. Suleymanov, and his deputy for personnel work, Captain Lieutenant V. Leshchenko.

At 1000 hours of the following day, both officers were escorted by the Brigade Commander, V. Tsaplin, to the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet for an emergency session of the military council. In the words of Vladimir Leshchenko, he had never seen such a gathering of "angry admirals." Joining the conversation was the Brigade Commander, Captain 2d Rank Tsaplin. He complained that at the moment when he was trying to lower the Ukrainian state flag from the halyard of the minesweeper, the boatswain WO Nakalyuzhnyy supposedly dislocated his arm. Here Tsaplin, obviously forgetting himself, gesticulated with absolute freedom with his "dislocated" arm. This information, incidentally, was of little interest to the attending admirals.

Later there was a short break. The officers heard from their superiors numerous expressions which were far from dignifying the uniform and the occasion. Then the decision of the fleet military council was released to them. For violation of subordination procedures (read, for taking the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people and the hoisting of the state flag) so-and-so and so-and-so were to be removed from their position and within two hours should quit the brigade's position, carrying orders for assignment to the divisional commander of the Crimean Navy Base (that is, in exile outside of Sevastopol so as not to "muddy the waters"). The arrival hour was 2400 hours of the same day. Admiral I. Kasatonov also signed the orders for the discharge of Captain 3d Rank T. Suleymanov and Captain Lieutenant V. Leshchenko from their position with subsequent discharge into the reserves. In this manner the CIS admirals (as they considered themselves) dealt with the naval officers who were citizens of Ukraine.

There is a different situation in the operations group of the Ukrainian Navy. Of course, the conditions are much more spartan but that is not the issue. Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin has repeatedly listened to similar stories by officers, warrant officers and petty officers who in an instant were turned from good and promising into persecuted and out of favor. A kind word was found for each. But there was not a single instance when anyone came to their aid. Of course, it would be hard to leave the men in their former positions, and so they were, to put it simply, gotten out of sight and moved farther from the sailors so that the "contagion" not spread.

The officers and warrant officers from the seagoing minesweeper *Signalshchik*, according to the orders of the Ukrainian minister of defense, are continuing to serve in the Ukrainian Navy. They are needed here. As for the sailors who took the oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people, the brigade command permitted the crew to disband. Incidentally, a similar plight befell the first mate of the minesweeper, Sr Lieutenant A. Kovalenko, who had maintained neutrality. The accusations against him

were that he did not report promptly on the preparations for taking the oath and did not oppose this.

In conclusion, we have already announced that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense stood up for the victimized sailors. By an order of the minister of defense, the *Signalshchik*, was registered as part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the servicemen themselves will be restored to service.

### Sub Commander Takes Loyalty Oath, Raises Nationality Question

92UM1410C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
1 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondent Vladimir Voronkov: "I Will Yet Return to the Submarine..."]

[Text] Never in his life did Valeriy either think or guess that fate would give him a surprise, make a sharp turn and separate him from the sea at some time. Separate him from his customary, modest navy lifestyle, from his close circle of friends, from that atmosphere which literally saturated him and which he breathed and lived. The sailors sympathetically perceived the officer's internal tribulations and responded to him with reciprocity. Maybe that is why he never had misunderstandings and all the more so conflicts in his relations with them. Understanding came through joint, at times grueling, work and through collectively overcoming all-possible brain-twisters while solving various tactical missions at sea.

Mutual understanding was always found, even in those short-lived minutes of an unusual situation when each person's nerves were strained, just like a string, and one senseless action or offensive, insulting rebuke could have reduced everyone's efforts to naught.

Captain 3rd Rank Valeriy Petrenko did not deviate from that principle. Along with Submarine Commander Captain 2nd Rank Aleksandr Romanov.

"He and I lived in perfect harmony," Valeriy would say later. "We didn't have any secrets from each other, all the more so any sort of offstage topics of conversation. We didn't conceal anything, everything was in that same vein. Therefore, it's obvious that the understanding was mutual: from a half-word, from a half-hint."

On the other hand, Petrenko never crossed the border in mutual relations. He realized perfectly: Romanov was the commander, and he was his assistant for personnel. Together they constituted that most durable monolith which permitted them to "breach" the wall of indifference and to instill optimism and faith in their commanders in their subordinates. Based on the results of their service and sailor's life, people became convinced: the commander and his assistant were decent, kind-hearted people who would never offend you. For them, officer's honor was above everything else. And they



trusted them completely and they entrusted their fates and lots to them without a trace of doubt.

Although it was difficult at times, the submarine crew was always distinguished by some sort of internal ease and self-discipline and a comprehension of everything they did. The submarine gained momentum not in days but in hours. Either during an exercise or when putting out to sea on a mission, there was the high intensity and flattering responses of the leadership. They began to talk about the submarine crew's successes in the Black Sea Fleet. When Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin arrived in January 1991 and expressed a desire to visit one of the ships, the command authorities, without deliberating, proposed to him that he visit the leading submarine, become acquainted with the crew, and see, as they say, the duty and lifestyle of military sailors from within.

"After inspecting the submarine, we invited Vitold Pavlovich to the wardroom," Valeriy Nikolayevich recalled with cordial notes in his voice. "A very warm, cordial conversation. The prime minister was quite touched by our naval hospitality."

The submarine's glory continued to resound. None, even the most faultfinding-strict commissions, could have doubted the high professionalism of the people or the healthy moral atmosphere in the crew. After one such review at the beginning of this year, Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Igor Kasatonov noted at a meeting with personnel that at that moment the submarine was one of the best ships in the Black Sea Fleet.

The crew was flattered by such a high assessment and by such attention to itself.

The successes did not cool off the people. They were that stimulating impulse that does not permit you to have a fair opinion of yourself or to become proud of yourself. Yes, and the very atmosphere of high mutual exactingness that had developed in the collective served as a reliable foundation for progress and improvement. Everything was going like it would never be better. And suddenly, just like thunder in a clear sky—there was a mutiny on the ship. A schism! Captain 3rd Rank Petrenko and his like thinkers took the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. The reaction of the Black Sea Fleet command authority was unambiguous and quite drastic: They do not take two oaths in the fleet. They tasked Brigade Commander Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Kostkin to deal with the "mutineers". He did not stand on ceremony, he formed up the "oath takers" and began working them over.

"Just how didn't they insult me!", recalled Valeriy Nikolayevich, breathing heavily. "In a word, I had to survive."

Captain 1st Rank Kostkin raised the ethnic issue which no one had previously fanned under any conditions. The crew had never thought about that. The people valued and respected each other not according to ethnic origin

but for human and professional qualities. And now the brigade commander was especially focusing attention on that factor. When the line reached Senior Lieutenant Igor Barinov, Captain 1st Rank Kostkin exhaled and it was as if he shot him at pointblank range:

"Who are you by nationality?"

"Russian."

"Russian?", the brigade commander venomously asked again. And scathingly, he whipped him as if with a lash: "What kind of Russian can you be after this, if you have betrayed your oath for a bit of lard?"

"I did not betray, comrade captain 1st rank. I took the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine based on my deep conviction..."

With Captain-Lieutenant Oleg Kligman he did not become interested in nationality. Obviously, he guessed. He conducted the conversation without prefaces.

"Oleg Mikhaylovich, if we can somehow yet understand Petrenko's actions, since he is a nationalist, so how could you—a Jew—resort to this traitorous step?"

"I request, comrade captain 1st rank, that you do not touch upon my nationality. It has nothing to do with this. I think that I acted according to conscience. I was born and raised on Crimean soil and it, as you know, is an integral part of Ukraine."

That is how the officers maintained themselves with dignity and did not submit to the brigade commander's provocative actions. It is interesting to know how Captain 1st Rank Kostkin himself would have reacted to this type of accusation if it had been directed at him? All the more so in this insulting form... He certainly would have been agitated, he would have become angry, and he would have begun to complain, he would have gone to the leadership. The officers whom the brigade commander had so cruelly "exposed", do not intend to complain to anyone, they are simply confident in the correctness and unselfishness of their deed. And they are also convinced that the Ukrainian Navy needs them and they will totally serve it. Although they are not living easily right now. Judge for yourselves. Senior Lieutenant Barinov has been assigned to a position that has been reduced, Captain-Lieutenant Kligman has been excluded from the list of candidates who are entering the Naval Academy, and they have refused to award the next higher rank to Lieutenant Viktor Litvinov. These are the strict sanctions that they have applied.

They have written off Valeriy Petrenko from the submarine. Now he is serving in the Ukrainian Navy. For now he is assigned to the organizational team of the sociopsychological service and he conducts a circle on the study of the Ukrainian language. The officer is convinced that this is a temporary post and he will very soon be involved with the profession that is inherent to him.

"I will yet return to the submarine," Valeriy told me with total confidence when we said goodbye. "I will yet serve the Ukrainian Navy."

### **Co-Chairman of Union for "Social Protection of Servicemen" on Group's Program**

92UM1410B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
6 Aug 92 p 1

[Interview with "Sozidatel" Union Co-Chairman Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Sergeyevich Lartsev by an unidentified NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent, under the rubric: "Ukrainian Armed Forces Structural Development: The Social Aspect": "There is Cause for Alarm"]

[Text] A republic scientific-practical conference "Social Problems of Servicemen and Political Stability in Ukraine During the Transition Period to Market Relations" will be conducted by "Sozidatel", the Union for Social Protection of Servicemen, Retirees and Their Family Members, on 19-20 September in Kiev.

Our correspondent met with "Sozidatel" Union Co-Chairman Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Sergeyevich Lartsev and asked him to talk in more detail about the planned measure.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] What goals have the organizers of this scientific-practical conference set for themselves?

[Lartsev] The forum's goal is an analysis of the effectiveness of the force of our state's military legislation in relation to how it affects the social protection of servicemen. It is no secret for anyone that they are, in general, good laws and that they have moved far ahead in many parameters as compared to the laws of the former USSR, but that they are not always being completely realized in practice as a result of political, economic, and other causes. But that gap between theory and reality is capable of worsening the already significant tension in our society.

We see the primary task of the measure being conducted to expose the mechanism of existing problems, to summarize the experience accumulated in that direction, and to work out a program of needed measures to reduce the growing social and political tension among servicemen.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Who will be invited to participate in the work of the scientific-practical conference?

[Lartsev] The list of people who have been invited is quite broad. Representatives of the majority of Ukraine's political parties and movements, military social organizations, the Ministry of Defense, and Ukrainian people's deputies will be invited to participate in the conference's work. We are certain that members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense and State Security Issues and the Committee for Social

Protection of Servicemen Issues under the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers will very actively participate in the discussion of problems.

Furthermore, we anticipate the arrival of guests from near and far. The Conference Preparation Organizing Committee has sent invitations to the European Organization of Military Unions (YeOVS) and to the Union of Bundeswehr Servicemen. Members of the Russian Federation Servicemen's Trade Union and the Belarus Officers Union will be among the conference participants.

We would like to believe that the extremely representative composition of conference participants will permit us to study the experience of social protection of servicemen of other countries and to establish contact between various social organizations and to plan ways to resolve difficult social issues through our joint efforts.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Who will finance this, we need to assume, quite expensive measure?

[Lartsev] Our Union "Sozidatel" will bear all expenses for conducting the conference and payment of temporary duty, trip, hotel, and many other expenses.

I want to direct attention to the fact that the conduct of these measures is hardly the only measure toward which our union's resources are being expended. During the little over a year that has passed since its formation, we have managed to organize work on the social adaptation of servicemen who have been released into the reserve. From December 1991 until the present time, "Sozidatel" has retrained 385 officers and warrant officers who have been released according to the reductions based on educational structures at the Kiev School for Managers.

Two hundred ten officers, warrant officers, Armed Forces veterans and their family members have been taught at free-of-charge Ukrainian language courses using our union's fund.

As of today, contracts have been concluded to train another 1,000 servicemen in management specialties.

Significant sums have been spent on organizing the operation of an information telephone to collect data on subleasing housing. More than R20,000 have been spent on advertisements alone.

### **The Program of the Scientific-Practical Conference "Social Problems of Servicemen and Political Stability in Ukraine During the Transition Period to Market Relations"**

Report: "Lack of Social Protection of Servicemen as One of the Factors That Is Increasing Political Instability in Society".

Co-report: "The Resolution of Social Problems of Servicemen Is an Important Condition for the Structural Development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces".

**Speeches:**

**1. Ukrainian military law and the real practice of social protection of servicemen:**

- the degree of conformity of Ukrainian military law with international legal standards;
- the causes of the low effectiveness of a number of provisions of military law; and,
- the role of social organizations in defending servicemen's interests.

**2. The experience of the Western and Eastern European countries' servicemen's social organizations in the resolution of social problems.**

**3. Ways to resolve the housing problem:**

- the activities of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to provide housing to officers and warrant officers;
- the role of social organizations in the solution of the housing issue;
- the place of commercial structure in providing housing to servicemen; and,
- the degree of conformity of Ukrainian Ministry of Defense plans and the state's economic capabilities.

**4. Social aspects of Ukrainian Armed Forces structural development:**

- the problem of Ukrainian citizens, who are performing service outside its borders, returning to the Homeland;
- material support of servicemen;
- social problems of Armed Forces veterans;
- protection of health of servicemen and their family members;
- social adaptation of servicemen released into the reserve;
- the experience of utilizing the professional potential of officers and warrant officers who have been released into the reserve in market structures;
- protection of the interests of family members of deceased servicemen; and,
- problems of social rehabilitation of soldiers-internationalists and participants in the elimination of the aftereffects of the Chernobyl accident.

**5. Ways of humanizing social relations in the army:**

- democratization of relations in the Ukrainian Armed Forces as a factor to increase their combat capability;
- primary directions to harmonize mutual relations of commanders and subordinates; and,

—specific features of social problems of compulsory service military personnel and ways to resolve them.

If desired, other initiative speeches are possible within the framework of the conference. Conference materials will be published in a special collection.

**Conference location—Kiev Garrison Officers' Club (may be changed). Organizations or individuals who desire to participate in the conference can send their requests to the following address: 2 Sofiyevskiy Street, Kiev, 252001, telephone: 228-16-09; 228-66-19.**

**Reforms in Military Schools Viewed**

92UM1410A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
6 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by VIKa-Ukrinform Correspondents Yevgeniy Rudenko and Gennadiy Shkadin: "A Military School on the Path of Reform"]

[Text] The first steps have been made toward the realization of the new military education concept in Ukraine. Republic Ministry of Defense Military Education Directorate Chief Major-General Yuriy Prokofyev stated that in a conversation with VIKa-Ukrinform correspondents.

Nine higher military educational institutions with their own status will be opening already in the near future, he said. In the capital, the Military Institute for Command and Control and Communications, which will combine the higher military schools for PVO [Air Defense] and communications, and also the Military Institute for Aviation will operate, besides the recently created Kiev Military Institute for Ground Forces. The Military Institute for Aviation is being created based on the Kiev Aviation Engineering and Vasilkovskiy Aviation Technical schools and will train all engineer-technician personnel for the Ukrainian Air Force. The Military Institute for Ground Forces is being formed in Odessa and the Military University and Institute for Air Force Pilots is being created in Kharkov. The facilities have been created for the Ukrainian Armed Forces Academy and the Military Humanitarian Institute [VGI] in Kiev.

They intend to open departments to train psychologists, sociologists, teachers, and heads of the military education system at the VGI. Course length is one year. Here they will accept only officers with a higher education. One more military institute with a humanitarian orientation will begin to function in Lvov next year. A block of departments of the city's leading VUZs [higher educational institutions] will enter the military department of Lvov State Institute, Polytechnical Institute, and Conservatory. A similar military department is already operating under Kiev State University.

Students who have completed the first year of civilian institutions may enter the military departments. After the first year of study, they will undergo a repeat professional selection board and then they will be able to sign a contract. It will constitute four years of cadre service as

an officer in leading posts and 10 years service in the reserve for the students; it will constitute 5-10 years of cadre service for military educational institution cadets.

Besides higher military educational institutions, Major-General Prokofyev noted that a network of initial military schools will be created in Ukraine. The First Ukrainian Military Lycée imeni Heroes of Krut, at which instruction will be conducted in the native language, will open on 1 September in Lvov based on a specialized boarding school. They plan to open two more lycées next year: in Kiev—in place of the Suvorov School and at Krivoy Rog—based on a specialized boarding school. In the future, they plan to create lycées at Sumy, Kharkov, Chernigov, and in other cities. Studies at them are calculated at three years with an orientation on in-depth physics-mathematics courses and physical education. The lycées will have various profiles and will prepare young men for flying, air defense, motorized rifle, tank, and border higher educational institutions.

Beginning in September, stressed the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Military Education Directorate Chief, departments of Ukrainian specialists [ukrainistiki] will be introduced at all Ukrainian military VUZs. They will assist future officers in the study of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture and history.

#### **Aviation Garrison Commander Accused of Corruption**

92UM1409A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
12 Aug 92 pp 1,3

[Ukrainian Officers Union Starokonstantinovskiy Aviation Garrison Appeal signed by SOU Leading Organization Chairman Lieutenant Colonel O. Guk, 26 July 1992, under the rubric "Society Sounds the Alarm": "Six SU-24's From Our Garrison Could Not Take Off..." To Ukrainian President and Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief L. Kravchuk, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman V. Durdinets, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K. Morozov, Ukrainian Officers Union Chairman Colonel of Militia G. Omelchenko, and *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* Editor-in-Chief Lieutenant Colonel V. Bilan"]

[Text]

#### **To Our Readers**

Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov's appeal to servicemen and society to report through our newspaper on specific cases of abuse of official position was published in the 125th issue of *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* for 10 June 1992. Since that time a whole series of messages have arrived from various regions of Ukraine addressed to the editorial staff. Some of them have been published and the rest have been sent to the competent organs for verification and to take steps. Correspondents are also driving out to these locations.

You can become acquainted with the results of their verification in the articles under the rubric "Society Sounds the Alarm".

At the same time, we have received a series of letter and telephone signals without signatures—from Kiev, Chernovtsy, Odessa, and Dnepropetrovsk oblasts... This impedes and sometimes totally excludes the possibility of verifying the facts. The sources of some information or other are not always indicated which places the reliability of reported abuses in doubt. We request that our remarks be taken into account.

A man, who has noted and who has firmly decided to root out scandal, is not afraid of anything!

We appeal to you, the Ukrainian Officers' Union [SOU] Starokonstantinovskiy Rayon members. Pain and alarm about the fate of the building of state independence and the independence of our native Ukraine that is impossible without the presence of a highly trained army that is devoted to the people of Ukraine has forced us to do this.

An analysis of the state of affairs at Starokonstantinovskiy Garrison provides all of the grounds for this alarm and requires the adoption of urgent steps to improve the moral-psychological atmosphere based on eradicating cases of abuse of official position by the command authorities of the garrison and individual military units.

We think that it is no accident that it is from Starokonstantinovskiy Aviation Garrison that six SU-24 aircraft were hijacked to another state and that the unit Colors were stolen. This is a shame for any state and the guilty parties must be held accountable in accordance with military regulations. But none of the garrison's leading officials have been held accountable.

Division Commander Major-General of Aviation A. Perevalov and Chief of Staff Colonel Kortsov purposefully conduct work to worsen mutual relations in military collectives and use this while resolving their own personal problems.

Knowing of cases of abuse and seeing the impunity, servicemen and their family members are losing faith in the law and justice and they do not believe that Ukraine will build its own Armed Forces with these leaders.

It has been reliably established that Major-General Perevalov was involved in the illegal transport of foodstuffs and other cargoes beyond the borders of Ukraine using military transport aircraft [VTA] for the Air Force leadership's personal money making purposes.

So, on 21 April 1992, the Ukrainian Air Force command authorities gave their authorization for an AN-12, side number 18, military transport aircraft sortie along the route Vinnitsa—Chertkov—Mirgorod—Novosibirsk—Irkutsk—Komsomolsk-na-Amur. The aircraft commander was Captain O.A. Ageyev (military unit 45076). On board were: General A.A. Perevalov, Colonel A.

Lagutkin, Deputy Commander for Combat Unit 42039 for IAS [Engineer Aviation Service] Pavlishin (designated as senior on the aircraft); Captain V. Shutov, Colonel Yuzenko, and Novosibirsk Aircraft Plant Representative B.B. Podvalnyy.

At Chertkov and Vinnitsa airfields, the aircraft was loaded with sugar, butter, and vegetable oil, vodka, margarine, two VAZ-2109 automobiles (Colonel Lagutkin's) and a Moskvich (Captain Shutov's) under the cover of aircraft equipment.

At Mirgorod airfield, General Perevalov attempted to prevent Colonel Alekseyev and an SBU [Ukrainian Security Service] representative from inspecting the aircraft.

After General Perevalov's telephone call to Vinnitsa, the aircraft flew there. An inspection was conducted at Vinnitsa with the grossest violations and authorization was given to continue the flight.

On 28 April 1992, at Dzemgi Airfield (Komsomolsk-na-Amur), the aircraft was loaded with 36 1-tonne boxes (listed as General Perevalov's personal effects) and two Toyota automobiles. At the present time, these automobiles belong to General Perevalov and Colonel Kortsov.

The act of investigation on this case is attached and the case has been turned over to the procurator but we do not have any confidence in the objectivity of the investigation.

The use of VTA aircraft was also previously conducted with the grossest violations. On 12 July 1991, "Sovintekh" KRO [not further identified] Concern paid military unit 65211 45,300 rubles to lease a transport aircraft to transport cargoes to Kamchatka Peninsula. Payment was conducted by limited check book. The source documents for the payment are missing just like other documents. A similar case was on 8 October 1991, just for the sum of R19,000 from Kmelnitskiy's "Posrednik" Commercial Enterprise. Military unit 19074 Commander Major-General of Aviation Perevalov concluded a contract with Glavbolgarstroy firm to transport cargoes and people to the city of Machulishche on board an AN-26 without payment for the transport movement. The sum of R60,000 was taken based on Perevalov's personal order. The legality of carrying out transport movements through other scheduled flights also require verification and legitimacy.

Construction of Major-General Perevalov's personal dacha is also being conducted with the use of military unit materials, equipment and personnel. As a result of the verification of commission 5 BA on this case, it has been established that there are documents on only one third of the construction materials, but those for the performance of the work are absent.

Construction of a home for General Perevalov was conducted surreptitiously but after this fact was revealed, construction was halted and General Perevalov's involvement, as we would have expected, has

been denied. The fact of the reformulation of a four-room apartment for his daughter to obtain housing at the city being constructed is also being denied. These facts require verification by the empowered commission because all preceding commissions have mainly operated ineffectively which provided General Perevalov the opportunity to cover his tracks.

With General Perevalov's personal authorization, the illegal privatization of apartments by servicemen who have not taken the oath and are departing for CIS states (Servicemen Ozhelyan, Shabalik, Chernodyrov, and others) is occurring at the garrison.

The cadre policy is being conducted to appoint officers to posts who are personally pleasing. So, General Perevalov has proposed and defended the candidacy of Major Ye.M. Murygin to the post of chief of the socio-psychological service department. He did not pay attention to SOU's recommendations. And the decision to place Major Murygin on pension was made only after the theft of a gold ring from Lieutenant Lazorenko. That is one of the incidents.

Personal Messenger and KES [Housing Operation Service] Chief Warrant Officer M. Bondar has been sent to Germany for further performance of duty as a CIS serviceman, which is illegal.

Not being a professional hunter, General Perevalov acquired rifled weapons and an SKS [Simonov self-loading] carbine for R63.

All of the financial transactions in violation of a Ministry of Defense order are being conducted through the financial unit not of the aviation-technical facility but of the division's separate communications battalion which permits them to be carried out in an uncontrolled manner.

Division Chief of Staff Colonel Kortsov also participated in cases of the illegal use of VTA aircraft. As it was indicated above, one of the Toyota automobiles belongs to him.

Construction of the personal dacha is also being conducted with the grossest violations of laws. So, Colonel Kortsov paid the military unit only R1,239 for 17 DS-4 blocks and three PK 60 X 115 stoves, although retail prices are significantly higher.

As a result, a material loss in the amount of R21,008 has been inflicted.

Cases of drunkenness and debauchery confirm Officer Kortsov's immoral conduct in his everyday life. On 14 April 1990 at 24:00 hours, he, in a drunken state, knocked Private Gromovich off his feet and kicked him for a prolonged period of time at the flying personnel clinic. In the morning, he demanded that the witnesses testify that Private Gromovich was drunk. Then they hushed up this matter and he received the rank of colonel and a higher post. Colonels Grushak and Alekseyev are familiar with this matter.

At that same clinic, Colonel Kortsov, in a drunken state, offered a bottle of alcohol and a young girl to Private A. Zaytsev so that the soldier would be silent and wouldn't talk to anyone about his drunken orgies.

Kortsov humiliated and insulted Lieutenant Galkin while drunk at that same location. In the presence of a company of drunkards which included an adolescent girl, the lieutenant was ordered to stand facing the wall so that he wouldn't see the scandals being created by Kortsov.

This is far from the entire list of actions that are incompatible with the rank of a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer.

In violation of the Ministry of Defense order of 1991 "On Prohibiting Commercial Activities at Military Units", personnel from military units 65211 and 77064 sold equipment at reduced prices without the authorization of the supply services and without the price list numbers or orders from the supply organs on selling prices. So, on 29 January 1992, Captain Viktorenko paid R181 for a small boat. Military Unit 77064 Commander Colonel Smirnov approved the assessment certificate. The financial service chief's signature is invalid because Major Volostikov (NFS) [not further identified] has already given up the case and the post. On 29 January 1992, according to receipt No 7/12, Lieutenant Colonel Koptev paid R114 for a small boat. According to receipt No 7/5 dated 28 January 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Pechkurov paid R218 for a small boat. NFS refused to sign an assessment certificate because everything had been processed in obvious violation of the laws. Colonel Smirnov confirmed to the members of a commission the fact of the shipment of 10 small boats to the Air Force leadership at Vinnitsa on an AN-12 aircraft, although he had initially refused.

Aviation-Technical Facility Commander (military unit 65211) Lieutenant Colonel Kushneruk compiled contracts with various civilian organizations with large violations.

An additional investigation is required on the case of violations of the law during construction and turn over of modules for housing for servicemen who have been withdrawn from the WGF [Western Group of Forces]. They have been looted to the extent that they have still not been accepted and the families have already been living for a year and are paying money. General Perevalov and the Air Force command authorities have "hushed up" this matter.

Garrison command authorities also permitted the grossest violations of the law when the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine was taken. Many servicemen took the oath in a solemn atmosphere on 21 May 1992 only after SOU's intervention. Prior to that, since January, they just signed their names to the oath, and didn't even read it, at front-line units. And an Officers' Assembly Council was urgently elected at military unit 77064, at the aviation regiment (Commander Colonel

Smirnov) to oppose the SOU. At that same unit, until 16 July 1992, none of the newly arrived personnel have taken the oath. And once again at SOU's insistence (since 29 servicemen had only signed and 45 officers hadn't even done that) the oath was taken in a solemn atmosphere. The question did not arise for the unit commander that officers were permitted to fulfill their official duties and to fly without the oath. The grossest deviations from cadre policy, the work of the housing commissions, and abuse while allocating shortage goods are occurring there.

So, Captain Kovalev was submitted for and appointed to a higher post, while having three reprimands that had not been removed and having been deprived of his right to drive an automobile on 28 February 1992 for driving an automobile in a drunken state.

After the initiation of aggressive activities by the SOU rayon organization to ascertain cases of abuses by the garrison leadership, Major-General Perevalov set out on the path of discrediting the SOU leaders. A policy is being conducted that nationalists-chauvinists, failures and the oppressed, who are attempting to remove Russians from leading posts, have assembled in the SOU.

Specifically, Colonel Smirnov has stated that General Perevalov issued an order to create SOU organizations at a military unit.

Colonel Kortsov stated the need to "close the mouth" of one of the SOU rayon ispolkom [executive committee] members, chairman of military unit 77064's SOU leading organization.

According to Colonel Smirnov's personal statement, they propose placing "their own" people in SOU for the goal of removing from the leadership aggressive servicemen who are devoted to Ukraine in the future.

\* \* \*

This situation can no longer be tolerated. Garrison personnel believe that the Ukrainian Armed Forces must be created using clean hands.

We need to urgently create an independent Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Financial Commission, possibly with the involvement of the deputy corps, for a complete investigation of all violations of the law at Starokonstantinovskiy Aviation Garrison.

While considering the negative experience of the work of preceding commissions, we request that steps be efficiently conducted, without providing the opportunity to cover tracks because a precise link with the local authorities is also being traced.

[Signed] Lieutenant Colonel O. Guk  
26 July 1992

Authorized by the Starokonstantinovskiy Rayon SOU Executive Committee, Ispolkom Member, SOU Leading Organization Chairman Military Unit 77064

### Drafts of Law on Civil Defense Viewed

92UM1409B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
12 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Civil Defense SRSU [not further identified] "Kievlift-3" Chief of Staff Vladimir Dyachenko: "Civil Defense of Ukraine: What Will It Be Like?"]

[Text] A draft Law on Ukrainian Civil Defense is being prepared for the next Supreme Soviet session. It is very important that its discussion be under society's rapt attention. The ingrained stereotype of the secondary importance of the problems of public protection may play a fatal role in the future of the Ukrainian people.

#### Three views exist on the state public safety system:

1. The leaders of organizations, production, and agriculture, while recognizing that a significant portion of the responsibility for the state of the environment and the health of the population will be assigned to them by the law, are attempting to limit the role of the public safety system and to maintain a position of secondary importance for protective measures with regard to economic activity. If this opposition is not overcome, we will not manage to stop the ecological crisis.

The draft concept of the Law on Civil Defense that has been submitted to the Supreme Soviet leaves open the issue on preventing the harmful impact of the environment on man. This means that the state knowingly rejects the systems approach to the solution of society's most complex and painful problems.

International experience indicates that the creation of ecologically favorable conditions of existence requires multi-year and large-scale activities of all organs of state power and broad public support in a single system that encompasses all directions of activity. Civil Defense [CD] responds, in an organized manner, to those requirements and only it is capable of solving this task with the condition of the reorganization and expansion of the spheres of activity.

The draft concept of the law declares the principle of international organization of CD as the unity of three types of activities: warning—protection—rescue, but does not use it as the basis for organizing the state public safety system and therefore substantially reduces its effectiveness.

The concept does not provide a precise definition of the place of Civil Defense in the structure of state organs, it is assigned the role of "integral part" and "primary functional element" of the warning and action system in emergency situations. Warning and actions in emergency situations—these are the functions of CD itself and its integral part. How can we divide them into another system, and yet one that dominates Civil Defense?

We cannot agree with the concept's assertion that "improvement of Ukrainian CD is being carried out... in the directions determined by the government and

Defense Council... and their annual instructions." The many years experience of leadership from above has not justified itself. The public safety system, which international experience confirms, must be self-organizing and self-improving in all of its functional elements within the limits stipulated by law. To preserve the principle of activity based on instructions from above means to agree with the deficiency of the existing CD system—lack of initiative of the lowest elements of administration and their lack of responsibility.

One of the primary deficiencies of Ukrainian CD—is the low level of training of the population and CD specialists which is the primary cause of many mass tragedies. The draft concept of the Law on CD does not define the ways for effective restructuring of the training system and does not create priorities for development of a scientific base for research of the problems of public safety.

The draft concept does not define the directions for the reorganization of the CD troops, the level of training and equipment, and the principle of formation of the CD troops does not meet contemporary requirements for population protection.

#### While proposing another approach to the organization of the public safety system, we proceed from the following conditions:

1. The only possibility for effective population protection under conditions of the ecological crisis is the development, based on Ukrainian CD, of a state system of Civil Safety as an integral part of Ukrainian National Security which confirms the right of citizens to safe conditions of existence and is directed toward preventing all forms of risk that exist in society.

2. Reorganization of CD is being conducted along the following directions:

- increase the level of training and its strict mandatory nature for students and the able-bodied population; training of GB [State Security] specialists while taking into account the specific nature of production and territorial conditions;
- development at the local level of a system of panels of experts on the state of the environment, health of the population, analytical forecasting and planning of protective measures;
- comprehensive cooperation in the establishment of voluntary organs of public control and organization of State Inspection of Civil Safety;
- strict mutual responsibility of State Security organs of the state and citizens in fulfilling safety requirements and total compensation of damages to victims by guilty individuals (organizations); and,
- expansion of the sphere of activity of State Security organs in all types of existing threats and the primary one—the harmful impact of the environment.

Ukrainian Civil Defense organizes and conducts its activities based on the fundamental principle of unity and interconditionality of three functions: warning—protection—rescue, and tasks itself with the following:

**In warning:**

- scientific support of the entire complex of problems of population protection;
- conduct of preventive measures based on skilled analysis of emergency situations, consideration of international experience, and utilization of the principle of cause-and-effect relationships;
- development of state programs for the restoration and protection of the environment and health of Ukrainian citizens;
- development of a Civil Safety law;
- development of systems to monitor sources of danger and to warn the population;
- training of the State Security organs, the population and the Ukrainian Armed Forces for operations in emergency situations during peacetime and wartime; and,
- training of State Security specialists based on their branch and territorial specialization.

**In protection:**

- conduct of state programs for the restoration and protection of the environment and the health of the population;
- conduct of a series of measures to protect the Ukrainian economy and the population from mass disasters and armed interstate conflicts;
- conduct of exercises and drills to rehearse operations in emergency conditions at all levels of the State Security system, specifically in cities, rayons, and regions with a large population density and with the presence of especially dangerous industrial and energy facilities;
- establishment of permanent state monitoring of compliance with Civil Safety legislation and inspection of potential sources of danger;
- development and conduct of programs to transfer enterprises to waste-free production and to increase their safety;
- organization of activities of state services and departmental rescue formations at constant readiness. The transition of CD troops to a professional basis and the development based on them of mobile rescue subunits at a high degree of readiness and a broad profile of operations in emergency situations; and,
- material support of the State Security organs, enterprises, organizations and the population with special equipment and protective systems.

**In rescue:**

- organized and rapid deployment of Civil Safety men and equipment using a constantly prepared communications and warning system;
- mobilization of all state organs of protection, non-militarized formations of enterprises and organizations, and the population to conduct protective and rescue measures, the involvement of Ukrainian Armed Forces units and maintenance of reliable command and control; and,
- elimination of the aftermath of emergency situations: rendering assistance to victims, restoration of state

and industrial utilities and the natural environment; and compensation for damage inflicted by enterprises, organizations and citizens.

We propose placing the following principles at the foundation of Civil Safety:

- the priority of the interests of public safety over the state's economic and political interests;
- the independence of the activities of State Security organs from local level leaders and their vertical subordination;
- development of State Security programs and plans based on a consideration of the interests of the population and the conclusions of comprehensive committees of experts on survival conditions and the state of the environment;
- personal responsibility of State Security officials and workers for the fulfillment of the law's requirements and the organization of population protection (workers of enterprises and organizations);
- strict cooperation of all subjects of the economy, organizations, citizens and the state;
- work and financial participation in Civil Safety of all enterprises and private individuals, regardless of the forms or types of their activities;
- unification of all organs that fulfill the functions of population protection in the Civil Safety system and coordination of their activities;
- training of the Ukrainian Armed Forces beforehand based on State Security programs and their operational resubordination to the State Security organs in peacetime emergency conditions;
- mandatory participation of all able-bodied citizens and students in Civil Safety training;
- involvement of public organizations and voluntary citizens' associations in activities in the State Security system;
- broad utilization of all of the mass media to propagandize Civil Safety;
- dependence of organized forms of State Security from economic effectiveness of the entire system and of its individual elements; and,
- observance of the rights of Ukrainian citizens to complete, objective and timely information on the sources of the threat and total compensation for all forms of damage stipulated by law, by the state, enterprises, organizations or individual citizens.

Civil Safety's organizational structure is determined by the need to create a fundamentally new, effective system of public protection and by actual economic conditions and the experience of population protection in the developed countries. It permits, without increasing financing, us to substantially increase the effectiveness of activities by unifying existing CD structures with all organs of public safety.

State Security is based on the territorial-production principle of construction and has three levels of organization:

- statewide;
- oblasts, major cities and regions; and,



—urban and rural areas.

The development of a public safety system will brook no delay. The situation is intolerable when under conditions of the impact of a massive environmental threat to the population, state protective organs are incapable of changing the situation. Today—this is one of the most important state problems and not only the results of the reforms currently being conducted but also the fate of future generations depend on the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's solution to this problem.

#### **Agreement Between Defense Ministry, Civilian Defense Workers**

92UM1411B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
13 Aug 92 p 1

[Agreement Between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Trade Union Council of Workers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 1992]

[Text] This agreement is concluded between the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Trade Union Council of Workers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the purpose of effective protection of the social, economic, and labor rights and interests of the workers of the armed forces.

In conditions of the transition to a market economy, conducting military reforms, and in order to reduce the negative consequences in conditions of implementing programs to stabilize the national economy, the Ministry of Defense and the Trade Union Council will demonstrate constant concern for the workers, increasing their standard of living, timely resolving of problems of daily life, and creating the necessary working conditions for maintaining the combat readiness of the armed forces. They pledge to take the necessary steps to improve production relations, increase labor productivity, strengthen labor discipline, improve working and health conditions of the workers, and decrease social tension in labor collectives.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine recognizes the Trade Union Council of the Armed Forces as the sole and authorized representative body of all workers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on matters regulating their labor and social activities.

Proceeding from the set goal, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Trade Union Council conclude an agreement on the following:

#### **I. General Provisions**

1.1. The Ministry of Defense and the Trade Union Council shall ensure for workers absolute observance of the rights and guarantees determined by labor legislation. They pledge to take steps in a timely manner to extend to them additional privileges (compensation payments, benefits, additional payments) specified by programs of social protection of the population.

1.2. Draft normative acts submitted by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to supreme bodies of state power and administration, as well as orders and directives of the Ministry of Defense affecting the labor and socioeconomic rights and interests of the workers shall be drawn up with participation of the Trade Union Council or in coordination with it.

1.3. The Ministry of Defense shall ensure that commanders and chiefs of all levels execute the laws of Ukraine and other normative acts affecting the labor and socioeconomic rights and interests of the workers. Until the passage of appropriate laws of Ukraine, the normative acts of the former USSR Ministry of Defense shall be in effect on its territory, unless they are at variance with legislation of Ukraine.

1.4. Commanders of troops, districts, armies, large units, and military units and administrators of institutions, military educational institutions, enterprises, and organizations of the Ministry of Defense shall:

- resolve in coordination with or with the participation of the appropriate trade union bodies (committees) questions associated with wages and labor safety, labor safety practices in production, providing housing, health protection, pensions and social security, and trade services of workers in instances specified by legislation;

- create the necessary working conditions for elective bodies of the Trade Union of the Armed Forces, grant them free use of equipped facilities, and provide the necessary types of communications;

- grant time off with pay to members of elective trade union bodies who are not relieved of their production work to perform public duties and also time for their trade union training.

1.5. Fulfillment of this agreement shall be subject to review at the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine with participation of the Presidium of the Trade Union Council in December of this year.

#### **II. The Ministry of Defense shall:**

**On questions of social and economic protection of workers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:**

2.1. For the purpose of creating conditions for the stable work of labor collectives, provide assistance in placing product orders for the state by enterprises and organizations. In accordance with legislation, take the steps necessary to provide them with material and technical resources and for timely marketing of finished products.

2.2. In accordance with the Law of Ukraine on Employment, notify the Trade Union Council in writing within 3 months about the pending elimination or relocation of military units, military educational institutions, enterprises, institutions, and organizations or about personnel

cuts in conditions of reforms in the armed forces and about measures for finding employment for workers released.

2.3. Provide for measures for expanding housing construction using its own funds with forces of contract organizations and share participation. Together with the Trade Union Council, ensure observance of glasnost in accounting for and distributing living space for workers and constant monitoring on the part of the military command authorities and trade union committees of observance of housing legislation.

Workers who have worked conscientiously in the armed forces system for at least 15 years and need improvement in housing conditions, as well as individuals having the right under the law to receive housing on a priority basis, can be assigned housing from the available housing of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine at the request of the command authorities and the housing commission.

2.4. Assist labor collectives in drainage of land for horticultural partnerships, orchards, and individual housing construction.

**On questions of labor safety and worker health protection:**

2.5. Ensure timely disclosure and correction of discrepancies in work places, buildings and structures, machinery, and equipment with regard to labor safety rules and norms.

2.6. Provide in a timely manner to workers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine special work clothing, special footwear, and other individual protective gear in accordance with standards in effect.

2.7. Draw up and review in a timely manner normative and technical documentation for labor safety and make changes and additions to it to increase safety requirements of production processes.

2.8. Constantly accomplish sanitary monitoring of all existing domestic and technical facilities, construction of industrial buildings, sanitation and auxiliary facilities, and treatment and health institutions, and conformance with labor safety requirements and sanitary norms in order to reduce the incidence of illness and injury of workers.

2.9. Pay the victim or his family members a one-time monetary compensation (within the limits of payments established by legislation) in the event of an injury or other health problem of workers in production that is the fault of the military unit, institution, military educational institution, enterprise, or organization of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations have the right to establish, within the limits of their own available funds, additional benefits for victims as a result of a work injury or other health problem.

2.10. Study the question of a phased transition to a system of full medical support for workers of the armed forces by military medical institutions of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

2.11. Ensure the conduct of mandatory preliminary (when coming on the job) and periodic medical examinations of all workers subject to the effects of hazardous substances and unfavorable production factors in accordance with normative documents in effect.

2.12. In coordination with local public health agencies and with the military medical service on closed garrisons resolve the question of conducting annual clinical examinations of workers of the armed forces.

2.13. Allocate discount passes for workers of the armed forces and their children:

—to sanatoria and rest homes of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine—in the amount of 15 percent of their total amount;

—to children's health camps—in the amount of 25 percent of the total amount.

Authorize the medical directorate to sell over and above the established percentage to the Trade Union Council passes to health resorts, tourist facilities, and children's health camps of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine at their full value.

2.14. Study the question of building a sanatorium-type health camp for 600-1000 for children of servicemen, workers, and employees in an environmentally clean zone of Ukraine.

**III. The Trade Union Council of Workers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine shall:**

3.1. Accomplish constant monitoring of workers' observance of legislation in effect, fulfillment of this agreement, and implementation of agreements and collective contracts in military units, institutions, military educational institutions, and enterprises.

3.2. Ensure observance of social guarantees of labor collectives in the area of organization of labor and wages and participate in the drawing up and coordination of all normative acts affecting the interests of workers of the armed forces.

3.3. Accomplish supervision and monitoring of the course of construction, renovation, and retooling of production facilities relating to fulfillment of labor safety and environmental protection norms and rules.

3.4. Ensure proper monitoring and supervision of the condition of safety, environmental protection, and production sanitation equipment, and sanitary conditions of workers of enterprises, organizations, institutions, and military units serviced by the Trade Union Council.

3.5. Together with the medical directorate, accomplish scheduling and distribution of passes allocated for

workers of the armed forces to health resorts of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

3.6. Ensure active participation of trade union committees in worker bodies monitoring the work of military trade and public catering enterprises.

#### IV. Final Provisions

4.1. The agreement between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Trade Union Council of Workers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine establishes minimum guarantees for workers and employees. In collective contracts and agreements, labor collectives may at their own expense establish more preferential social guarantees within the limits of legislation in effect.

4.2. This agreement applies to all categories of workers in military units, enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine that belong to the Trade Union of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

4.3. Any of the parties signing the agreement have the right to propose changes or additions to the agreement that do not create obstacles for fulfillment of obligations already made by the parties. These proposals are accepted by mutual consent of the parties and with provision of the necessary justification.

4.4. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing and shall be in force until 1 January 1993.

[Signed] Colonel-General K. Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine  
7 August 1992

[Signed] D. Miroshnichenko, chairman of the Trade Union Council of Workers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine  
3 August 1992

#### Odessa Military District Commander on 'Social-Psychological' Service and Military Training

92UM1469C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
8 Sep 92 p 1

[Interview with Vitaliy Grigoryevich Radetskiy, commander of the Odessa Military District, by Lt Col Vyacheslav Voronkov, chief of the press service of the Odessa Military District: "The People, the State and the Army Are Sacred Concepts to Me"]

[Text] The idea of interviewing Lt Gen Vitaliy Radetskiy, commander of the Odessa Military District, came to me a long time ago. He has expressed his basic thoughts repeatedly, and they were voiced in his speech at the recent district Officers' Assembly and at a meeting with workers from the district social-psychological service.

[Voronkov] Vitaliy Grigoryevich, we have recently been hearing assertions that disorder and shakiness, figuratively speaking, have set in in the armed forces of Ukraine,

that discipline has begun to deteriorate drastically, that the officers have lost their interest in the service.... The "critics" link this to the elimination of the institution of political workers and party organs....

[Radetskiy] I absolutely disagree with such statements. The development of the armed forces is proceeding in an organized manner in general in units and subunits of the Odessa Military District. I could cite many examples to illustrate this and mention the names of hundreds of servicemen who are true patriots of Ukraine.

With respect to the abolishment of the institution of political workers and party organs in the military, this process of taking politics and the party out of it was a dictate of the times. I want to say that in more than a quarter of a century in the military, I have encountered hundreds of political workers totally devoted to the cause. They were all slaves to the system, figuratively speaking, however.

[Voronkov] But no army can get by without the institution of indoctrinators, teachers, psychologists and sociologists. There can be no vacuum in the area of ideology. I recall a very apt saying to the effect that the hearts of the people are hills. If we do not take them, our enemy will do so immediately.

[Radetskiy] The role of the social-psychological service is growing by the day in the armed forces, including the Odessa Military District.

The district social-psychological service is headed by Col Anatoliy Kobzar. I know him from more than just a single decade of working together. The agency he heads keeps its finger on the pulse of the times and is doing a lot of good with respect to social protection for district military personnel and their indoctrination.

[Voronkov] The purpose of the social-psychological service is to shape a humane world outlook and a willingness to come to the armed protection of the homeland.

[Radetskiy] The humanizing of the military service is a very important matter today. What am I personally contributing to the concept? We need to reject the idea of developing in the servicemen the cork-tumbler, tin-soldier syndrome. All of us, the general and the private, are comrades-in-arms. The words "people," "state" and "army" are sacred to us all. I am profoundly convinced that we need to reject repression in the indoctrination. I would put it this way. Commanders and chiefs today need to be rigid but not cruel, kind but not push-overs.

[Voronkov] It seems to me that precisely these qualities are lacking in many officers and warrant officers in this difficult period, when Ukraine is building its armed forces. Let us be candid. Among a certain part of the officer corps one can hear complaints about the forced Ukrainianization of the army, about emerging nationalism in the district units and subunits.

[Radetskiy] Let us analyze that. National is not the opposite of international. I am profoundly convinced

that people can preserve their identity only through the national. Nationalists, in the good sense of the term, are always concerned with the prosperity of their people. With respect to the "Ukrainianization" of the army, believe me: This is idle talk. It comes mainly from those who do not want to serve conscientiously and try to rationalize their negligence. Every day I see many examples of Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Belarusians and Poles serving honorably and conscientiously in the army of independent Ukraine.

I would consider the so-called Ukrainianization from another perspective. How can one serve in the army of a sovereign state and not know its language, its culture and traditions? I can call that nothing other than spiritual nihilism, arrogance and haughtiness.

**[Voronkov]** It is recently being said a lot that we need to understand the officer's spiritual culture.

**[Radetskiy]** That concerns me too. In our time, when entire spiritual worlds are opening up for people, I feel that we cannot be mere passive observers. We must absorb the achievements of culture and literature. Tell me why it is that one so rarely sees an officer in the theater or at a symphonic concert. Why is it that some of them read only inferior things and will not pick up the classics, modern prose or poetry? Is it not contempt for the culture of a people which gives rise to slavery of the soul, spiritual callousness and nihilism? Why do we not know our historical roots and are turning into Ivans who do not recall our ancestry. Is it not because our former life contained so many black and blank spots? Take the starvation of '33, for example, the tragedy of the UPA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army], the 10 million who died during the planned starvation, the thousands of innocent UPA fighters killed, who included Russians, Poles, Jews, Frenchmen, Romanians, Uzbeks.... Who will answer for that? Who will tell the truth?

**[Voronkov]** These matters were extensively discussed also at the recent district Officers' Assembly. It will assume a worthy place in the history of the OdVO [Odessa Military District]. Unfortunately, however, not everyone feels this way. Some of the mass media have reported that it was held in order to capture the initiative from the Ukrainian Officers' Union.

**[Radetskiy]** I am familiar with that viewpoint. What do I have to say about it? Both the Ukrainian Officers' Union and the Officers' Assembly are operating on the same team, figuratively speaking, and there should be no opposition here. I respect the SOU [Ukrainian Officers' Union] and try to help it. The Crimean SOU organization was provided with transportation and communication facilities at my order, for example. I could cite numerous such examples.

I do not understand who is instigating rumors about opposition, almost to the point of confrontation, and about an alleged hostile attitude toward the SOU on the part of the district commander. This is all a lot of nonsense with far-reaching objectives.

As the commander I am prepared to cooperate with any party and any sociopolitical movement which will help create and develop the armed forces of Ukraine. In our difficult times all the workers and the people of Ukraine should unite and not separate.

**[Voronkov]** Vitaliy Grigoryevich, is it not the social-psychological service which is expected primarily to resolve these matters in the army?

**[Radetskiy]** And not it alone. It is the moral duty, if you like, of each of us. We talk about shaping a new kind of individual who is not degraded but proud, who has a sense of national dignity and not a subdued soul. Let us first of all develop ourselves. Today, when the army is becoming a popular army in fact and not just in words, we need to derive spiritual strength from the people. The people do a lot for us, but we also do a lot of good for them. We helped rural residents with fuel, for example, and we shall help with the harvest.

**[Voronkov]** Vitaliy Grigoryevich, the day is probably not far off when priests will join the army, is it.

**[Radetskiy]** They are even now frequent visitors to the subunits. That is the way it should be. Religion represents an enormous element in our history. And the moral values which it brings people are of common human importance.

My mother believes in God, you know. We frequently mentioned him when she was bringing up us three children. That which is good in the Radetskiys is unquestionably linked to those qualities which mama developed in us.

**[Voronkov]** We have had an unusual conversation today, Comrade Commander.

**[Radetskiy]** Probably. Believe me, though, when I say that what I have discussed today troubles me very much. Both the spirituality issues and the humanizing of the service are strategic missions. It is the task in the shaping of the new man. And the future of our state depends upon how we develop him, including his development in the army. Let us fight for it.

#### Chernigov to Train Flight Specialists for Air Force

92UM1469B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
8 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Col N. Litvinchuk, candidate of technical sciences, docent, military pilot 1st class, under the rubric "The Military Reform: Problems, Opinions": "Scientific Cadres for the Air Force of Ukraine"]

**[Text]** With the disintegration of the USSR Ukraine lost its traditional sources for replenishing the national air force with scientific and scientific teaching cadres in the flight field, since it had no post-graduate programs or special councils for the preparation and defense of dissertations for academic degrees for candidates of military

sciences with a flight specialty. The last candidate of military sciences from among flight personnel arrived at the Chernigov Higher Military Air School for Pilots from the Air Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin 6 years ago, for example. Furthermore five candidates of military sciences left the school for various reasons during that period. As a result of the release of servicemen who have served out their prescribed term into the reserve, the departments will be giving up their other military scientists during the next few years. What then?

Hopes are now pinned on the Ukraine's Air Force Flight School, but it is still in the design stage. In view of the situation which has developed with respect to military scientific cadres, the importance of the nation's defense capability and the emergence of civic maturity, and after weighing all of the possibilities, the scientific council of the Chernigov VVAUL [Higher Military Air School for Pilots] on 15 June 1992 decided to initiate the training of scientists in the flight field at the school.

A working group was set up and then a scientific council with authority to approve subjects for candidate dissertations and to appoint scientific supervisors were set up by order of Maj Gen Avn V. Kuzuberdin, head of the school.

The first group of graduate students and of post-graduates to study by correspondence has been announced. They were chosen from among the personnel with the best theoretical training and a bent for scientific flight work. Their training is to begin in December 1992. After the financial and housing problems are worked out and a full-time post-graduate program is set up at the Flight Institute, some post-graduate students studying by correspondence and graduate students will be able to continue their studies there.

The procedure for entering the post-graduate program, the training process for post-graduate and graduate students and the writing and defending of dissertations will strictly conform to the requirements of the VAK [Higher Academic Courses] of Ukraine. It is proposed that a fully-empowered, specialized scientific council be set up to handle the defending of candidate dissertations at branches of the Flight Institute. Prominent Ukrainian military scientists would be invited to serve on the council. Scientific instructors from the flight school departments and other institutions with a good scientific background from educational institutions of the former Union will be appointed scientific supervisors of the post-graduate program.

With respect to VUZ-level flight science, the Chernigov VVAUL has considerable superiority over the other flight schools of the former USSR and has officially been declared the leader.

For more than 2 decades it was at the fore in the development and adoption of innovations in the training of flight personnel. Numerous high commissions more than once affirmed the scientific innovativeness and practical value of many things developed at the school,

and some of them have even been adopted in the training process abroad. Individuals could not defend their candidate dissertations at this VUZ, however, because academic science, which had a monopoly on the training of scientists, did not take VUZ research projects seriously. This was despite the fact that it was nurtured fairly well by them. It is precisely for this reason that the vital functioning of flight schools still lags behind in many respects in the area of decision-making volition on the part of commanders, and the intellect of the aviation specialists was long since shifted to the field of creating and producing aviation equipment and supporting the technical aspect of flight work. For this reason it is being proposed that the training of scientists for flight schools be assigned to institutions and VUZs in other fields. Therein lies a methodological miscalculation. It is the following.

The accumulated volume of knowledge on the aviation system is almost three orders above the average person's ability to assimilate it. When we speak of a fine specialist or scientist, it can therefore refer only to a narrow range of related specialties. A person can be a doctor of sciences or a professor in the field of aircraft design, for example, and also have a tolerably good understanding of what is involved in flying. If he has not tested himself in the air, however, he cannot comprehend all the subtleties of flight work upon which the continuous improvement of his combat effectiveness and flight safety depend as far as the human factor is concerned. It is therefore perfectly valid to consider establishing a scientific field dealing with the effective and safe mastery of aircraft, the theory of flight work. This is precisely the objective of the establishment of a post-graduate program at the Chernigov VVAUL primarily to provide scientific support for the training and combat preparation of Air Force personnel.

Pilots wanting to become military scientists have already been drawn to the newly established council.

Why not make it possible to reveal at an early stage the potential of those people who can rightly be considered the best human material, the flower of the nation, with respect to the aggregate of requirements set for occupational health, intellect and the ability to perform competently at the most crucial moment? Under the former system, most unfortunately, they became a burden to society upon retiring, since they had been taught nothing other than how to pilot a combat aircraft. And world experience and our own have shown that with more attention from the state, they can become prominent statesmen, military leaders, managers and scientists.

A great deal has already been done with respect to VUZ science by initiative—that is, at the level of those actually performing the work—at the Chernigov VVAUL. It is now up to the client, so to speak, primarily a matter of moral support from the state and the military departments. There is a folk saying to the effect that if a manager is interested only in the short term he should put his money into commerce, but if he is interested in

the future of his enterprise he should invest in education and science. Given the country's foreign economic situation, commercial centers are also needed in the armed forces, but if we want to see to the future of our children we cannot assign a Cinderella role to science.

The establishment of the post-graduate program at the Chernigov VVAUL goes far beyond just resolving the problem of training scientific cadres. In the worsening economic crisis, the absence of initiative and the decline of the society's morals and the prestige of the military service, this measure also has a political aspect. A rebirth of faith in people, including the country's armed defenders, in their abilities and in the future of the homeland begins precisely with such creative "trivialities," after all.

## BELARUS

### Defense Ministry Affirms Belarus Neutrality, Non-Nuclear Status

92UM1424B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA  
in Russian 4 Aug 92 p 3

[Belinform report under the rubric "The Position": "The Army Must Be Outside of Politics"]

[Text] The Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus approved a group of documents designed to support Belarus' declared principles of nuclear noninvolvement and neutrality and to reduce the forces to the essential level. Conceptual programs were also approved for the training of our own regular forces and for the gradual transfer of Belarusian military personnel serving outside the republic to the armed forces of Belarus. Steps were worked out for the army's gradual conversion to the state language.

Steps are being taken to stabilize the situation in the military collectives, to bolster the patriotic and indoctrinational work and to provide social and legal protection for the servicemen.

The Ministry of Defense has proposed to the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers that the oath of allegiance to the people of Belarus be administered to armed forces personnel in December 1992.

Certain public structures, however—the Belarusian Association of Servicemen (Belaruskiy zhurtavanniye vayskowtsaw) among others—are depicting the activities of the Ministry of Defense as not representing the true interests of Belarus.

The leadership of the BZV [Belaruskiy zhurtavanniye vayskowtsaw] is ignoring decisions of the Supreme Soviet and the government on the reformation and manning of the armed forces and deliberately distorting the national aspect of military development, which is based on the Law on Citizenship in the Republic of Belarus.

When representatives of the BZV address the public, they not only compromise the armed forces and the Ministry of Defense but frequently insult generals and other officers, issuing ultimatums regarding their holding of posts approved by the republic government.

The BZV conducts active political work based on this in the forces, calling it patriotic work. The BZV members, most of them officers, attempt to establish their own organizational structures in the formations and units, which leads to segmentation of the military collectives and the officer corps along national lines and according to political affiliation.

Such activities on the part of the BZV do not help to reinforce stability in the forces and have an extremely negative effect with respect to the implementation of the military policy adopted.

As a state structure, the Ministry of Defense tries in its practical work truly to take politics out of the armed forces. Because of this it speaks out resolutely against attempts to insert a political factor into military life.

The Ministry of Defense believes that servicemen absolutely must not participate in the activities of any sort of political structures (political parties) and that these must not be established or function in any form in the armed forces.

As an essential and special aspect of the state, the armed forces must perform their sacred mission in complete conformity with the laws and must not take part in the political struggle.

## BALTIC STATES

### Status of Estonia's Armed Forces

92UN2094C Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER  
in English 13-19 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Ildar Nizametdinov: "Estonia: Estonian Armed Forces To Remain Small in Number"]

[Text] Last week Estonian Supreme Council deputies continued to bask in the hot August sun, and as a result *The Baltic Observer* will take the opportunity to survey legislation concerning service in the armed forces of the three Baltic countries.

Just days after the restoration of Estonia's independence last year, the country began to rebuild its armed forces. On September 3, 1991 the SC accepted a resolution on forming the Defense Forces.

Last fall the General Headquarters of the Defense Forces was created, headed by Colonel Ants Laaneots. Then, on April 13 of this year, a law *On Forming the Defense Ministry* was passed. Ulo Uluots, a mining engineer and SC deputy, was appointed the Defense Minister last month.

The restoration of Kaitseliit—Estonia's pre-War volunteer defense organization—began two years ago, and in April of this year Kaitseliit was recognized as a part of the Defense Forces by a government resolution.

Paragraph 10 of the new Constitution of Estonia, accepted in June of this year, is devoted to the defense structure. According to the Constitution, the head of state defense is the President of the Republic, who in turn appoints the Defense Council, a consultative body.

Since the President of Estonia has not been elected yet (elections will take place on September 20), the Defense Council currently consists of the SC Chairman, a speaker of the SC and the Prime Minister.

The practical leadership of the Defense Forces is taken by their commander, who is appointed and dismissed by the National Assembly (the SC's successor) on recommendation of the President. The commander of the Defense Forces nominates candidates to serve as commander of Kaitseliit and head of Kaitseliit's General Headquarters, but their appointments must be confirmed by the government.

The National Assembly can declare a state of war, mobilize and demobilize the armed forces, and adopt resolutions on using the Defense Forces for carrying out international obligations. In the case of aggression directed towards Estonia, the President has the right to bypass the State Assembly in announcing a state of war and beginning mobilization.

The law *On Defense Service* foresees general military service for most male citizens. The service is divided into active (obligatory or contract) armed reserve service, and all servicemen must take an oath to the Republic. The Constitution prohibits servicemen from holding civil posts and from participating in the activities of political parties.

Physically and mentally fit male citizens between the ages of 19 to 28 are conscripted for obligatory fixed-term service. The period of service may not surpass 18 months, although on August 3 the government adopted a resolution according to which recruits must serve only 12 months.

Graduates of higher educational establishments are not conscripted for fixed-term service, nor are persons who have served not less than 18 months in the armed forces of another state (namely, the USSR), nor are released convicts.

Persons who have worked in the security and secret service of countries which occupied Estonia, or who have participated in repressions against citizens of Estonia for their political views, are not listed for service in the Defense Forces.

The officer corps and re-enlisted servicemen work on contract. Women also have the option of serving. Those

who have left the army are entered into the reserves, and until reaching the age of 50 can be called in for military training and mobilization.

Estonian leaders have repeatedly announced that the country's army will be small and oriented towards defense. The exact size of the Defense Forces has not been publicly announced, but it is known that at present the number of soldiers does not surpass five to six thousand.

The expenses for maintaining the Defense Forces, including Kaitseliit, are covered from the state budget. Next week the Supreme Council will begin to discuss the draft budget for the second half of the year, and then the expected expenses for the Defense Forces will be known.

### Functional Overlapping in Latvia's Defense, Security Structures

92UN2093A Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER  
in English 23-29 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Janis Domburs: "Latvian Armed Forces ready for Battle—Against Each Other"]

[Text] In August a year will have passed since Latvia has been internationally recognized as an independent state, but by then the Latvian parliament still won't have managed to pass pressing legislation on state defense and state security issues. Nevertheless, four armed structures have been created in the past year and the overlapping of their functions and goals has the potential to needlessly cause instability in the country.

The August 1991 coup was an eye-opener. People saw for themselves that almost a year and a half after the Independence Declaration of May 4, 1990, Latvia still lacked strong and loyal armed forces to rely on. Following the unsuccessful Soviet coup, Latvian defense and security forces began to be built from scratch.

If initial organizational problems were understandable, the mutual accusations and conflicts which have followed provide the first warning signs that all is not well within Latvia's internal security and defense structures. The lack of comprehensive defense and internal security policies, coupled with the fact that the four largest Latvian armed units are unable to divide their fields of influence and functions, does not bode well for a promising future.

### Home Guards

The Home Guards, which answer to the Latvian Supreme Council (SC-parliament), and whose Commander-in-chief is SC chairman Anatolijs Corbunovs, were created last August through the parliament's law *On the Forces of the Home Guard*. The real decision maker, however, appears to be parliamentary deputy Girts Kristovskis, who heads the Home Guard headquarters.

In the space of six months, Home Guard units were formed in all regions of the country; at the beginning of this year the number of Home Guards exceeded 10,000 people (about 9000 volunteers and 1000 staff employees).

Although the Home Guards have successfully cooperated with customs officers and in several cases were the first to police Latvia's borders while there was a lack of Border Guards, the prestige of the Home Guards has fallen. Frequent reports of irresponsibility in handling firearms and ignorance of legal procedures in defending law and order were the main factors which led to the denial of increased powers to this organization by the SC.

#### Defense Forces (Border Guards)

Organizing the Defense Forces is a task assigned to the Latvian Defense Ministry, which was formed last autumn. The Defense Forces unite the border guards (almost 8000 people), naval soldiers (1500) air force and anti-aircraft defense forces. The Defense Ministry and the Home Guards still quarrel over who should command the internal professional military units (the equivalent of infantrymen). There is no army *per se*.

Most agree that the Ministry of Defense should deal with military intelligence gathering. However, with the role of the secret service and its power structure still undefined by the SC, the Defense Ministry has incorporated its intelligence service within its Foreign Relations and Information Department.

#### Security Service

Within a year's time, the Police Battalion headed by Juris Vectirans has twice changed its name. Considered to be the most loyal armed unit to Latvian authorities before the August 1991 coup attempt, the battalion was ordered by the Interior Ministry to disarm and leave its headquarters on the first day of the putsch, in order to avoid clashes with Soviet armed forces.

Embittered at what they saw as capitulation to the Soviets, more than a few battalion members were relieved when their unit came under the command of the SC later that year. Initially renamed as the SC Guard Service, the unit is now known as the Supreme Council Security Service.

Now, as new intelligence and counterintelligence structures are being formed within this service, it would like to be known as the Security Service of the Republic of Latvia and to take on the main functions of the state secret service, formerly occupied by the KGB.

There are two objections to such a move. Firstly, the SC Security Service was formed on the basis of a police staff which is not oriented to intelligence work; secondly, since the current SC Security Service incorporates a 300-member special task force unit of so-called Green Berets, the organization as a whole would be militarized and could become a body of repression.

#### The Interior Ministry

The leadership of the Interior Ministry controls the Latvian police units, but has not attempted to involve them in state defense structures. However, conflicts between the Interior Ministry and other armed structures have arisen regarding internal security.

The Interior Ministry also has an intelligence and counter-intelligence service, embodied in the Department of Information, which advises government and parliament leaders. Opponents of this department believe that it is the precursor to a political police.

#### Infighting

As they wait for the parliament to pass legislation on Latvian security and defense matters and dictate a final allocation of functions, the principal Latvian armed units are engaging in mutual accusations and mudslinging. The situation is similar to the tragi-comical fable by Krilov, where the swan, the lobster and the pike each pull the same cart in a separate direction. Even worse—the Latvian services seem to spend most of their time gathering discrediting information about each other.

Within the state budget for the second half of the year, parliament allocated the four services only half of the amount that they had demanded. Now, in order to justify future funding increases, these Latvian armed services are invoking images of a dangerous and potentially aggressive Eastern neighbor in Russia, just as the American armed forces did regarding the USSR.

[South of the border, in Lithuania, similar infighting has occurred. In the beginning of June, State Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius announced that with the pre-election campaign approaching, opposition political forces had tried to lure individual employees of the Defense Department and even whole structural units to work for them.]

There isn't much hope that the Latvian parliament will play the role of Solomon the mediator for two reasons: the leaders of two of the competing structures—Talavs Jundzis (who is also Defense Minister) and Girts Kristovskis—are parliamentary deputies, and there is still uncertainty regarding the subordination of the armed forces between the legislative and the executive branches of the state.

Right now in Latvia, mutually hostile statements between the representatives of the Home Guard and the police, the Security Service and the police, the Home Guard and the Defense Forces, etc. are the norm. As each trumpets its own merits and each accuses the other of disloyalty, radicalism and lack of discipline, Latvia risks evolving into a state with an aggressive and military



internal policy. Let's hope that passions simmer and that cooler heads prevail. The sooner they do so, the better.

### **Latvian Legislation on Military, Labor Service Surveyed**

92UN2093E Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER  
in English 13-19 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Ilze Arklina: "Latvia: State Service Applies to All Pending Citizenship Law"]

[Text] As in the Estonian legislature, the halls of the Latvian Supreme Council (parliament-SC) were silent last week, due to the summer recess. We will therefore survey Latvian legislation on military and labor service in the country.

According to the September 10, 1991 law *On Compulsory State Service in the Republic of Latvia*, all male permanent residents of Latvia between 19 and 25 years of age must serve a term in the state service. Men up to 50 years of age who have completed their term of service are placed in the reserves. All servicemen must swear an oath of allegiance to the Republic.

The state service is divided into military service and labor service. Military service lasts for 18 months, labor service for 24 months. Those who have graduated from higher educational institutions must serve in the military for only six months.

After the Latvian citizenship law is adopted by parliament, only Latvian citizens will be called up (except for in the rescue and fire-fighting services, where non-citizens will still be able to work). All Latvian citizens who have served in the Soviet military will be placed in the reserves.

The call-up for the state service takes place twice a year: in the spring and in the fall. The conscription is directed by Latvian Ministry of Defense and by the state service departments of cities and administrative regions.

Employers must dismiss draftees from their working places or studies for the period of time indicated by the call-up papers. Drafts can also be recalled from their business-trips and vacations.

According to the amendments in Latvian legislation (adopted on September 10, 1991), if a person fails to report to a state service board upon conscription, he may receive a warning or a fine of up to 50 rubles or be detained for up to five days.

If a person still evades the callup even after a warning, he may be imprisoned in accordance with the Latvian Criminal Code for up to three years. Anyone inflicting bodily injuries upon himself or feigning illness or forging documents in order to avoid serving may face up to five years imprisonment.

Conscription may be delayed for personnel and students of educational establishments, post-graduates of educational establishments and for past and present convicts, as well as those whose cases are under investigation at the time of conscription.

The same delay is also foreseen for persons who work for the Latvian Interior and Defense Ministries; who are temporarily ineligible for state service due to their health; who work on their own farms or in the farms of family members; who support two or more under-age children; who are the only supporters of disabled family members; for deputies as well as for deputy candidates during an election campaign; and for persons who cannot be conscripted for lack of positions.

Conscription can also be delayed for athletes who are participants or candidates of a national team. The Latvian Council of Ministers may establish other criteria which would retard conscription. The cases of those who have been exempted from service are reviewed every year, and once they have reached the age of 25 they are put in the reserves.

Those assigned to military service are dispatched to the Defense Forces—border guards, naval guards, battalions or the intelligence service—all under the jurisdiction of the Defense Ministry; or to military formations of the Interior Ministry, which include an escort guard service and the police.

Other draftees are detailed to labor service, in accordance with requests presented by hospitals and other institutions to municipal state service boards. Those who, for religious or moral reasons, do not wish to serve in the military, are also assigned to labor service.

### **Lithuania Lacks Law on Defense Forces**

92UN2096D Riga THE BALTIC OBSERVER  
in English 13-19 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Karlis Freibergs: "Lithuania: Lithuanians Still Waiting for Defense Law"]

[Text] Last week the Lithuanian Supreme Council (parliament-SC) held only one session, on Thursday. As reported in last week's issue, the parliament voted to allow the government to choose a site for the construction of an oil terminal near the port city of Klaipeda. The Klaipeda City Council had previously blocked government attempts to do so.

The SC also voted on dismissing the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, but the tally was six votes short of the required 65 votes for the Board's dismissal.

Regarding state service, Lithuania remains the only Baltic country without a law which regulates the command and control of the armed forces. The enlistment of draftees is therefore effected twice a year, in the spring and in the fall, by government decree.

All male citizens 19 years of age and over may be drafted to serve in the Border Guards and the Internal Service (which is responsible for guarding prisons), both of which are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, headed by Audrius Butkevicius. [The Ministry was created last year on the basis of the Department of National Defense, which was formed in the fall of 1990.]

The required term of service is presently one year, although this may be raised to 18 months. Exceptions are made for those who are studying in institutions of higher learning, or work in polyclinics or for the police, among others. Once one's employment in these spheres has ceased, however, one may be called in for active duty.

Men who have served in the Lithuanian armed forces or the former Soviet army may enter the reserves on a voluntary basis, according to M. Meskauskas of the Defense Ministry. Women may also apply for administrative positions in the Defense Ministry, but as of yet there has been no provision for them to undergo active combat training.

To date, there have been no criminal proceedings against draft evaders, because up until now "all of them have provided medical or other justification for avoiding service," said Meskauskas. Conscientious objectors may also opt to serve in the alternative labor service, but as of yet this practice has not been widespread.

As in Latvia and Estonia, former convicts may not serve in the armed forces, nor may those with an inadequate knowledge of the state language. Those who have served in the KGB and other repressive organs may be denied access to the officer corps.

Until the defense law is passed, the government and the provisional Defense committee have each been authorized to mobilize the Lithuanian armed forces. The Committee consists of the parliamentary chairman, the Prime Minister and several members of his cabinet.

Following the January 13, 1991 slaying of unarmed civilians in Vilnius by Soviet troops, the Lithuanian parliament adopted a law *On Voluntary Service* (on January 17), according to which volunteer guards (some of whom were subsequently issued guns) would be empowered to protect the Supreme Council and other buildings.

The voluntary guards are also under the jurisdiction of the Defense Ministry. Recently, however, there have been grumblings of protest on their part regarding financial remuneration, since as a voluntary force, they receive no salaries.

Finally, there is the professional parliamentary Security Department, headed by Arturas Skucas, which now guards the Supreme Council building and which answers directly to the SC.

In all, there are an estimated 6,000 men serving in the Lithuanian armed forces, according to BNS.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Turkish Military Support to Azerbaijan Alleged

92US0861A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 39, 23 Sep 92 p 9

["Own Information" report: "'The East Is Ours,' Turkish Members of Parliament Maintain"]

[Text] Secretary of State Gennadiy Burbulis recently signed in Istanbul a package of agreements between Russia and Turkey against a background of speeches about the half-century history of Russian-Turkish relations. There were many exalted opinions concerning the cooperation and friendship between the new Russia and the former Turkey as though things between our countries are going well.

It is just that today's by no means simple military-political realities are giving increasingly noisy reminders of their presence. The initiated know that in the past six months the Turkish authorities have quite often closed off the air space on the approaches to Azerbaijan and have been refusing civil airlines flights over a large zone. Why? There is a reason....

Since last spring Turkish "reserve" officers who have served their time in Turkey's national army have been ferried from Erzurum to Azerbaijan on Turkish Air Force planes. The latter are aged 30-35. It is perfectly obvious that people are not usually discharged into the reserve at so young an age.

On the scene each of them takes under his command a company of Azerbaijani fighters. Language difficulties do not arise—the Azerbaijani and Turkish languages differ from one another little. The Turkish "reservists" are therefore training the new recruits without difficulty, after which they make for the zone of military operations in the Karabakh area. And are fighting!

Some 5,000-6,000 Turkish "reserve" officers have been ferried to Azerbaijan altogether. Perfectly sufficient, let us speak plainly, for maintaining a "hot" level of military operations...

Turkish weapons, ammunition, and military hardware are streaming into Azerbaijan. Soviet-made, what is more. Where did Turkey obtain our weapons? From "unknown friends"? No, it is all, apparently, much more simple. Turkey obtained the weapons, ammunition, and military equipment from the FRG "for struggle against the Kurds." From the arsenals of the former army of the GDR.

Such close attention on Turkey's part to what is happening in the Transcaucasus is not only a tribute to history. It should be remembered for an understanding of what is going on that it was at the request of Ankara, bolstered by Great Britain in 1921, that autonomous Karabakh emerged within the borders of Azerbaijan.

Turkey has at this time its own interest in a settlement of the Karabakh conflict, preference being given Baku, not Yerevan, what is more.

There is also, apparently, a Turkish general commanding, it is maintained, military operations in Karabakh. His name is Khalil-pasha. Well, to be more precise, we are talking about Khalil Kaloydzhi [name as transliterated], military attache at the Turkish Embassy in Baku, the only one in the diplomatic corps in Baku as yet. His involvement in the Karabakh conflict is denied, of course. But in a very distinctive way, however. Thus responding to a question of a correspondent of the Turkish newspaper HURRIYET, Khalil-pasha declared that he personally was not in the ranks of the Azerbaijani Army in Karabakh.

Why is Moscow, listening to the assurances of friendship from Istanbul and Ankara, looking quite indifferently on Turkey's irrepressible activity in the former Soviet republics? Incidentally, they have become members of CSCE. The security of Russia's borders should be guaranteed unswervingly, on the Transcaucasus flank included. Mr. Suleyman Demirel and some other Turkish politicians have their own view of the problems arising there. Yes, he signed the new Moscow treaty on friendship with Russia (May 1992). But at the same time he declared not long before this that Turkey was prepared to perform a political role in the region from the Adriatic to China. Whence also, incidentally, Ankara's burning interest in Yugoslavia! Turkish members of parliament are saying openly that "the East (that is, the independent republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia) is ours!"

#### Georgia Creates Military Engineering Units

924C2269A Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA  
in Russian 2 Jul 92 p 3

[Interview with Colonel Batono Karlo Kalandadze, chief of Engineer Troops of the Republic of Georgia's Armed Forces, by Levan Dolidze, chief of the Press Service of the Republic of Georgia's Ministry of Defense: "Special Troops of the Georgian Army"]

[Text] Our republic's Armed Forces are coming into being. They will contain the main troop arms necessary for the reliable protection and defense of the homeland. The Press Service of the Republic of Georgia's Ministry of Defense is continuing to acquaint the readers with the complex process of force generation of the republic's Armed Forces. Colonel Karlo Kalandadze, chief of the Engineer Troops of the Republic of Georgia's Armed Forces, answers questions for us today.

[Dolidze] Batono Karlo, engineer troops are being created for the first time in the Georgian army's history. One does not have to be a military expert to understand not just the need but the particular importance of creating modern engineer troops in view of Georgia's small area, its small population and the terrain and

climatic conditions of the republic in general. What is your opinion on the matter?

[Kalandadze] The fact that the Georgians have been great warriors is known far beyond the borders of Georgia. Many European and Asian armies have considered it an honor to have Georgian soldiers in their ranks, who were at the same time wise commanders. Less well known, though, is the fact that since ancient times the Georgians have known the art of military engineering.

[Dolidze] What is the present-day purpose of the engineer troops now being created for the first time?

[Kalandadze] These are special troops for providing engineer support for the combat operations of units and formations of the Armed Forces. The objective of engineer support of combat operations at the contemporary stage is to enhance the anti-tank and anti-landing effectiveness of the units and formations of armed forces in a defense, in a counterattack and a counteroffensive, in the maneuverability, mobility and survivability of the troops.

[Dolidze] Tell us, please, who will make up the engineer troops?

[Kalandadze] We had a sense of great responsibility in setting about the creation and formation of the engineer troops, which constitute a meld of the entire gamut of engineering and technical philosophy today. The engineer troops will be made up of the following specialists: mine and demolition specialists, road and bridge builders, water-supply specialists, pontoniers, fortification builders, electricians, mechanics and many other specialists.

[Dolidze] What is the situation with respect to the manning of the engineer troops?

[Kalandadze] As I have already mentioned, we need specialists in the broadest range of engineering fields. Service in the engineer troops, not without its romantic quality and flight of engineer imagination, demands not only great discipline and industriousness but also a large body of engineering and technical knowledge, and in some cases enormous physical exertion. Our selection of specialists and of all personnel for the engineer troops is based on precisely these criteria.

[Dolidze] Where is it planned to train the future cadres of engineer troops?

[Kalandadze] We are presently discussing the training of specialists in military departments at the republic's higher educational institutions.

[Dolidze] How do you intend to provide the national special troops with the necessary equipment?

[Kalandadze] I shall begin by saying that at the present stage engineer troops have a combination of complex equipment for diverse purposes and uses. Based on our present situation, we shall make do at first with the

engineer arms and ammunition, which we acquire as a result of the transfer of some of the weapons and equipment from the Transbaykal Military District. After that we are counting on our own capabilities.

[Dolidze] Please tell us a little bit about yourself.

[Kalandadze] I grew up and attended school in Batumi. My father, a doctor by profession, was a victim of the repression in the '30s. After graduating from the Lenin-grad Military Engineering School I completed the Moscow Military Engineering Academy. I served as a military adviser in Cuba, where I actually took part in the establishment of the engineer troops. In recent years I served at district headquarters as Deputy Chief for Armaments of district forces.

I accepted the offer to serve in Georgia's armed forces with enormous pleasure, and I shall devote all of my experience, knowledge and professionalism to the establishment of an army and its engineer troops worthy of my homeland.

## CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

### Sporadic Shooting in Kurgan-Tyube

92UM1461B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 11 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Ladin and Aleksandr Pelts: "Clash Between Militia and 'Food Detachment' from Kurgan-Tyube"]

[Text] On the evening of 9 September, 14 km from Dushanbe on the road to Rogun there was an exchange of fire between a task force of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs and an unknown armed group of 12 people.

The day before, the chief of the city department of the militia repeatedly called asking for help, since unknown persons were arriving in the city in trucks. They were demanding a collection of food for those fighting in Kurgan-Tyube. They seized some explosives from an explosives depot that were intended for building the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant.

A 19-man group, some of them armed only with pistols, was sent from Dushanbe to reinforce the militia at Rogun. But information was received en route that a "Ural" with armed people was heading in the direction of Rogun. The fighters opened fire first. But this time, as we were told at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the militia "was able to shoot first." As a result of a 40-minute battle, one of the fighters was wounded and arrested, and the others managed to hide. A machinegun and four assault rifles were confiscated.

According to information received at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, sporadic shooting continues in Kurgan-Tyube, but on the whole, the intensity of the fighting is

decreasing. However, no absolutely reliable information is being receiving from there.

### Russian Motorized-Rifle Regiment's Situation in Kurgan-Tyube

92UM1461A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Sep 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Colonel Anatoliy Ladin and Captain 2d Rank Aleksandr Pelts: "A Russian Regiment Finds Itself Not at War But Under Siege at Kurgan-Tyube"]

[Text] In the last few days, we twice crossed the well-visible front line between the warring parties in the city of Kurgan-Tyube. The city is virtually totally in the hands of the anti-Nabiyev opposition. The president is already gone, but the division of the groupings, as before, runs precisely along the same street which is adjacent to the military camp of the Russian motorized rifle regiment. So, exchanges of fire usually break out right at the regimental command post [RCP]. On the one side of the street is a barricade of supporters of the opposition. Behind it are the fighters armed with a large-caliber machinegun, a grenade launcher, assault rifles, and hunting rifles. Near this post is hidden a so-called armored KamAZ (a KamAZ motor vehicle with two layers of steel plating in front and along the entire perimeter of the body).

There is the same barricade on the other side of the street. But behind it are fighters from Kulyab, supporters of Rakhmon Nabiyev, and also residents of Kurgan-Tyube—persons originally from a neighboring oblast. "Combat equipment" is also here—an armored tractor. An ordinary agricultural machine now adapted for cover when conducting combat operations.

What do these posts do on the front line throughout the day? If a person or vehicle should appear on the street controlled by them without advance warning, they fire without hesitating. Such are their "responsibilities."

The regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Merkulov, has contact with both sides. In order for us to leave the area of the regiment, and it remains on in a neutral zone by will of fate, a telephone call first had to be made to someone. Then Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Chebotarev, who is known on both sides by his figure, left the gates of the RCP, undoubtedly risking his life. He waved a piece of white material. We watched this everytime with alarm, realizing that a round might be fired in response to any chance occurrence.

We had occasion to drive out the gates of the unit several times. And everytime this was preceded by Lieutenant Colonel Chebotarev, the volunteer "bearer of a flag of truce," going out on the street. We well sensed what it took for him to do this when an UAZ rolled out into the middle of the street, and we understood that we were now "sitting" in the front sight of opposing sides. If they were to fire, no one would bear any responsibility, of course. A reason would be found for justification. And

laws and some rights are not in force here. Here, confidence and rightness is on the side of the one who has the weapon and the possibility of using it without second thoughts.

So, it has turned out that the families of the servicemen of the Russian motorized rifle regiment have ended up prisoners to the consequences of the armed clashes. It was to the village of Lomonosovo, where the officer and warrant officer housing is also located, that the people escaping from the firing streamed on 4 September, and it was to here that the Kulyab fighters began to retreat. What was left for the commander of the Russian motorized rifle regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Merkulov, to do? Trying to avoid an increase in violence in the village, he closed the entrances to it through his posts with consent of his command in Dushanbe. Today, mainly officers stand duty around the clock here. We heard the fighters themselves say that Lomonosovo would have been done away with long ago if not for the regiment.

Today, the refugees, and several thousand of them gathered in the small village on 4 September and subsequent days, have left Lomonosovo. Some of them are now in the small town of Kalininabad, which is near Kurgan-Tyube, under the protection of detachments of Kulyab fighters, and some left for the oblast center of Kulyab. Not everyone is able to afford such a "luxury"—in other words, escape. You must hire a truck to take your things with you, and this is very expensive.

Nevertheless, people continue to leave. We saw on the road vehicles loaded down with household goods. Uzbeks, Russians, Koreans, and Tajiks are abandoning native places. There are few who believe peace will come soon to these parts.

In Lomonosovo, life is on the brink of total despair today. There is not even a week's supply of food, especially bread. Threats are made against those who shelter refugees. One courageous woman secretly left with a helper from the village besieged by opposition forces. The two of them brought 36 loaves of bread from the city. If they would have found out at the posts which they passed that they were bringing bread to Lomonosovo, reprisals would have been inevitable.

The refugees are assigned flats. We were shown the lists. For several days 20-30 people lived in a two-room flat, and 40 lived in a three-room flat. Despite real threats, the Russians gave refuge to Tajiks, and Tajiks gave refuge to Uzbeks.

Today it is quiet on the streets of Lomonosovo. But this calm is delicate and unstable. That is why everyone who lives in the village, and it is multi-national, everyone who, contrary to his own desire, ended up in the continuous round of bloody events in Kurgan-Tyube is counting on protection from the military. That is precisely why the name of Lieutenant Colonel Merkulov,

the regiment commander, has become a symbol of faith in such protection and hope for life for thousands of people.

We arrived at the regiment by helicopter in the morning. We were not able to speak with the commander until several hours later.

"See for yourselves, delve into the situation," Merkulov advised.

Only later did we learn that the commander had not slept at all the entire 24 hours before our arrival. The man lived and worked at the limit of his abilities and by his example forcing his numerous subordinates not to lose presence of mind and "go all out."

By will of fate, the regiment has found itself sort of at the center of the armed conflict, taking a strictly neutral position with respect to it. But it takes a lot for the regiment commander and all personnel to remain in the position of non-intervention and keep the territory of the regiment a neutral zone, to which each of the opposing sides lays claim with equal decisiveness.

It is approaching midnight—time to check the posts. We go out into the darkness that has enveloped the military camp. Today the regiment commander himself is inspecting the sentries.

We had barely begun to go around to the posts when a round rang out in the vicinity of the motor pool. The sentry explained: unknown persons appeared immediately from two sides. He tried to stop them with a shout—they did not obey. Then he fired a warning shot into the air...

At another post Merkulov is more stern—an officer standing duty here, which has become common in the regiment due to the personnel shortage, has chosen a poor observation point...

Now before us was a different Merkulov. He was the same calm person, but able to find the necessary words for each one, attentive to any small things, not overlooking anything, irreconcilable to the slightest omissions.

Today he is not only a military specialist here, but also both a politician and diplomat.

*NOTE. According to the latest report from our correspondent, the situation on the border between Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube oblasts has worsened sharply. Armed detachments of the opposition seized the Shar-Shar pass. The militiamen and fighters from Kulyab Oblast guarding it were forced to retreat, losing 12 men killed.*

**MOLDOVA****Resolution on Moldovan Military Tribunals**

925D0737A Chisinau NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 8 Sep 92 p3

[Resolution of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on the Ratification of the Statute on Military Tribunals]

[Text] The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova hereby resolves:

1. To ratify the Statute on Military Tribunals.
2. To establish the fact that the Supreme Court reviews by way of oversight cases previously decided by military tribunals of the former USSR at an appeal from the chairman of the Supreme Court or an appeal or finding by the prosecutor of the Republic of Moldova.
3. This resolution takes effect on the day it is passed.

[Signed] Alexandru Mosanu  
President of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova,  
Chisinau,  
4 August 1992

**Moldova: Statute on Military Tribunals**

925D0737B Chisinau NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 8 Sep p 3

[Statute on Military Tribunals]

[Text]

**I. GENERAL PROVISIONS**

Article 1. Military tribunals administer justice in the armed forces and are a part of the court system of the Republic of Moldova.

Military tribunals exercise their authority in accordance with the Constitution, the Criminal, Criminal Procedure, Civic and Civic Procedure codes, with this statute and other legal standards.

Article 2. Military tribunals exist to guard the security of the Republic of Moldova and the combat capability and combat readiness of its armed forces against all encroachments.

The functioning of the military tribunals focuses on the enforcement of military discipline, the procedure for performing military service, the prevention of crimes and other breaches of the law in the armed forces.

Article 3. Military tribunals pass resolutions and impose sentences for the Republic of Moldova.

Article 4. Military tribunals are set up by the Parliament at the joint recommendation of the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defense.

Article 5. Citizens of the Republic of Moldova who have reached the age of 25 by the day of the elections and have a higher legal education may serve as chairmen, deputy chairmen and members of military tribunals.

An individual elected a member (or judge) of a military tribunal for the first time must pass a qualifying exam.

The chairman, deputy chairman and members of military tribunals are elected by the Parliament for a period of 10 years and may be recalled or relieved of their position before that period has elapsed by the Parliament in accordance with the 1 December 1989 Statute on Disciplinary Liability of Judges, Recall and Early Release of Judges and Jurors of the Moldavian SSR.

Article 6. Criminal and civil cases in all military tribunals are considered by an individual judge or a court consisting of two or three judges.

Appeals and cases subject to review are considered collectively, by at least three members of the court.

Article 7. Judges of military tribunals are independent in the exercise of their legal authority and are subject only to the law.

The influencing of judges in any way in the exercise of their legal authority is inadmissible and entails the liability established by law.

Article 8. Judges of military tribunals may not be held criminally or administratively accountable or arrested without the Parliament's concurrence.

Article 9. For violating the law in their consideration of court cases or for committing service-related infractions judges of military tribunals are held criminally accountable by the procedure established in the 1 December 1989 Statute on Disciplinary Liability of Judges, Recall and Early Release of Judges and Jurors of Courts of the Moldavian SSR.

**II. THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS**

Article 10. Military tribunals have jurisdiction over crimes committed by:

- privates, noncommissioned officers and officers of the armed forces, the carbiners (internal troops) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and troops of the Ministry of National Security;
- management personnel of corrective labor facilities;
- individuals covered by special instructions in the current law;
- reservists attending assemblies.

Article 11. In addition to criminal cases military tribunals consider civil suits of military units, legal and real persons for the recovery of material damage inflicted upon them by military crimes.

Article 12. When one individual or a group of people are accused of committing several crimes and even one of the crimes is under the jurisdiction of a military tribunal but the

others are under the jurisdiction of a different court, all of the crimes are considered by the military tribunal.

When a group of individuals is accused of one or several crimes, and the case of even one of the accused falls under the jurisdiction of a military tribunal but the others are under the jurisdiction of a different court, the entire case is considered by the military tribunal.

Article 13. Criminal cases involving crimes calling for the maximum punishment, the death sentence, are considered by the Judicial Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court as the court of first instance.

The Judicial Collegium of the Supreme Court has authority to assume jurisdiction over any other case under the jurisdiction of a military tribunal as the court of first instance.

### III. OVERSIGHT OVER THE PERFORMANCE OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS

Article 14. The Supreme Court exercises oversight over the performance of military tribunals, and the Prosecutor's Office as well in matters pertaining to the legality of court decisions and sentences.

Article 15. The Plenum of the Supreme Court:  
—by way of oversight, considers objections by the chairman of the Supreme Court and the prosecutor, as well as findings of the prosecutor of the Republic of Moldova based on newly revealed circumstances in cases considered by military tribunals.  
—hears reports from the chairmen of military tribunals on the application of the law by military tribunals and the implementation of decisions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court.

Article 16. Within the scope of its authority, the Presidium of the Supreme Court also considers cases decided by military tribunals by way of oversight and on the basis of newly revealed circumstances in which decisions have been rendered by the Judicial Collegium for Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court.

Article 17. The judicial collegiums for civil and criminal cases of the Supreme Court consider:

1) appeals, specific complaints and objections to decisions, sentences and rulings of military tribunals and the findings of judges on these tribunals;

2) by way of oversight, objections by the chairman of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor of the Republic of Moldova and their deputies to decisions, sentences and rulings of the judges on these courts which have gone into legal effect, as well as decisions, sentences, rulings and findings rendered by military tribunals on the basis of newly revealed circumstances in criminal and civil cases which have not previously been considered on appeal or by way of oversight.

Article 18. The chairman of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor of the Republic of Moldova and their deputies, in

their performance of oversight over the functioning of military tribunals, have the authority to demand files on court cases considered by the latter for verification by way of oversight and for the study and summarization of judicial praxis.

Article 19. The chairman of the Supreme Court and the prosecutor of the Republic of Moldova have the authority to halt the execution of decisions, sentences, rulings and resolutions in cases considered by military tribunals in cases and by the procedure specified by law.

### IV. THE ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THEIR WORK

Article 20. The Ministry of Justice administers the military tribunals.

Article 21. The Ministry of Justice:  
—monitors the organization of the work of military tribunals and takes steps to improve it;  
—organizes the keeping of judicial statistics;  
—together with the Ministry of Defense, selects, provides for the advanced training and indoctrinates members of military tribunals;  
—exercises organizational and methodological supervision over the work performed by military tribunals to explain the law in the armed forces;  
—jointly with the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Defense, works out proposals for organizing the work of military tribunals;  
—issues orders under the signature of the minister of justice on matters pertaining to the organization of the work of military tribunals.

Article 22. The chairman of a military tribunal:  
—exercises direct supervision over the work of the military tribunal;  
—directs the study of legal praxis and the keeping of judicial statistics in the military tribunal;  
—organizes the work of indoctrinating and enhancing the skills of the personnel and of explaining the law;  
—issues orders within the scope of his authority on the organization of the work of the military tribunal.

### V. THE STAFFING AND THE MATERIAL-TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS

Article 23. The structure and staff of military tribunals, as well as the wage fund for their workers are established by the Presidium of the Parliament at the joint recommendation of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defense.

The personnel of military tribunals are on the staff of the Ministry of Defense and are provided with all benefits and allowances on an equal basis with the personnel of military units and establishments of the Ministry of Defense.

Article 24. The military tribunals are provided with material-technical supplies and financing by the Ministry of Defense out of funds allocated by the government for these purposes.

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

**Malyshev Tank Plant: From T-34 to ZLM-350  
ATV**

92UM1349A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian  
No 126 (376), 7 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Nikolay Kosyy, Kharkov, under the rubric "Economics": "Conversion: Muffled, as in a Tank"]

[Text] *The press has understandably never before been invited or let in to this enterprise.*

*Almost everything here was designated with the classification "secret."*

*Times have changed, but evidently not for the better. The Plant imeni Malyshev—the very same one where they designed the best tank of World War II, the T-34—is at the brink of a complete stoppage today.*

*Conversion, on which we have placed such hopes, has not taken here. Tanks do not fit with motorcycles in any way. The stoppage of production of military hardware has also entailed the stoppage of the output of consumer goods.*

*And it looks like no journalist will want to come here in a year or two—there will be nothing left to write about.*

**The war that was declared for highly efficient production is in its fourth year now. Is it not time to count up the losses and clear foul-smelling ideas from the field of battle?**

**The Armor is Strong...**

There are about five hundred tanks standing on pedestals on the territory of Eastern Europe, from the Urals to Berlin, in honor of the soldier-liberators. Almost all of them are the renowned "thirty-four." And only at one place, in the yard of a former steam locomotive plant and today the five-times decorated Kharkov Production Association [PO] Plant imeni Malyshev, in a granite stone extolling the weapon of victory, is there the inscription "to the creators of the legendary T-34 tank." Yes, it was right at this plant that the combat vehicle—later rightfully called by historians the best tank of World War II—was created more than half a century ago...

At one time practically all of the leaders of the party and government considered it their duty to visit the famous plant. It was a beautiful gesture at the time to crawl through the tight hatch of the tank, affix the latest decoration to the facade of the plant administration and throw a few tens of millions to defensive might. True, there was not time to recall everything about the chief designer of the weapon, M. Koshkin, and to give him his due. But they remembered and "awarded" him the Star of the Hero, albeit fifty years after his death...

The press has understandably never before been invited or let in to this mysterious enterprise. Almost everything here was designated with the classification "secret."

Even the very idea of peeking through the checkpoint was considered seditious just a couple of years ago. Now the producers of the tanks themselves seem to have a vested interest in the disclosure of "state secrets."

**The General Said: We Will Rivet Pots and Pans**

The Plant imeni Malyshev has been "riveting" some pretty good tanks year after year over the last half century. Some of the best tanks in the world, to be precise. And when the word "conversion" was heard at the plant four years ago, many thought then that the sky would fall on their heads and rivers would run backwards before the need for their products disappeared. How naive those forecasts look today.

With the start of the broad-scale campaign for "disarmament," the VPK [military-industrial complex] was the first favorite offspring to get a fair thrashing by its own agency. They say that the former general director paid with his job only because he refused to sign the crash plan for a multiple increase in the output of civilian products on product lines that were not prepared for it. Today it is understandable to everyone that this was not only an unrealistic task, but an absurd one as well. And there was especially no time to reflect after the sensational transoceanic speeches by our general secretary. The general secretary is at the UN! What discussions there could be! Let's just hurry up and cut back and close down... Today, it seems, it is already possible to sum up some of the results of that process, which, it seemed to us, had gone successfully.

About 40 percent of the workers, according to some data, had been dismissed from the Plant imeni Malyshev PO after several years of so-called conversion [*konversiya*] (in the defense industry they call it "sabotage" [*diversiya*]). Many highly skilled workers and specialists in unique and rare professions themselves bailed out of the plant, having seen that everything was collapsing. By the middle of the eighties they were manufacturing several dozen of the most modern tanks and military tractors here—at the level of the world's best models, I emphasize. Today their production, expressed in plant terminology, has been cut back several orders of magnitude. An interesting expression, isn't it? They explained to me tête-à-tête that this signified that the plant was facing the threat of a curtailment of the production process.

The Plant imeni Malyshev, like most defense enterprises, was putting out many civilian products. It is worth saying that almost all domestic diesel locomotives "run" on Malyshev engines. But the situation is no better for those shops today either. The greatest good for the workers of the once-prestigious enterprise in Kharkov is to hear from the shop chief that there will still be work tomorrow... The engineers only shake their heads—no one in the world has converted tank production to the output of pots and pans in one stroke.



### Your Crane Into a Board, Ten-Millionth

Matters, true, have not yet reached pots and pans. They recently put an ironing board into production. A beautiful board—it costs more than a thousand rubles. There is no doubt that it would be better for housekeepers to iron on the floor than lay out a month's pay for such an innovation. But that is, as they say, a by-product of production; what about in place of the tanks?

Motorcycles! No, not for a spin—for agriculture. Four wheels, feels pretty good off the road and goes quite fast on a smooth road. This vehicle can plow or harrow, put various devices into motion and truck harvests. In short, if you believe Chief Engineer V. Galitskiy of the machine-building plant, this is not a vehicle but a dream for the rural inhabitant. So then, the peasants are snapping up these motorcycles? Not exactly, they answer, the price is steep. This conversation took place a couple of weeks ago, when the ZIM-350 cost only 40,000 rubles. Now it is 118,000. Fly to your dream, people! It is not profitable for the enterprise to sell its motorcycles for less—it would be working at a loss.

One could fantasize a little, and hope that the government will find some subsidies and a buyer will appear for the motorcycle—which is, by the way, not very likely. And not so much because of the fact that these funds simply do not exist, but rather for the simple reason that this motorcycle does not look like the machine that will “make it rain” in the village and feed us full. But suppose all of that were so. In that case, I would ask, could one consider that a serious product for the plant's capacity? Hardly, say the plant specialists—it is too trifling a product. And as for the shops where the tanks are made, they further explain, one can make either tanks or nothing in them, scrapping all of that expensive equipment. It is simply impossible to retool them. And there is no third way here, as they say.

What about a powerful crane on “tank tracks”?—the adherents of immediate demilitarization correct me. Well then, it is time to say a few words about this “miracle technology,” which, they justly note at the plant, has no world analogues. Such ideas really would not occur to everyone... But we will leave irony to better times and try to answer one simple question—who ordered this multi-ton, multi-million crane, at what jobs do they intend to use it? There is no answer, it turns out, or more precisely it goes like this—we will look for a buyer. And what if you don't find one? And another thing. Military equipment of this type has one design drawback—the motor does not last very long. It is difficult to call that a drawback, true, since the life of combat vehicles, as is well known, is short. But that is military hardware, and this is a super-crane that should “toil” for a minimum of decades so as to recoup the money spent on it. And it will perhaps not last that long. And designers who know this better than me continue to put the tank of dozens of tons and the crane in the same “harness.”

### What They Are Saying at the Machine Tools

The people at the Plant imeni Malyshev are in general in no way distinguished from the work force at other enterprises. They love to eat lunch, and a little something to drink after work wouldn't be bad. But they know how to work here. Up to now they remember with nostalgia the strained plant rhythm when they didn't pass through the checkpoint for half a day. But the pay, as they say, was commensurate. And now? The girls get more at the hosiery mill.

The opinion is widespread that the VPK is some kind of bloodthirsty monster that cares about just one thing—bringing forth as many weapons as possible and annihilating all of us. That does not, to put it mildly, quite correspond to reality. Starting from the general director and ending with the fitter, they are entirely peace-loving people, believe me, who would have a great desire to be making motor vehicles, baby carriages and toys. But insofar as they are still working at a defense enterprise, they reasonably ask, does Ukraine need our plant or not? Does the Ukrainian army need tanks or not? And when you recall that the Plant imeni Malyshev PO is not just military hardware, but a whole family of diverse engines as well, the question then does in fact inevitably arise—can all this be called conversion? After all, they haven't stopped the production of just the special hardware; the other shops are at the brink of stoppage as well.

The Malyshev people do not yet seem to intend to strike—what is the sense of these strikes, can the government really be intimidated, can they knock loose no less pay than the miners? But would life really improve from that? We want to work and earn money for a dignified human life, the workers said, and we do not understand why the government and the Supreme Soviet are depriving us of that right. Can it be that democracy, independence and freedom, they ask, do not signify discipline in production and order in the state?

### And Perhaps, Nonetheless...

Tanks? I know I am running up against a shattering picture, but I will try and pose a few questions and answer them from the viewpoint of common sense.

Can mankind get by without armies? Recent events, such as we remember as Desert Storm, prove that we will have to wait some time for overall disarmament. And insofar as we are creating our own army, and there are tanks in it, as is well known, Ukraine would seem to need a tank plant? No—opponents will note, not without grounds, there are enough for decades already. But recall that Storm once again, where it was not so much military talent as the latest hardware that triumphed. To shut down tank production completely, to break up the design bureau, would signify an automatic lag not only in the development of arms, but also in technical progress.

So fine, those same opponents will tell me, 5-10 of them a year maybe, but not 100-200. There could even be more, by the way, the equipment allows it. But if not,

then tell me, if you please, what we will do with it, if it is, as has already been said, not suited for anything else? Scrap it? But that is millions, billions, that we do not have enough of.

And a final question. Will there be fewer tanks on Earth if Ukraine rejects their production entirely? I think not. Supply is always found for demand, according to the laws of the market. Yes, the issue is the weapons trade, which we are for some reason bashful in talking about recently. We are experiencing want, large losses, we are begging around the world—and we are not putting into the market the product that would bring us solid profits in hard currency. It is incomprehensible why we have become such “peacemakers” if all the leading nations of the world—whose company we are striving to join—have been dealing successfully in various arms right up to the present. If we do not sell tanks, someone else will. And nothing will change in the world. And that being so, then perhaps it is worth it for us, along with our “big neighbor,” to stop the mutual door-slamming and destruction of economic and defense potential, and to be occupied with conventional global affairs. Who knows what awaits us tomorrow...

But I could be wrong.

#### Head of Defense Industrial Investment Enterprise Interviewed

92UM1386C Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian  
22 Jul 92 p 7

[Interview with Military Industrial Investment Company (VPIK) General Director Vitaliy Doguzhiyev by DELOVOY MIR Correspondent German Lomanov: “VPIK Is Beginning. Who Will Gain?”]

[Text] Conversations about conversion began several years ago but in fact no one hurried with conversion—in the defense industry, they hoped that they would manage to preserve the production of military equipment if not at the previous level, than at least at an acceptable level. But this year, it has been reduced by 60 percent and many enterprises have in general not received any orders. By the way, the extremely, extremely militarized United States intends to reduce its military budget by a factor of two over the next decade and Russia did that at a single stroke. What is happening in the military industrial complex [VPK] today, they delicately call wholesale conversion, although at times it is simply an elementary stoppage of plants—here we have gone our own way, along an up to now unknown path.

How can we help the defense industry, which has now turned out to be on the verge of catastrophe? And do we need to help, do we need to revive a dying monster that gobbled up our economy? Our Correspondent German Lomanov's interview with Military Industrial Investment Company (VPIK) General Director Vitaliy Doguzhiyev began with these questions.

#### In a Matter of Seconds

Normally special chemical laboratories determine the content of fat and protein in milk and each analysis takes 1.5-2 hours. One defense enterprise has developed an express analyzer which any milkmaid can work with directly on the farm—no special training is needed. At that, the analysis is ready literally after several seconds. VPIK is organizing and financing industrial production of the device.

[Doguzhiyev] We cannot revive the former military industrial complex, that is criminal. But it is just as criminal to lose the magnificent scientific and technological potential of the defense industry. Of course, the equipment at military industrial complex enterprises is worn out but it is still not like the equipment at other enterprises. And our company's task is to unite the capital of the entrepreneurs and the high technologies of the defense sectors.

[Lomanov] However, its very name already puts people on guard and many people involuntarily think: VPK, VPIK—what's the difference, two peas in a pod. There's the complex, here's the company, but both are military industrial...

[Doguzhiyev] The essence is not in the name. Why are we investing money in military industrial complex enterprises? Well first of all because they can produce goods that are competitive on the world market. But we are financing only the production of civilian products. VPIK is trying to assist enterprises that are converting, many of which right now are doomed to vegetation and then to death. VPIK's projects permit the preservation of jobs—you know what kind of unemployment our hasty, spontaneous conversion threatens. According to some predictions, this year 500,000 defense workers will find themselves on the street and, according to other predictions—1,000,000. Personally, I am inclined to think that the latter prediction is more realistic. Can we really remain indifferent?

[Lomanov] Will you not begin to assert that VPIK is acting from philanthropic motives. Like any commercial company, it must first of all be interested in its own benefit.

[Doguzhiyev] Well, what is the irony in that? First of all, we are involved with philanthropy. For example, specialists of the previously restricted NIIshetmash [Scientific Research Institute of Calculating Machines] at one time began to develop a computer suite for brain cancer radiation therapy. They could not complete it because of the chronic ailment of our entire science—a shortage of money. We allocated 1.5 million rubles to them to complete the work. Incidentally, if the new method proves its effectiveness, it has not been excluded that we will finance its series production—but already on a commercial basis. This method, judging by everything, is suitable for the diagnosis of any oncological diseases, not just for brain cancer.

Of course, you are correct—VPIK is a commercial structure and we must conduct our business in order to preserve and multiply capital and pay our stockholders well-deserved dividends. But, in contrast to the majority of new commercial structures that are primarily involved in intermediary activities, VPIK is investing money primarily in production. Unfortunately runaway inflation is not providing the opportunity to invest in the long-term programs that we would like to make the foundation of our activities. For now we have to invest capital in projects, the return on which will already begin this year and next year.

[Lomanov] Soon is not always profitable [play on words—skoro—ne vseгда sporo]. Recently, information that the famous Arzamas-16 intended to produce watercolor paint brushes jointly with some cooperative caught my eye. They proposed this project to the Institute only because they know how to weld together white tin at the “Soviet Los Alamos”. But really that’s not the only thing they know how to do there. It’s sad—a mighty institute, a mass of unique technologies, a brilliant assemblage of physicists and mathematicians and suddenly paint brushes...

[Doguzhiyev] If Arzamas-16 would turn to us, I hope that VPIK would be able to select something more serious and profitable from local know-how.

[Lomanov] Analysts note: many latter-day investment companies, a real boom is being observed in the creation of them, are stingy on information on their activities. And primarily because that they do not have any real investment projects. Are your projects also a “commercial secret”?

[Doguzhiyev] Not hardly. Here are some of them as an example. You know that the bottom of Siberian rivers is like a wooden sidewalk—sunken driftwood logs have paved it for decades. Several cooperatives, working practically manually, salvage nearly 1,500 cubic meters of timber per year. And there are millions of logs there—a truly golden bottom. Several space sector enterprises, which have united in “Kontekh” Corporation, are developing profilographs to explore the underwater “deposits”, manipulators to salvage the logs, microwave ovens for drying, and centrifuges for complete impregnation—in a word, an entire suite of equipment throughout the entire technological chain. Realization of this project will return into circulation hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of “worthless” timber, will improve the ecological situation in the rivers, and will provide a workload for excess capacity at converted enterprises. And we will recoup the investment in 1-1.5 years.

#### **The Air Will Become Fresher and the Profits Will Become Larger**

Disinfecting the air with ozone—is an ancient and well-known method, nevertheless native industry has not mastered the production of effective ozonizers. And there are interesting designs—NII [Scientific Research Institute]

thermal processes specialists, who are working in the space industry, have developed a small instrument to obtain an ozone-air mixture. Its weight is a total of 12 kilograms and its power requirement is no greater than a 40 watt bulb. The inexpensive ozonizer, that decontaminates containers and incubation chambers, will reduce the loss of chicks from infectious diseases and thereby substantially increase profits. According to expert assessments, this addition to a major poultry plant could reach R10 million per year. VPIK is financing the organization of series production of the ozonizer at electrotechnical industry enterprises.

[Lomanov] So, space firms are “diving” under water. Are you saving them based on an old friendship—as a man who devoted himself for many years to the formation of that sector?

[Doguzhiyev] No, for a businessman, personal predilections are impermissible in business. We select promising technologies regardless of sector. For example, we are financing the production of the anticancer compound platidiam. Until the collapse of the CMEA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance], the Czech firm “Laksma” supplied it to us, but right now clinics have been left without medication. Meanwhile, synthesis of the basic compound, from which they made the finished compound in the CSFR [Czech and Slovak Federal Republic], has been developed in our country. Why not see the chain through to the end? Nearly 200,000 doses will be produced already in the next few months. The profit is obvious—one dose of platidiam costs \$4 on the world market. We could saturate the domestic market and also enter the foreign market. We are financing production of diamond draw plates and knives for microsurgery. The draw plates cost \$3 each and a diamond knife—nearly \$1,000.

[Lomanov] And how many of these projects are there in your portfolio?

[Doguzhiyev] Approximately 150. But our experts have selected only 11 for financing. During the first stage, we have invested nearly R50 million in them. We borrowed another R20 million from “Tekos”, the largest commercial telecommunications network, which is already operating based on the Space Flight Control Center, MPS [not found], and “Rosneftgas” networks. Selection is very fierce—our experts propose for realization only those projects that, first of all, change the form of property of the project’s participants and, second, ensure a profit standard of no less than 400 percent at current prices.

[Lomanov] But inflation will consume it.

[Doguzhiyev] Some part of it—certainly, but the ruble’s depreciation is taken into account in business plans. Despite inflation, at the time when the output of the product begins, production will provide R600,000-800,000 profit for each million rubles invested. So, the potential investor himself can decide what is more profitable—to invest money in VPIK stock or to keep his

money in the bank, while observing the government's attempts to curb inflation. We are certain that our stock, in contrast to the ruble, will have a weighty and quite real value in two years since they are ensured through investments in production, in real estate and other assets that are constantly increasing in price.

#### Milk Will Not Turn Sour

In order to preserve the taste and quality of milk, you need to chill it directly at the farms, immediately after the milking—then you can transport it without fearing that it will turn sour. But there are no such refrigerators. Meanwhile, Russia's General Machinebuilding Department NII [Scientific Research Institute] Thermal Processes has an original development—a gas dynamics cooling device. Air that is injected by a compressor is cooled to minus 20-40 degrees and is pumped through a liquid in which an ice sludge is formed. A heat exchanger is located in that sludge and, while passing through its pipes, the milk is rapidly cooled to minus 4-6 degrees. The machine's capacity is nearly a tonne of milk per hour. Neither freon nor ammonia is used in it—the GDKhA device is simple to operate and meets the highest ecological requirements. VPIK is financing series production, we propose initiating production in 1993-1994, and the planned volume is 10,000 units per year. Defense complex enterprises will be the primary manufacturers—their high technological potential guarantees the quality and reliability of the new refrigeration machines.

[Lomanov] Incidentally, who are your stockholders?

[Doguzhiyev] There are nearly 900, you can't list them all, I will name only the largest: Russia and Moscow Credit Partnerships, "Finist-Bank", "Kapital-Tsentr", the subsidiary firm of BUTEK "ISV" Concern, "Ural-mash" PO [Production Association], "Yupiter" Insurance Company, "Iskra" AO [Joint-Stock Company], "Impuls" NPO [Scientific Production Association], NPO imeni Pleshakov, and Taganrog Aircraft Complex imeni Beriyeu. We issued one million common registered shares at a cost of R1,000 each. Juridical persons can subscribe for a 50,000-share package and free sale has been open for physical persons since 1 July. Judging by the articles in DELOVOY MIR, in April-June our shares were being sold on the stock market, despite its obvious depression, for 5-40 percent above the face value. Of course, the company sells them only at face value.

[Lomanov] Your charter capital—is R1 billion. Quite a bit but not a lot. Conversion in Russia will require hundreds of billions. Is it sufficient to compare these figures...

[Doguzhiyev] In order to understand—VPIK is incapable of retooling the entire defense industry. We are not even attempting to do that, but, don't consider this to be immodesty, we would like to beat the path along which others will travel. A government decree authorizes investment companies' operations on the stock market but actually prohibits direct investments in industry: if

you want to invest money—buy stock. But the stock market in our country is in its infancy, moreover the overwhelming majority of enterprises, while changing the form of ownership, are becoming restricted stock companies and their securities are not appearing on the market. And in the defense industry—becoming a stock company is generally unplowed virgin land. And we have decided to become involved with that. We want to take several capital military industrial complex enterprises and to transform them into stock companies—this will permit us to work out the methods which are suitable for others. I am convinced: our society is still not mature enough for the appearance of private defense firms, but the realization of major investment projects is practically impossible without their partial or total transformation into stock companies.

[Lomanov] I don't know how you feel, but mass privatization, especially in the defense industry, appears to be the next myth to me...

[Doguzhiyev] In any case, privatization of state enterprises as single property complexes is unlikely, they are unattractive for private investors because of their low profitability. The economists who are cooperating with us suggest that the creation of mixed private-state enterprises that use only that part of state property that is necessary for the production of competitive products that enjoy effective demand. That is profitable for a private investor or his broker—the investment company—because it increases his capital, it is the state's share (buildings, equipment...) that requires large initial expenditures. And this symbiosis is advantageous for the state since it permits the attraction of additional investments and involves dynamic entrepreneurs in a deal who, while concerned about their share of the capital, will force the mixed enterprise to operate efficiently.

#### How Do You Aim a Beam "Cannon"

X-ray and gamma radiation, that suppresses the growth of cancer cells, has long been used to treat oncological diseases. However, the use of this method in hospitals is fraught with difficulties—only very experienced clinicians can skillfully outline the field of impact on a patient's skin and provide the required dose and time. A small mistake and the radiation begins to destroy not only cancerous but also healthy cells. Now a personal computer, to which a graphics terminal with a 256 color monitor has been connected, will assume responsibility for radiation therapy planning. The system analyzes the x-rays of the affected organ that have been taken by the tomograph, helping the doctor to aim the beam "cannon" in such a way that healthy organs and tissues do not suffer during treatment. Specialists of the formerly restricted NIIshet-mash [Scientific Research Institute of Calculating Machines] began to develop the beam therapy planning suite for the Institute of Neurosurgery imeni N. Burdenko. VPIK has allocated R1 million to complete the work.

Now about our billion—is that a lot or a little. A little bit of course. Therefore VPIK is beginning to create regional

structures that will permit the accumulation of free investment resources locally and will help to implement our projects on the periphery. Having thus increased the investment potential, we will be able to realize major programs, for which, strictly speaking, VPIK was created. Regional centers have already begun or will begin work in the near future in St. Petersburg, Stavropol, Nizhniy Novgorod, Omsk, Voronezh, Belgorod, and Zlatoust. We are also beginning to establish foreign ties. "YEVRO-MIK INVEST", a Russian-Hungarian joint venture, has been created. VPIK Council of Directors Member V. Surikov has become one of the founders of "Sovkonsalting", a Russian-American joint venture with headquarters in Washington. We have concluded an agreement with this firm—we will consult Western investors and seek the most profitable investment programs for them in Russia.

[Lomanov] Six months work has shown that VPIK is one of the first investment companies that has managed to more or less successfully avoid the many reefs on the unknown waterway. But the majority of business people think that it would be good to clean up the waterway itself. Do you agree with that?

[Doguzhiyev] Absolutely. A number of barriers interfere with the successful operation of investment companies and the main one is the absence of state and regional concepts of economic development that precisely define investment priorities. If there was such a strategy that provided for a system of coordinated incentives and benefits, private investors and the state would be able to act together, while directing the flow of capital primarily into production. But for now the Central Bank of Russia has made investment in it unprofitable, having repealed the restriction on credit rates and having provoked their drastic increase. And that is under conditions when the rates of inflation are increasing, the population is becoming impoverished, and high taxes are stifling manufacturers. As a result, investment companies are investing their resources not in securities but in short-term money market assets, while granting short-term credit, and are acting as the banks' competitors. And their role is different, yes, the difference between credits and investments is great. The bank provides money under firm guarantees which are ensured by material resources—if the borrower does not repay the credit, the security becomes the property of the bank. Investment companies invest resources while calculating on future profits—there are fewer guarantees here and the risk is greater. In my opinion, the government, while considering that risk, must reduce the tax on profits of investment companies—this stimulates the accumulation of real investment resources and ultimately, the development of production.

Well, of course, enormous difficulties arise due to the lack of a stock market—it is impossible to consider the sluggishly circulating stocks and bonds of a dozen or so stock companies to be a stock market. We are convinced: we need to urgently create a national stock system, our specialists have developed its concept and have submitted it for discussion.

[Lomanov] Let's return to specific matters. The tens of millions invested in production—that is a small sum in comparison to the billion ruble charter capital. Moreover, they will bring a return not tomorrow yes and you will hardly obtain large dividends from these investments. Aren't you afraid that your stocks will decline in price?

[Doguzhiyev] Our stockholders have nothing to fear. The company's council of directors understands very well the obvious truth of commerce: money must make money. Four-fifths of the company's monetary capital is in circulation which provides no less than 80 percent profit. VPIK was created not for trading-brokerage activities but we have been forced to become involved in it because we are obliged to protect our stockholders' interests.

[Lomanov] It's sad that a company that dreams of raising our collapsing industry and of helping conversion has been forced to become involved in not quite that.

[Doguzhiyev] It's no less sad than Arzamas-16's water-color paint brushes. But then again, we intend to turn over our sales—brokerage activities to VPIK's specially created subsidiary firms. We will create a system to protect investments from risk. We hope that sooner or later the investment climate will change and the company will earn with all its might, having concentrated on the main direction—financing major industrial projects that are capable of saturating our market with modern scientific-intensive products and saving industry from ruin.

[Lomanov] And the last, a personal question. You were the director of a large defense plant, minister of a space sector, and vice premier. Now you head a purely commercial structure. Where was it easier to work?

[Doguzhiyev] If you regard your business seriously and responsibly, it is difficult everywhere. We are striving to create and consolidate not simply a company of capital—a company of minds. In my opinions, we have all of the preconditions. VPIK has united a new generation of businessmen and people who worked in the military industrial complex for many years and who know it thoroughly but who understand that the military industrial complex will either enter the market or will ultimately collapse—there is no third way.

I think it will enter.

**VPIK 's Investments in Production (in millions of rubles)**

Project	Value
"Platidium" anticancer preparation	1.0
Diamond instrument	1.0
Surplus military equipment catalog	4.5
Conveyer belts for APK [not found]	5.2
Ozonizers for farms	2.0
Ray therapy system	1.5
Salvaging and processing "driftwood logs"	41.0
Refrigerators for dairy farms	2.5
Timber processing	40.0
Biological fertilizer	8.0
International business communications system	10.0
Total:	114.7

**Corruption in St Petersburg Defense Conversion**

92UM1386B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA  
in Russian 28 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Dmitriy Gromadin: "It Is Better To Feed Our Own Bureaucrats"]

[Text] Vice Mayor Vyacheslav Shcherbakov's report on the government program of social assistance to Leningrad Military District servicemen was heard at yesterday's City Soviet Presidium session. Its cost is nearly one billion rubles. It is proposed that R475 million will be allocated for the construction of housing and R400 million for the creation of farms.

However a certain newly formed Russian Military Industrial Association, located in Moscow and formed from workers of the former USSR Council of Ministers, stated its rights to this billion rubles and promised the government to "properly" spend these funds in Leningrad Military District.

At the same time, the military district, naval base, MB [training base], GUVB [Main Directorate of Internal Affairs], PVO [Air Defense], the city administration and the oblast administration have created "Voyenstroy" Joint-Stock Company, the charter task of which is precisely social assistance to servicemen.

In the opinion of the deputies, the practice of the existence of a Moscow association of such concerns indicates that they are being created as a feeding trough for the former nomenklatura. And it is better to feed our own bureaucrats—it is easier to control them because they are here and not in Moscow.

A decision was made to create a working group of representatives of the interested parties to work out joint steps in the government and in the Supreme Soviet.

On the whole, more than 17,000 active duty servicemen and nearly 10,000 reservists need housing in the military

district. It is anticipated that another nearly 3,000 servicemen needing housing will be added during the course of relocating Russian troops from other regions of the CIS into the district. The draft Presidential Ukase "On Allotting Plots of Land to the Residents of St. Petersburg" that was prepared in the city soviet and the corresponding government instructions were also discussed. It is assumed that the city and oblast will create a mixed commission which must allocate plots of land within a 70 kilometer zone surrounding the city to all preferential categories of city residents.

**Problems in Conversion of Electronics Plant**

92UM1386A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 7 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Mikhaylov: "Competitors Are Also not Required Abroad"]

[Text] "Istok"—is not just an enterprise. It is also an entire city—the Moscow suburb of Fryazino, one of the largest electronics instrument making centers in our country. It worked primarily on defense but never shunned peaceful orders.

"I recall I was reading some science fiction novel about a robot-microsurgeon that could be sent to any point of the human body," recalled gas medical laser laboratory Chief V. Aleynikov, "The novel was called 'Glotayte khirurgu!' [Swallow the Surgeon!]. An empty invention, it would seem, but we implemented that dream."

The conversation about installing "Yantar": it will permit a laser beam to reach any point of the human body and will destroy blood clots, clean out blood vessels and cut out tumors.

Besides "Yantar", "Istok" manufactures quite a bit of other medical equipment.

In brief, "Istok" is not one of those enterprises for which conversion means the cessation of activity. A large scientific reserve, forces of skilled specialists and scientists, and high technologies—all of that is already finding application in the national economy. Taking advantage of freed-up capacity, "Istok" is undertaking to improve satellite and radio-relay communications systems. Microwave heating is also very promising. Just one example. In our country, there is an enormous quantity of submerged logs—timber that have settled on the bottom of rivers used for transportation. It is impossible to simply raise them to the surface—they will soon be transformed into rotten wood and they will rot. If you dry them using microwave energy, you will obtain the highest quality timber.

All of these new directions are receiving development right now. The return would be soon. If...

"If they did not create obstacles for us," "Istok" General Director Aleksandr Korolev frankly said. "Several months ago, we stopped one of the production lines because, as they told us, the need for its product had fallen off. Fortunately, we did not begin to destroy anything. And they called me recently: that same equipment is urgently needed. That isn't some type of accidental blunder. Russia doesn't have a precise, clear military doctrine. Yes, things have become a bit more cordial in the world but each country has a defense doctrine and, naturally, Russia must have one. We must determine as soon as possible how much and what we need for our armed forces. We need to know what we can and what we should not use for conversion.

"And another thing. Has our government pondered the fact that the production of military equipment could become unprofitable for us? In that case, having acquired independence, we will simply not accept unprofitable orders. And, by the way, everything is headed in that direction. Based on the existing procedures, the customers, while concluding contracts with us for the delivery of instruments, track so that our average salary does not exceed the four minimum salaries of 342 rubles. Although there is an decree where the minimum wage has been determined to be R900. It turns out that our customers do not want to recognize presidential authority.

"Defense complexes and small cities near them were built comprehensively: they immediately provided housing and other social benefits to the people. Therefore, a large portion of the housing in the city, 15 children's preschool institutions, the Palace of Culture, and a multitude of other structures of a social nature are on 'Istok's' balance sheet to this day. Last year, that cost 'Istok' R11.3 million, it has currently required R11.6 million in the first quarter alone, and a total of no less than R60 million will be required this year.

"That calculation was performed last April and prices are rising. Now let's take into account that a profit of R120 is anticipated this year and so far we have managed to scrape up only R9 million for new equipment from it. Everything is headed toward the fact that the city will ultimately consume the enterprise's profit and will practically cease its further development and, of course, conversion.

"Right now Mosoblsoviet [Moscow Oblast Soviet] does not permit to take more than 20 kopeks from city residents for water. Heat is also sold to them cheaply based on current concepts. 'Istok' uses its profits to pay for the difference between the actual cost and the prices established by the authorities. This is a delicate situation. The 'Istok' administration understands that it is impossible to totally transfer these expenditures onto its own workers and employees since they will be simply unable to withstand that load. But we could increase

payments by a factor of two. That would not be so burdensome for the population and at the same time would help 'Istok' to deal with its financial difficulties.

"Already today, by way of illustration, three kindergartens are empty. They decided to sell them at a labor collective conference and the trade union also does not object to that. Buyers could also be found for some other buildings that were built using 'Istok's' resources. People are prepared to suffer somewhat for the sake of preserving the enterprise and the city where they live and work. However, everything that has been accumulated over the years and that 'Istok' erected now belongs not to it and not even to the Department of the Electronics Industry. Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee for Property Management], that has arrived to replace the faceless but ubiquitous state, has become the owner of everything around here. Alas, the new owners aren't any more charitable than the old owners and they don't intend to give their approval which for some reason they call their own.

"As for the international market, we have already understood: We will not penetrate it through our own efforts," thinks Korolev. "No one is waiting for us there. The firms which have mastered high technologies have already distributed and shared everything. Therefore, whether you want to or not, you will have to enter into a cooperative with someone. Not compete but cooperate with our competitors. But we still haven't managed to establish contacts. The U.S. government is directly impeding the import of foreign electronic equipment, having raised the duties on it to 39 percent. If we lagged behind the United States, we wouldn't need protective measures. However, American scientists know that we have scientific-technical achievements in the technology of manufacturing microwave instruments and in microwave technology and that 'Istok' is not losing to anyone. Specialists from abroad frequently call on us, walk around and near, but not for the sake of joint work, but only to obtain our know-how and to raise the level of their own product. So, we have had to come to the conclusion: the United States is not interested in the development of our electronics center and that is why we should not expect any assistance from them."

#### **Defense Industry's Economic Needs Viewed**

92UM1415A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 14 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by Oleg Rosnitskiy under the rubric "Conversion": "Defense and the Defense Industry: It Is Time to Reconcile Interests"]

[Text] It is not surprising in the present situation that there is constant debate at various levels on the political, military and economic problems of the military and the VPK [military-industrial complex], the foundation of the country's technical military might and at the same time a heavy burden on the economy and the people. The problems cannot be solved without reconciling the



interests of the military and the VPK with those of the entire society and of each individual citizen. We must not forget that those people drawn into this conglomeration by the militarized system—servicemen, workers in the VPK and their families—are the same sort of impoverished citizens of Russia as you and I.

### **The Military Must Also Live Like "Human Beings"**

Every day we see on television mountains of rusting tanks, of which we have produced 64,000, twice as many as the NATO nations taken together and three times as many as we had in 1941. The reduction of the Soviet military by 500,000 men announced by Gorbachev had no major economic consequences. Advocacy of the idea of establishing a smaller army of professionals by many scholars and specialists evoked a storm of protest on the part of the generals and marshals Akhromeyev and Yazov, who based their position on the high cost of such an army. They were right, of course. No nation can afford a professional army of 5 million men. But the larger the army, the more generals. And we were "ahead of the rest of the entire planet" in this area as well.

Military reform is presently proceeding in Russia, slowly but inexorably. One of its features is a gradual transition to a professional army. The proposed numerical strength of the Russian military is 1.2-1.5 million. The degree of militarization of the population will be approximately the same as in the USA but higher than in China, for example, not to speak of Japan. The military will take the most valuable part of Russia's manpower, young and healthy men, potential farmers, entrepreneurs, guardians of order and other active categories of the population. The size of the military is sometimes justified by citing the great length of our borders. We know, however, that the numerical strength of the Border Troops was only 220,000. Possibilities for further reducing the Russian military have not been exhausted. Nor have possibilities for the social protection of the servicemen. Since we are seeking admission to the "big eight," we must provide a proper standard of living not just for the top brass, but also for the soldiers, NCOs and lower-ranking officers. And we have something to strive for. A sergeant in the American infantry on barracks status receives 700 dollar per month; a junior officer, 2,400, and the state provides an apartment measuring up to Western standards for him and his family. And so, free will for the servicemen in the signing of a contract and fitting pay for his work and the risk involved in the performance of his military duties are the basis for reconciling his interests with those of the state and the society.

### **Conversion and Reconversion**

In the recent past the term "conversion" had a dual meaning. In the USA during World War II, for example, the term "conversion" meant the modification of civilian industry for military production, and the term "reconversion" was used to refer to the reverse, the switch back to civilian production. The reconversion meant, among other things, that when the war ended,

Ford plants successfully reverted to the output of the prewar, 1939 model automobile, and there was an all-around return (within 1.5-2 years) to civilian production. In the USA the term "conversion" presently means the demilitarization of the economy and a switch to the output of civilian products.

Our trouble is that many enterprises of the VPK were set up exclusively to produce military products. They are narrowly specialized and accustomed to operating under the system of administration by command, an extravagant economy and generous financing with the slogan "Results at Any Cost." They have nowhere to return to in the conversion and are prevented from moving ahead toward respecialization by a lack of available funds. In the USA, with its stable political and economic situation, detailed laws have been worked out specifying who plans and finances the conversion, who defends the interests of workers in the VPK, who finds jobs for them and retrain them, while we have set about the conversion in a situation of a disintegrated USSR and a collapsed economy, with neither the funds nor the legal means of directing it. Incidentally, the secretaries of commerce and labor are co-chairmen of the American Council for Regulation of the Conversion, and its members include many cabinet members (the secretary of defense, among others) and representatives of the commercial sector of the economy and labor unions.

Japan's postwar history is an example of a decisive, rigid conversion. Immediately after the war the production of all military products was forbidden there by order of the headquarters of the occupation forces, and half of the capacities of the machine-tool industry and all armaments and aircraft plants, a total of more than 900 enterprises, were confiscated entirely for the payment of reparations. The government had no choice but to initiate a program of structural reforms of industry in a situation of extremely limited financial resources. When one considers Japan's limited sources of raw materials, one has to admit that the conversion in Russia today is hardly more dramatic than in the Japan of that time. How did the Japanese find their way out of this abyss.

Through talks and agreements between the government and the occupation authorities, by liberalizing the economy and privatizing military enterprises, by adopting foreign management methods and new technology, they achieved a steady growth of economic effectiveness, particularly in motor-vehicle engineering and radioelectronics. Every child knows what Japan represents today.

Even during the era of the USSR we were forced to write that the nation's government lacked the political will to effect a large-scale conversion. Is Russia truly going to take that same path?

### **"A State Within a State"**

Workers with the VPK, attached military personnel and their families could form the population of a respectable European state, perhaps even a member of the "big



seven." But this is an extremely specialized state. Its citizens do not produce any of the goods for life but only consume goods produced outside of that state, expending their efforts exclusively on the conversion of top-quality raw materials and other resources into "goods" which are useless in the daily lives of the people. Marx' "money-goods-money" formula does not function here, because there is no natural circulation of capital. The freedom of citizens of our imaginary state of the VPK is limited to military posts, bases, ranges, "mail boxes" and entire closed cities. Not so long ago the most talented of them labored entirely in Beria's camps. The system of administration by command and an extravagant economy penetrated into every nook and cranny of this "state within a state," and its leaders were situated at the pinnacles of power.

Workers in the VPK are also beginning to grumble, however. We must understand them, people who performed their assigned jobs conscientiously for decades. The work was performed on the basis of special decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers and was always considered important. It is no longer needed. Large quantities of weapons and other military supplies stockpiled at storage facilities are being stolen because there is no civilized market for them. Now the Moscow defense workers are prepared for a warning strike. Their situation is truly disastrous. Their average wage is 1,200-1,700 rubles per month, a third of them are on unpaid leave and some of them have been placed on a three-day work week. It is estimated that 50% of them will be unemployed by the end of the year. What are they demanding? They are demanding that the size and the makeup of the state order for their products be specified once and for all, that they be permitted to form their own survival strategy and reorientation toward the civilian consumer and that they be authorized to engage in independent foreign economic activities. In short, the people are demanding economic freedom.

#### **The Defense Industry and Economic Freedom**

Economic freedom for the producers of goods and services competing among themselves for the consumer helps to increase the wealth of the entire society. In the situation today we are still a long way from that kind of civilized market. Right now thievery, profiteering from scarce commodities and organized crime are thriving. Even today, however, the society's wealth can be enhanced only by demilitarizing the economy, conversion and the development of entrepreneurship, primarily in agriculture and in the light and food industries.

The solution to the VPK's problems lies in extending the greatest possible economic freedom to its collectives. This is consistent with the Russian government's reform line. Restructuring of the militarized economy, in-depth and large-scale conversion, privatization of most defense enterprises, the involvement of entrepreneurs and Russian and foreign capital in the conversion, and government guarantees of security for the entrepreneurs and

their capital—these are the ways to overcome the dead-end system. Economic freedom in and of itself cannot automatically provide prosperity, of course. It is only the condition under which prosperity is possible. We must learn how to use that freedom productively to develop entrepreneurial initiative directed toward the good of the people.

In order to attract private investments into the conversion we must do a considerable amount of work in the legislative area, of course, as well as alter the mass thinking in a way to promote the implementation of the laws. A certain amount of legislative work is being performed in Russia. Among other things, Russia's Supreme Soviet has ratified the State Program for the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises of the RF [Russian Federation] for the Year 1992. A second group of enterprises whose privatization is permitted but requires the consent of the governments of Russia or its constituent republics, depending upon the form of ownership, is of greatest interest in the area we are discussing. They include facilities and enterprises for the manufacture or repair of systems and components of all types of weapons and for ammunition production, and nuclear-power engineering enterprises.

The behavior of many directors of enterprises undergoing conversion has also caused big difficulties. The problem is that in the past the interests of the investor state were observed not by achieving profitability for a project but by achieving the result at any cost. One cannot deal with the private investor that way. He is investing his own money, and he wants to have an accurate idea of what kind of benefit he will receive, and when. It turns out that enterprises entering into negotiations with a potential investor are ignoring his interests entirely and operating in the old way, as though with their own ministry. You give us something, and that is the end of it. Many enterprises have doctors and candidates of sciences on the staff, including economists, but they are not accustomed to considering the commercial prospects for expensive, long-term projects and do not know how to compile a convincing business plan for the investor. This is one more reason why it is essential to have broad and specific interaction with enterprises with nonstate structures, with the entrepreneurs, in setting up joint production projects.

According to Andrey Kokoshin, a deputy defense minister of Russia, Russia's defense will be based on economics. The Ministry of Defense will build its relations with enterprises on a new, contract-based legal foundation, while the enterprises may be state and private combinations or joint-stock companies. These timid advances in the resolution of the defense industry's problems do not inspire great optimism, but they do give us hope. We have repeatedly advocated bringing the VPK into the general stream of economic reform and large-scale conversion. A move toward a socially oriented market and economic freedom is the only way to reconcile the interests of the entire people, the military and VPK contingent, the individual, the society and the state.

## MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### **Lt-Gen Belyayev on Evacuation of Kabul Embassy** *92UM1479A Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Sep 92 p 3*

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Valeriy Nikolayevich Belyayev, first deputy commander of the airborne troops, by Pavel Penezhko: "Thirty-Four Schwarzeneggers"]

[Text] Lieutenant-General Valeriy Belyayev, first deputy commander of the airborne troops, tells in detail about the evacuation of diplomats from Kabul.

[Penezhko] Valeriy Nikolayevich, you are the one who carried out the directive from the chief of the Main Staff on this dangerous expedition. Was it regarded as a regular operation or as some kind of special one?

[Belyayev] The term "operation" is too grand. It has a different quality in our lexicon. What we had was a special mission performed by a subunit of airborne troops.

[Penezhko] All the same, you no doubt worked out alternative plans, including plans for the most adverse situations, and took into account foreign experience—that unsuccessful attempt by the Americans to evacuate their embassy in Iran, for example. In short, what happened—the shelling, the loss of people and equipment—was it all covered to some degree in the plans?

[Belyayev] No. Provisions were not made for that scenario. Nor do we have information on international experience in evacuating embassies. What did we rely on? On patriotism, professional training, loyalty to duty, readiness to carry out orders, mutual assistance and a precise understanding by everyone of his duties.

[Penezhko] So the entire responsibility for the success of the mission lay on those actually performing the job, that is, on the soldiers. What did those who sent them into fire take on? Incidentally, why were our aircraft greeted that way in Kabul? What do you think?

[Belyayev] That is a question for Comrade Kozyrev. I do not know. I am not a diplomat.

[Penezhko] The entire experience of the war in Afghanistan had taught us how little they respect agreements with "shuravi" [Soviets], to put it mildly. Why did we not take this into account?

[Belyayev] No, there was only one scenario: land at the airport, take the diplomatic staff on board, provide security and defense.

[Penezhko] About the defense.... Our MIGs were patrolling above the Kabul airport. Why did they not open fire to suppress the fire positions? The Ministry of Defense

says that this was because the Mujahedin were firing from residential areas. This really does not sound very convincing, though.

[Belyayev] This is outside my area of authority. The MIGs are not a part of the airborne troops. There were 34 of our "Schwarzeneggers in T-shirts." You will have to ask the chief of the General Staff about the behavior of the MIGs.

[Penezhko] How were the members of the group selected, and how were they briefed?

[Belyayev] The members were selected on the basis of a directive from the General Staff. The senior officer had to have combat experience. Our choice fell on Lieutenant-Colonel Ivonik, a regimental chief of staff who fought in Afghanistan and was awarded the orders of the Red Star and Red Banner. There were two doctors with experience in combat....

[Penezhko] And what about the lieutenant and the privates?

[Belyayev] They had never been under fire, of course. It was a reconnaissance company, however, fellows with excellent training, specialists in their area of work. And all of them were recommended for awards.

## SECURITY SERVICES

### **Security Service Deputy on Formation, Work of "Special Services"**

*92UM1337C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
17 Jul 92 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Major-General Vasiliy Stepanovich Gorbatyuk, first deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Security Service, by Major Vladimir Knysh, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent: "General of the Special Service"]

[Text] In the Khmelnytskyi area there is the village of Mytintsy. It is not well known. For him, there is no more beautiful place in the entire world, there is no place sweeter. For there is the father's house and infinitely precious to his heart are the people whom he only sees during leave.

The remaining 11 months of the year he is a Kievan. Like all the city dwellers, he takes advantage of the goods of Kievan life. But, in contrast to many of us, he lives in a constant shortage of time. Such work. It takes up for Major-General of the Ukrainian Security Service Vasiliy Stepanovich Gorbatyuk not only a daily 12-16 hours of his life but also partially "takes over" his days-off.

You might not believe it if you were told that he is happy to do this. But this is his way of life.

We met at the Congress of Young Politicians. The First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Security Service, Major-General Vasiliy Gorbatyuk did not have the time

to answer the numerous questions of its participants. One of them particularly comes to mind, the most hair-splitting. He spoke loudly, expressively, without trying to conceal his emotions and the negative attitude toward the Security Service.

But there was no verbal duel. The general answered his aggressive questioner with absolute calmness and with great sincerity. He did not try to avoid the hard questions. And it went well for him. No wonder it would have been impossible to hold one's own against the frankness of the general in an impeccable civilian suit...

[Knysh] Just what is the current Security Service?

[Gorbatyuk] This is a special purpose law enforcement body. Certainly in the future it should be that special service which should be found in any democratic state. The People's Deputy Levko Lukyanenko (he is currently the Ukrainian ambassador to Canada), for example, feels that our special service should be created according to the model and like the German BND. It impresses him. Others find more to their liking, for instance, the British Intelligence Service. A third group prefers the American and still others the French. We, though, do not feel it necessary to copy the Germans, the Americans or the English. We rather shall try to take the best from world experience. In terms, of course, of our conditions. It must not be forgotten that Ukraine is in the geographic center of Europe. For this reason our special service also should have its specific character. It should both contrast with the others, and in some ways be reminiscent of our partners and rivals.

For now our agency is in a stage of organization. Certainly the Security Service was set up only on 20 September of last year. We began to really work after the adoption on 25 May of the current year of the Law on the Ukrainian Security Service. Only after this did the legal basis appear for our activities.

[Knysh] Could one say that the experience of the former special service (I have in mind the KGB) would not be employed in the new structure?

[Gorbatyuk] First of all, I would like to make one essential clarification. The KGB was a conglomerate and not a pure special service. Political spying, intelligence and counterintelligence, the guarding of the frontiers and other activities not inherent to a special service, along with which it had to be an armed detachment of the party—even this is a not complete list of the total scope over all the spheres of life of society and the state.

Generally, what is a special service? It is intelligence and counterintelligence. It does not even include special operations. But the KGB was a colossal monster, actually a state within the state. What have we taken from the former KGB? Intelligence and counterintelligence (in principle these are not altered) and the fight against organized crime. The methods and procedures for conducting these are characteristic not only for the KGB but also for all the world's special services. And these are as

old as the world. Even the Bible mentions this form of work. For example, a well concealed agent network is indispensable. For this reason I categorically reject the idea when they say that supposedly the Ukrainian Security Service has adopted the methods and procedures of KGB work. It is a question only of general approaches which characterize such a specific sphere of activity throughout the world. Some more advanced equipment could be invented for carrying out our operations. But the fundamental aspect, the work methods are unalterable.

[Knysh] Then let us talk about what is admissible for the Security Service.

[Gorbatyuk] There is no and there never again will be any police political spying.

[Knysh] Clearly, before this was the most powerful area of activity.

[Gorbatyuk] If somewhat approximately, this encompassed something like an eighth of it. Certainly the KGB endeavored to keep control over all the processes which were linked with ideological questions, the nationalistic movement, dissidence in order not to allow even the slightest center of opposition to arise. Now everything is completely different. We do not intervene into ideology and politics if the constitutional standards are not being violated. On the contrary, what was previously an object of persecution is now defended by the special service, for persecution is contrary to the law. Many people, unfortunately, still do not understand this, although it is actually a very crucial difference. Certainly ideology itself has fundamentally changed. We are searching for a path to national conciliation in Ukraine, we have sincerely accepted its statedom and we are doing everything so that it becomes a mighty, independent power.

Of course, at present we are using the services of the old experienced personnel of officers. Certainly professionalism is attained only by years of the hardest work, by the most difficult rough work, and it would be the greatest stupidity to give up their services. Even the Bolsheviks did not refuse the Tsarist special agents.

[Knysh] Since the conversation has come round to the professionalism of the special service worker, it would be interesting to know if your boyhood dreams have come true. You remember how we all dreamed of becoming a pilot, a cosmonaut, a sailor and an intelligence officer, but all of a sudden here you are a general, and not a simple one...

[Gorbatyuk] You know, I think that for young people the notion of an "intelligence officer" is excessively complex and at the same time oversimplified. They have fallen in love with Shtirlits and they do not go any deeper. More than one generation has been raised on this and other films about intelligence agents. For me, everything was quite different. I saw a different path for myself. For this

reason I was admitted to the artistic trade school in Uzhgorod, and became enamored of folk art. But that was not to be my destiny...

[Author's comment.] At all times the special services have not just collected people off the street. Whatever is said about the shortcomings of the former personnel policy, the so-called "bodies" recruited the finest of the fine. Let us be objective about this. Vasilii Gorbatyuk was no exception. Even regardless of his social origin, his ancestors, his father and mother and all his relatives who since time immemorial had worked the land and had been peasants. No one could dissuade them of the advantages of other work. Intelligent, very dutiful in his work, honest to the point of overscrupulousness, the peasant lad came to the notice of the appropriate "organization." In truth, when he was already a worker at the city Komsomol and had become... a junior field agent. But still a peasant son. We might recall the anecdote about the major's son who would never make general as the latter also had a son.

Would it be easy for him, a fellow from the deep country around Podolsk, to clamber up the service ladder in such an elite organization? Certainly the KGB as everywhere else had its own hierarchy, its own unswerving "taboos." There were the simple talented field workers and those who "by birth" were to take the places of the superiors.

Although what does one mean by eliteness? If one speaks specifically about my interlocutor, in this case one would have to speak about eliteness of the mind. Fortunately, in the "bodies" they have always appreciated the personal qualities of a person, his abilities, his desire to work at full strength and... the absence of claims in an ordinary officer to leading positions which were taken by the party elite. But let us return to this later in another lyrical, if one can put it that way, digression.

[Knysh] All the same, this was a process of transition from an ordinary man to "Shtirlits," wasn't it? Or was it simply that they took you, thank goodness, and you were a worker in the special service?

[Gorbatyuk] I would not say that I had to work excessively hard. When you are admitted to the service, they do not say just what specifically your job will be. This is established by a testing system, and your civilian specialty and individual abilities are considered. A former engineer could work with the questions of protecting the economy within the nation or become an intelligence officer. The difficulties appear somewhat later when you encounter completely unfamiliar disciplines or the necessity of more closely following the principle of covert operations. But in time a person becomes used to this. I should even say that sometimes a certain disappointment appears. Certain reality ends up much more prosaic. Everyone prepares for heroic deeds and at worst for finding spies. Pursuit, shots and interrogation—generally the complete image of Shtirlits. But in fact it is the hardest, rough and often routine work. There are those who do not last and request retirement.

[Knysh] So they are right in saying that a co-worker in the special service is not a profession but a way of life?

[Gorbatyuk] A person plunges headlong into his work and for a long time cannot "dig out." He often forgets about his family and rarely sees his wife and children. Because of such specific conditions one can say that our work is a way of life.

[Knysh] Well, all the wives of your co-workers accept this correctly and tolerate this way of life?

[Gorbatyuk] Our personnel officers without fail study not only the candidate but also the family of the future colleague. Priority is given to married officers. A family certainly entails an organizing, cementing focus and is a very strong factor of support. If it is seen that the spouse would not accept such a life, the man will not work with us. If a man is perfect in all other ways, then a final decision will be taken only after a talk with his wife. Without going into details, they tell her of many hardships which await both the husband and the family. She learns, in particular, that she can give up the hope of gaining an apartment sooner and so forth.

[Author's comment.] In actuality a complicated question. But here Vasilii Gorbatyuk was lucky. He married a girl who accepted all the conditions of his future "Shtirlits life," and approved of the way of life for the junior field agent. In truth, somewhere deep in her soul, the hope was fostered that she would be able to organize a life under such conditions. A daughter and a son were born and she kept on hoping, although she herself was now working in this system and firmly realized that there would not be anything else. And he strongly supported her in those rare minutes and hours when they were together.

He had one problem. He was too efficient. There is always one who pulls the plow and one who drives. There was the leap-frogging in assignments. Several times, having reached the position of senior field agent, he became a simple agent. But not for mistakes in his work. Here they did not cavil. It was merely how things worked in those times. His sole support was himself. And so he buried himself in his work.

Of course, previously in the KGB there was the tradition when, for instance, the party gorkom or obkom sent its candidate for the future holding of a leadership chair. Without experience or practical knowledge, such a "special" was immediately sent to study on the courses for the training of the leading workers. He returned a ready-to-go superior, but was actually impotent in solving service questions. Any agent could twist him around his finger. And untwist him as well. Without any doubt there were talented people among such personnel, but this was more the exception than the rule.

[Knysh] There were times when the workers from the bodies were permitted much, and violations of legality were committed under the guise of the interests at hand.

[Gorbatyuk] I cannot agree, although seemingly now it would be easiest to do this. No one would condemn this and possibly they would approve. It must be recalled that the activities of the KGB bodies were carried out within the limits of the then existing laws and various legal enactments. Heaven forbid that one deviated from them. It is a different question of just how just these laws and enactments were. Was there any justice in persecuting a person who thought differently? Or when they persecuted and prosecuted, for instance, the illegal mutterings of old men and women who sincerely believed in Jehovah or read the Testaments in their native tongue?

But now we base our operations on the laws adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament and for us the basic one is the Law on the Ukrainian Security Service and the Law On Operational Search Activities. It requires the approval of a procurator to permit the tapping of telephone conversations and video filming, the opening of mail and other actions which help detect criminal activity. All of this is carried out under strict control, without violating the rights and freedoms of the honest citizens.

[Knysh] Does this mean that someone suddenly has decided to tap someone's telephone conversation and he will simply be able to do this?

[Gorbatyuk] That is virtually impossible. First of all, it is essential to prove to the Republic General Procurator or to his deputy in charge of this that this is not a mere whim but a necessity for preventing a crime or catching a criminal. No one will engage in this for the sake of idle curiosity, since such actions are criminally punishable.

[Knysh] What is the sphere of interests for the present Security Service?

[Gorbatyuk] The limits of our operations are clearly set by the law. The Security Service is entrusted, within its legally defined competence, with protecting state sovereignty, the constitutional system, territorial integrity, the economic, scientific-technical and defence potential of Ukraine and the legitimate interests of the state and the rights of the citizens against the subversive intelligence-gathering activities of the foreign special services and encroachments by individual organizations, groups and persons.

But I would like to draw attention to the following. Unfortunately, by the efforts of certain states an information vacuum has been created around Ukraine or the most ordinary disinformation is about. Just listen to non-Ukrainian television or read the newspapers from the "other side." The world is not receiving first-hand information about Ukraine. Along with the others, this is also our job to provide the truth about the republic. This is extremely important for establishing mutually advantageous contact with other countries in the world. In particular our intelligence is concerned with this.

[Knysh] Have there been instances when various states have showed excessive curiosity about Ukraine?

[Gorbatyuk] That has not happened. No one would throw money away just for the sake of curiosity. I should say that the curiosity of the West about our state possibly is even insufficient. In any event, for now. It may seem paradoxical but at present it would be desirable if the special services of the Western states were more active in conducting information-gathering intelligence on our territory and provided their states with objective information. As a result of this, a true portrait of Ukraine would be sketched in, and its aspirations and the longings of its people would be understood. Of course, if the special service of a foreign state began to conduct subversive intelligence activities against us, then the conversation would be quite different. This we would never allow. We would not permit the harming of our independent state.

[Knysh] But is this not an expensive pleasure, to have a good special service?

[Gorbatyuk] You know the saying: you get what you pay for. Of course it is expensive. The game is worth the candle. The operations of our service will more than pay back the expenditures on it. Unfortunately, not everyone understands this.

[From the Editorial File.] The Ukrainian Security Service since its founding has prevented the carrying out of illegal transfer operations totalling 80 billion rubles through the new banking structures.

Conditions have been created favoring the attracting into Ukraine of investment totalling more than 1 billion rubles.

A number of attempts has been prevented by foreign firms to increase the amounts in concluding contracts with Ukrainian enterprises and this would have meant losses of tens of millions of dollars.

Returned to the state were over 1,500 works of art and culture which were objects of smuggling for a total of over 3 million rubles (their sales at auction prices would have exceeded several score million rubles).

[Knysh] It is no secret, Vasiliy Stepanovich, that the new special service needs new personnel. Not reprocessed, but actually new. Let us talk a bit about the prospects of a young man hoping to find a job with you. In particular will he be able to have a brilliant career?

[Gorbatyuk] Everything will depend upon the young man himself and talent, intelligence and industriousness. Obstacles for a career (in the good sense of this word) will never arise, as was the case in previous times. Without fail this career should be accompanied by hard work. Often work from morning to night, without counting on easy recompense. Let me repeat that the special service should actually become an elite body. But not in terms of privileges but rather in terms of intellect.

[Knysh] Does nationality play any determining role?

[Gorbatyuk] I can assure you that it plays no role. Our co-worker should be loyal to the people of Ukraine, its statedom and its national interests. But your newspaper does have an opportunity to describe our work. If young and talented officers from the Ukrainian Armed Forces wish to serve their motherland in special service, we are awaiting them. I shall not even give an address. The future agents will be able themselves to make their way to us.

### **Berkut Security Unit Cracks Down on Racketeers**

92UM1363C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
28 Jul 92 p 2

[Article by Ukrinform correspondent Zinoviy Zhizhara: "Berkut" Spreads its Wings"]

[Text] A major operation to seize groups of racketeers that had planned a "clarification of relations" for spheres of influence at the Kovel market was carried out in excellent fashion by the Berkut police rapid-response unit of the Volyn Oblast UVD [Internal-Affairs Administration]. No small amount of all kinds of weaponry—which could have brought no little grief to the market full of people—was taken from the criminals.

The "Berkuts" began to take the suspects, who had been singled out ahead of time, half an hour before the appointed time without undue fuss. And they were not wrong. Thirty of those detained proved to be namely those who ruled the roost in the trading ranks. They were thoroughly prepared for the fight between the clans. The confiscated weaponry—among which there were not only gas pistols, Finnish knives and other knives, but also grenades and even two shells for an anti-aircraft gun—testified to that.

The young police unit, created just four months ago, has become a genuine threat to criminals across the oblast. And it is not just a matter of their fine outfitting. Its chief asset is the people. The selection for it is strict and exacting—high physical and moral training and legal education. It was namely thus that police Lieutenant Oleg Prisyazhnyuk, Sergeant Aleksandr Bakula and Senior Sergeant Yevgeniy Zakharchuk recommended themselves.

The most difficult operations to neutralize criminals in the oblast today are entrusted, as a rule, to Berkut.

And it has truly spread its wings. The unit has uncovered more than thirty crimes and detained more than fifty bandits and more than a hundred and thirty violators of the public order in recent months alone. The operation of many dens has been stopped thanks to it, and it has become much safer on the streets of the oblast center and in restaurants and cafes. It has become prestigious for many young men to serve in Berkut.

### **Tajik Border Situation From Perspective of Border Troops**

92UM1422A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian 15 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Correspondent Igor Rotar: "Inside An Alien War: Russian Border Troops on the Tajik-Afghan Border"]

[Text] The Tajik-Afghan border sector has turned out to be the first mighty breach on the outposts of the collapsed empire that was renowned at one time for its impregnability. This year alone, 603 violators have been detained here. Even based on the modest official statistics, 424 people managed to outwit the border troops. During engagements between the violators and the border troops, four civilians and two servicemen have been killed and five people have been wounded.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA journalists managed to drive along the Tajik-Afghan border and to discover its most characteristic sectors.

#### **The Border**

##### **War Near the Barbed Wire**

Pyandzhskiy Rayon. Until recently, duty at Pyandzh Border Detachment that is located in the southern portion of Kurgan-Tyube Oblast, was considered to be a success. Today, despite the fact that the border is equipped with a system (barbed wire with alarms and a track monitoring strip) only in the sectors of Pyandzh and a large portion of neighboring Moskovsk detachments, it is this rayon that has become the record holder based on the number of violations. More than half of the detentions and the lion's share of the breakthroughs are on the Pyandzh axis; 13 of 14 combat clashes have also occurred on territory controlled by that detachment.

The Pyandzh border troops have found themselves "inside an alien war". After the May Revolution, Tajikistan actually split up. In Kurgan-Tyube Oblast that is primarily inhabited by people from Garm and Kulyab, Garm natives have turned out to be supporters of the opposition and Kulyab natives have supported their fellow countrymen on the land of their forefathers and have been fenced off from the new coalition government by armed detachments. They have demanded weapons for "self-protection."

Afghanistan, where practically every resident has a Kalashnikov assault rifle after many years of war, has become a unique "hide and seek" game both for those wishing to defend their own kishlak [village] and for enthusiasts seeking a new profitable business—smuggling. The convenience of the new "trade route" has been ensured by the fact that northern Afghanistan is settled by blood brothers—Tajiks.

There are quite varied methods to cross the border: from an insolently primitive crossing through the "system" (the alarm system does not operate everywhere "ahead of

schedule" and violators have a chance to depart for neighboring territory), to the refined—a stolen vehicle with a crane supports a "flight" over the barbed wire and the track monitoring strip.

Today the officers' mood is close to panic. The not too much money for current times (a border outpost commander receives nearly 7,000 rubles per month)—is poor consolation for people who risk their lives everyday.

The hopes of the servicemen who have been deprived of benefits to obtain apartments in Russia are ephemeral. The majority of the border troops perceive the prospect of remaining to live in a Tajikistan that is engulfed by the flame of internecine-parochial war as a tragedy. Even the uncertainty of life outside the republic is not stopping the officers: Practically all of them have already taken their own families out of Tajikistan.

If the officers prefer to leave Pyandzh in the manner prescribed by law, the soldiers are ignoring the conventions. Today they do not permit compulsory service military personnel outside the unit's borders even if relatives have arrived to see him: the garrison leadership is certain that the soldier will not return. But then again, "running away to perform service at the residence location" is not the only method of leaving the collapsed empire's hot border. Soldier's parents are besieging the garrison, although also unsuccessfully, and are requesting to take their children home (to Russia and Ukraine). Packets of telegrams on the deaths of border troops' relatives arrive for the garrison leadership after each report on television from the Afghan border. A record was set on 12 May: 72 telegrams on the deaths of parents. But today even that ruse doesn't always work smoothly. They aren't permitting soldiers to go see their allegedly deceased relatives.

An especially dangerously explosive situation has developed at border outposts where breaches of the border are especially frequent. In order to detain violators, the border troop leadership has been compelled to rush additional forces there: there aren't enough beds in the barracks and many soldiers have been forced to sleep on the floor. The nerves of the servicemen are at their limit since they are exhausted from the nearly daily engagements. And each local violator who is killed can be avenged.

#### **The "Roof of the World" Chooses Opium**

Moskovsk Detachment (Kulyab Oblast). The situation here is similar to that at the neighboring detachment: that same "system" on the border and those same techniques to cross it. But the Moskovsk Detachment's situation is still less tense. There is no shortage of weapons in the oblast: Kulyab residents obtained nearly 1,700 assault rifles from the president during the Spring civil strife which has served as grounds for arming their neighbors—the Kurgan-Tyube residents (today, the border troops leadership that is deployed in Tajikistan asserts that Kurgan-Tyube residents are the primary

portion of the border violators in Kulyab Oblast). Nevertheless, the Moskovsk Detachment's Officers' Assembly sent a letter to the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan which states that servicemen will leave their places of duty if the authorities do not stabilize the situation in the near future.

#### **The Pamirs (Gorno-Badakhshanskiy Autonomous Oblast)**

The civil war that has engulfed the southern regions of central Tajikistan has not yet reached this vast mountain kray. Therefore, although there is no "system" here and Afghan villages can be seen with the naked eye, the situation in the Pamir border area is much calmer than in the south of Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab oblasts. The nature of the demand for goods from the adjacent bank determines the relative calm: Here opium is quoted most of all.

The Pamir border sector also has other characteristics. The inaccessible mountain paths are not the best location for the smuggling business. The situation is complicated by the fact that there are no roads in Afghanistan's border areas and communication with the country's economic centers is carried out along mountain foot paths.

The ethnic composition of the border area residents is an important characteristic of the Pamirs. Many scholars regard as separate ethnic groups the nationalities of the Pamirs, who speak their own languages and who profess, in contrast to the Tajik Sunnis, Ismailism (a branch of Islam's Shiite sect). The ethnic factor is exerting some influence on the aggressiveness of "trading" activity of both border area residents and their neighbors "across the border". The Pyandzh River Border has separated both the Tajiks and the Pamir residents. But in Sunni Afghanistan, the Ismailism of the Pamir residents has turned out to be a very important circumstance.

Afghan Pamir smugglers complained to the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent about oppression by the Sunnis. Pir Said Mansur (the deputy of the Ismailites' Spiritual Leader Aga-Khan IV) lays claim to rule Afghanistan's Ismailist oblasts. According to the border troops, Mansur's assumption of power in Afghan Badakhshan could promote the stabilization of the situation on the border.

#### **"Shoot the Officers"**

The Kalai-Khum axis of the Khorog Border Detachment (Darvazskiy Rayon). Part of Gorno-Badakhshan Oblast, Darvazskiy Rayon is populated by "non-Pamir" Tajiks. The village of Kalai-Khum, located just beyond the mountain pass, is the Pamirs' unique gates.

"Our situation is difficult," said Kalai-Khum Border Troops Subunit Acting Chief Captain Valeriy Sych, "our border troops' technical equipment level is even worse than the militia's. That is absurd but there aren't even enough night vision devices. Smuggling frequently even



occurs in the open: the path runs through Pyandzh, they sell goods along the path, and improvised bazaars are being formed on both banks of the river. When the border troops attempt to detain smugglers, the entire village comes to the smugglers' assistance. The rayon has a substantial characteristic for the Pamirs: according to intelligence information, "guests" from Central Tajikistan have begun to come here for Afghan weapons. Hopes on inspection posts are ephemeral: the local militia operates at the exit from the border zone and the border troops do not have the right to inspect even personnel effects. The Kalai-Khum Procuracy leadership does not exclude this variation of the development of events under which Darvazskiy Rayon becomes one of the arms suppliers for the republic.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondents had the opportunity to learn about the difficulty of the work of the border troops who, according to the expression of Operational Detachment Deputy Chief Major Zaydulayev, "have been compelled to protect only themselves". Brisk trade with the opposite bank was occurring in the village along the notorious path. But it was difficult to end the trade—yells resounded from the crowd of local residents: "Shoot the officers!" The Afghans responded to the request without wavering and the border troops did not manage to approach the area where the "deals" were taking place. Fortunately, none of the officers was injured but the border troops only managed to cut off the path after difficult negotiations with the smugglers. When a column of military motor vehicles, in one of which were the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondents, was returning to the unit, firing was once again opened up against it from the Afghan side.

The assault rifle has become a frequent and sufficiently weighty argument in the dispute between the smugglers and the border troops. Servicemen do not have the right to open even answering fire against the Afghan bank, which the "businessmen" on both sides of the Pyandzh successfully take advantage of. Compulsory service soldiers told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that they have frequently had to "not take note" of smuggling in order not to end up under fire from the Afghans' bullets. It is remarkable that they are trying to solve purely economic problems using military arguments. So, recently Kalai-Khum was fired upon because they "hadn't given their neighbors breathing room".

However, it would be an exaggeration to think that only the craving to make a lot of money prompts people toward smuggling. The average wage of a sovkhos worker in Gorno-Badakhshanskiy Autonomous Oblast is R221. Their fellow tribesmen in Afghanistan are in an even more disastrous situation which is obvious from the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent's dialogue with detained Afghan Smuggler Nazar Makhbu.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] What prompted you to cross the border?

[Makhbu] There is hunger in our village. We don't eat bread everyday. Our primary food is mulberry trees with water. I have a pregnant wife. I came here to get flour. I am in the Union for the first time—I am telling the truth.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] Is it a great risk to cross the border?

[Makhbu] Many have ended up missing. My children are starving. Life forced me to cross the border.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] How substantial is the income from smuggling for the residents of Afghan border villages?

[Makhbu] The people who live on the border cannot do a great deal of business. Newly arrived people—residents of large cities—are actually involved in smuggling. There are many smugglers from your side of the border in our country. One-two people from Tajikistan come to our village every night. I think that 10% of the population of Gorno-Badakhshanskiy Autonomous Oblast are involved in smuggling.

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] Do the Afghan authorities detain Tajik smugglers?

[Makhbu] We don't have any authorities right now. In general, no one is interested in smugglers. It is another matter if the border violators are suspected of espionage—then that person could experience major unpleasantness.

### A Rebellion

Khorog. The situation at Khorog Border Detachment on the whole is similar to that in the Kalai-Khum Sector. Indeed, tip-offs about arms smuggling have not yet arrived here and the extent of the transfer of goods along the path is less widespread. But there is no calm on the Khorog axis. During the seven months of this year alone, four times as many violators have crossed the border as in 1991. The Pyandzh River is sufficiently shallow in the area of Khorog so that it can be forded in winter without any particular difficulty and boats use it to cross the border in the summer. The border outpost is 30-40% manned and there is a catastrophic shortage of gasoline—the border troops are physically incapable of protecting the entire border. It is easy to become convinced of that, it is sufficient to go to the bank of the Pyandzh at night: lights regularly flash along both sides of the border—the smugglers are exchanging goods and trading is occurring.

It is possible that it was due to random circumstances but it was in Khorog that we first encountered the symptom of the new process in the border troops that are deployed on republic territory—this year primarily residents of Tajikistan have been drafted into the border troops. The percentage of Tajik soldiers in the Khorog Detachment is reaching 33%. The sergeants assure us that the Tajik new recruits, who have been tempered in the internecine-parochial war, are refusing to follow orders. The situation is being complicated by the fact



that Slavic conscripts with extensive service also do not see any sense in continuing to serve in Tajikistan and they increasingly doubt that they are defending their own border.

The patience of the Slavic sergeants came to an end on 10 July. A wave of Tajik-soldiers' sit-down strikes passed throughout the unit the day before and rumors began to circulate throughout the Khorog Garrison that the Slavic sergeants would soon begin to beat them. In the morning, they were given a sticky lump of rice for breakfast—then the sergeants themselves organized a sit-down strike near the entrance to detachment headquarters. The primary demand: withdraw the Slavic soldiers and sergeants from the territory of Tajikistan within a 3-day period so that they could continue to serve in their own states. Negotiations with Detachment Commander Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Neroyev that lasted more than two hours did not produce any results whatsoever: the sergeants were inflexible. Toward evening, taking advantage of the lawlessness, 145 Tajik new recruits left the unit. At that time, 92 unarmed sergeants seized three vehicles and, having broken down the unit's gates, headed toward the Kyrgyz city of Osh. Understanding that forceful measures would only result in new blood being spilled, Sergey Neroyev decided not to stop the deserters. But the sergeants were nevertheless stopped several kilometers from Khorog near the village of Murgab. Arms were used to detain them and two "mutineers" were wounded. And although, according to the official version, the weapons fire was directed at the vehicles' wheels and the bullets hit the deserters when they ricocheted, according to the assertion of the mutiny participants, the Murgab Detachment border troops fired directly into a crowd of people. The sergeants returned to Khorog Garrison. They promised to forgive them for deserting. It was difficult to expect another end to this epic because the soldiers' and officers' moods are similar. As the mutiny participants assert, on 10 July the officers approached them and secretly empathized: "Run away from here before it's too late". Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Neroyev also does not condemn the sergeants: "If I may be frank, I can understand the lads. It is very difficult to serve in an uncertain state when the impression is being created that neither Russia nor Tajikistan need the border troops. When the sergeants saw that the Tajiks themselves don't want to protect the border, their patience was at an end".

#### **"The One Who's Drunk Will Beat Them"**

Ishkashimskiy Rayon is the only relatively calm sector of the Tajik-Afghan border. According to the assertion of Ishkashimskiy Detachment Commander Colonel Vyacheslav Aboimov, there hasn't been any firing on Tajik territory, armed resistance of violators, and cases of smuggling are rare.

Remote, high-mountain Ishkashimskiy Rayon is one of the most background areas in Gorno-Badakhshan. Colonel Aboimov thinks that the average standard of living of the population here is so low that people simply don't have the capability to acquire goods for smuggling.

The "conservatism" of the Ishkashimskiy people, the majority of whom believe in the sanctity of the border by habit, also has an impact. The economic-geographic situation of the adjacent Afghan populated areas also affects the situation—the rare, forgotten, high up in the mountains villages are practically cut off from the "outside world".

The calm and, as a result, forced idleness have not brought well-being to the Ishkashimskiy border troops. Here, more strongly than anywhere else in Gorno-Badakhshan, is sensed what the Pamirs Border Detachment Commander, Tsarist Army Lieutenant Colonel Mukhanov, had already written at the beginning of the century: "The continuing influence of the clean air, they say, affects the nerves. People become irritable, hypercritical and generally unbearable. Personally I doubt this so unique impact of the air and it seems to me that in this case we have the opportunity to observe the most ordinary phenomenon of desolate provincial life."

The isolation and boredom add to the general unsettled state of everyday life. The detachment certainly holds first place in the Pamirs according to the neglect of the social infrastructure.

The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondents visited the Ishkashimskiy Detachment's Lyangar Training Facility. The soldiers' barracks reminded us of cramped stone jail cells. There is a catastrophic shortage of coal in the winter and the temperature in the rooms is frequently the same as it is on the street—a mug freezes to the table. They frankly feed the soldiers rotten cabbage.

The severe conditions give rise to the simplicity of morals. Two Tajik soldiers ran away from training (already for the third time) on the day when the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondents arrived in Lyangar. Very drunk Acting Training Center Commander Major Timur Malkov was bewildered in front of the formation of soldiers: "Just yesterday I beat them half to death and they have once again headed for home!" This is how he ended his speech: "Soldiers, who will beat them when they end up with us?" Nearly fifty men took one pace forward. "Well done, get back in ranks".

It seems that the beating of soldiers and drunkenness have become an ordinary matter in the lives of many officers here. So, to a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent's question, who of the commanders is especially frequently involved with coming to blows, Privates Aleksandr Zhuts and Yevgeniy Leshchinskiy and Junior Sergeant Andrey Pushnoy frankly laughed: "Well the one who is drunk today!"

#### **Prediction**

So, what can we expect from the Tajik-Afghan border in the near future? If the current trend in the development of events on the border is maintained, a new powerful stream of weapons and narcotics will pour into the CIS

countries. Russia doesn't have any money for the construction of a new border line, therefore Moscow has to defend itself at the previous borders from the devastating Afghan "export".

On 21 July 1992, representatives of the governments of Tajikistan and Russia signed a protocol on intentions. In accordance with the document worked out and based on a Government of Tajikistan request, Russia guards the Tajik-Afghan and Tajik-Chinese borders during the transition period; Russia is ready to take under its jurisdiction the border troops of the former USSR who are deployed on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan; a month after the border troops transfer to Russia's jurisdiction, the parties are obliged to conclude a bilateral agreement on the status and procedures for the functioning of Russian Federation troops on republic territory.

The border troops were ecstatic about the preliminary agreement. But the euphoria was premature—the Russian President is not hurrying to issue an decree on the transfer of the border troops who are deployed on the territory of Tajikistan to Russia's jurisdiction.

It has not been excluded that Boris Yeltsin's slowness is explained by the frankly negative reaction of Tajikistan's most influential opposition parties to the agreement. So, for example, in the opinion of Democratic Party Chairman Shodmon Yusuf, the current border troops should in general be withdrawn from republic territory and replaced by the Tajik Army. The Tajik Democrats variation has two substantial minuses. First of all, for now Tajikistan doesn't have either an army or resources to create one. But even the elimination of the first obstacle would hardly help. Under conditions of the civil strife that has engulfed Tajikistan, the weapons of the new army could turn out to be divided among the opposing groups and the border could become quite "transparent".

However, even the temporary transfer of the border troops to Russia's jurisdiction will hardly result in a substantial easing of the border troops' plight. The situation of the border troops (no matter under whose jurisdiction they find themselves) is closely associated with the political situation in Tajikistan. You don't have to be a prophet in order to surmise: you can't foresee a rapid peace in a republic that has been divided into opposing regions. The utopian nature of the Khorog Agreement on Peace and Disarmament was obvious from the very beginning. The ink still hasn't managed to dry on the agreement and the leaders of the opposing forces, through their own statements, have actually crossed out what they had signed. Although the term of voluntary disarmament has expired, practically all of the weapons have remained with the population. There is practically no hope for the effectiveness of an imposed disarmament. The May events have demonstrated: the Tajik Militia prefers not to get involved in the struggle between the opposing groups. It has not been excluded that the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] specialized subunits that were called upon for disarmament will turn

out to be divided from within: the fighters will prefer to operate in accordance with their own political and regional sympathies. The logic of the development of events suggests that a new escalation of tension will follow after the inauspicious practical results of the Khorog Agreement.

The situation in which the Russian border troops have found themselves doesn't have any analogies in world history. The defenders of the border are gripped in a vice between two blazing regions. The relative calm at the Pyandzh's headwaters do not leave illusions: the war simply didn't manage to reach the Pamirs provinces.

Political scientists have already written about the similarity of the political situations in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Politics in its "pure form" is absent in both states. If in Afghanistan the struggle for power is interwoven with the ethnic factor, then it is interwoven with the regional factor in the neighboring state. There is very little to be done in order for the processes along both banks of the Pyandzh to develop along the same scenario—to finally destroy the already nearly nonexistent border.

Today, the nerves of the border troops are at the extreme and with the new excesses, the flight from the border river may acquire a mass and unguided nature. The border will be preserved only under the condition of the creation of professional, technically well-equipped, highly-paid border detachments. But reorganization will require time and resources and the political situation in Tajikistan is rapidly developing.

**The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA editorial staff thanks Khorog Border Detachment Chief Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Neroyev and Kalai-Khum Subunit Acting Chief Captain Valeriy Sych for their assistance in gathering information.**

#### **Russian, Turkmen Border Troop Agreement**

*92US0843A Ashgabat TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 28 Aug 92 pp 1-2*

[Agreement Between Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation Regarding Cooperation in the Sphere of State Border Security and the Status of Military Personnel of the Frontier Forces Deployed on the Territory of Turkmenistan for the Transitional Period]

[Text] Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation, henceforth referred to as the parties, taking into consideration the new political realities, the acquisition of state sovereignty and independence by Turkmenistan and the Russian Federation, convinced of the need to develop friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation on the basis of principles and norms of international law, proceeding from joint interests in the defense of the sovereignty, territorial inviolability, and security of the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan, community of the economic zone and the principle of openness of the

borders between the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan, taking into account the mutual determination of conducting a coordinated policy in the sphere of state border security and being guided by the principled agreement regarding cooperation of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation and the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan as recorded in the protocol on results of negotiations of government delegations of the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan of 23 July 1992, have agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

For the purpose of this agreement the terms given below have the indicated meaning:

- 1) "Transitional period"—the time determined by effective dates of this agreement;
- 2) "Military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan"—military personnel of the frontier forces consisting of citizens of the Russian Federation located at the time of organization of the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan on its territory who have not declared a change to the citizenship of Turkmenistan in the approved order or those who arrived for further service on the territory of Turkmenistan after the signing of this agreement;
- 3) "Members of the families of military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation located on the territory of Turkmenistan"—their wives, children, and also relatives permanently living with them and supported by them.

#### Article 2

The parties have agreed to the presence of military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation during the transitional period on the territory of Turkmenistan in the interests of ensuring the security of both parties and the formation of national Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan.

Military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation serving with the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan perform missions for the protection of the state border of Turkmenistan within the table of organization as it exists on the day of signing of this agreement or are attached as advisers to subunits of the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan

#### Article 3

The parties are forming a Unified Command out of representatives of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation and Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan for the purpose of coordinating the activity of troops in the protection of the state border of Turkmenistan and implementation of a coordinated border policy.

The regulation on the Unified Command will be adopted by the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation and by the chairman of the Committee on National Security of Turkmenistan.

Management of the activity of the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan will be exercised by the Command of the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan.

The Command of the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan will be appointed by the president of Turkmenistan on the recommendation of the Minister of Security of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the Committee for National Security of Turkmenistan.

#### Article 4

Laws and enforceable enactments of the Russian Federation pertaining to military personnel apply in full to military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan and to members of their families and they are guaranteed the benefits and privileges established for personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation including rates of finance allowances according to post and military grade not lower than for Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation. Indexation of pay of the military personnel is carried out in the order established in the Russian Federation.

#### Article 5

Military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan guard the state border of Turkmenistan and are not involved in the performance of other missions with the exception of liquidation of the consequences of natural disasters, accidents, and catastrophes.

#### Article 6

Military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan observe the constitution of Turkmenistan and its legislation and respect the national traditions and customs of the people of Turkmenistan.

#### Article 7

Military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan and their family members are guaranteed security, legal protection, and social, property and other rights just as all citizens of Turkmenistan.

Military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan are allowed unhindered departure and duty free shipment of personal property belonging to the military personnel and their family members outside of its borders.

Turkmenistan grants military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan as well as their family members the right to ownership of real estate belonging to them (dwellings, apartments, summer homes, garages, etc.). In case of impossibility of selling such property Turkmenistan guarantees the payment of monetary compensation on the basis of evaluations utilized on the territory of Turkmenistan.

#### Article 8

Military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan and their family members cross the state border of Turkmenistan with states of the former Soviet Union on the basis of documents certifying their identity and minor children on the basis of entries in those documents.

#### Article 9

Living space on the territory of Turkmenistan occupied by military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation serving in the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan is preserved for them at the time of the signing of this agreement.

Military personnel without living space as well as those who arrive in the future for military service to replace those who are departing are provided with living space on the basis of living space freed by departing military personnel and also the housing fund assigned to the Unified Command of the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan.

The Russian Federation and Turkmenistan provide military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation upon completion of service in the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan with living space in the selected permanent place of residence on the territory of Turkmenistan or the Russian Federation in accordance with their legislation.

#### Article 10

The Russian Federation and Turkmenistan pay pensions to military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan and military personnel of Turkmenistan discharged from active military service who select either the Russian Federation or Turkmenistan, correspondingly, as their permanent place of residence, in accordance with pension legislation of their country.

#### Article 11

Ensurance of the viability of large and small units of the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan and military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation undergoing service in them, as well as their financing and material-technical support are determined on the basis of a separate protocol.

#### Article 12

Until the adoption of its own enforceable enactments by Turkmenistan the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan as well as military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan will be guided by international agreements of the former USSR with Iran and Afghanistan and the law of the USSR "On state border of the USSR" in the part that does not contradict legislation of Turkmenistan, and will act on the basis of military regulations adopted in the Armed Forces and the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation, including those on questions pertaining to the exchange of information.

#### Article 13

The training of officers and warrant officers and the staffing of the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan in the transitional period with them will be ensured on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the parties. At the end of the transitional period military personnel of the Russian Federation may serve in the Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan on a contractual basis.

Military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan are granted the right to transfer to the territory of the Russian Federation on an individual basis throughout the transitional period.

The transfer of indicated military personnel outside the borders of Turkmenistan, as well as their discharge is accomplished through the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation.

The staffing of Frontier Forces of Turkmenistan with personnel on active duty and their discharge from active duty will be carried out by Turkmenistan.

#### Article 14

Jurisdictional questions associated with presence of military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Turkmenistan are regulated in the following manner:

1. As a general rule the legislation of Turkmenistan is applied and the local courts, the procurator's office, and local organs competent in questions of criminal investigation have jurisdiction in cases of crimes committed by military personnel of Frontier Forces of the Federation of Russia deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan or by their family members.

2. Point 1 of this article does not apply:

- a) In cases involving the commission of crimes by individuals belonging to the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation or by their family members against the Russian Federation and also against military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan or against their family members;

b) In cases involving the commission of military crimes by military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan if such unlawful acts did not cause any losses for Turkmenistan or its citizens. In cases indicated in subpoints "a" and "b" of this point competent Russian courts and other organs act on the basis of legislation of the Russian Federation.

3. Competent organs of the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan may appeal to each other with requests to transfer or accept under their jurisdiction various cases stipulated by this article. Such requests will be viewed favorably.

#### Article 15

1. Military personnel of the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation deployed on the territory of Turkmenistan will wear the military uniform of the established type and have the right to bear and store arms in accordance with the order established in the Frontier Forces of the Russian Federation.

2. Local state organs of the parties recognize that documents pertaining to educational qualifications, specialty, operation of motor vehicles and the like, issued by state organs of the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and the former USSR have full power (without tests or additional payments).

#### Article 16.

This agreement is concluded for a term of five years. Its action is automatically extended for an additional five years if neither one of the parties declares in writing at least six months before the expiration of the five-year term indicating its desire to terminate the agreement.

Concluded in the City of Ashgabat on 28 August 1992 in two copies, each in Turkmen and Russian languages with both texts having equal power.

[Signed] For Turkmenistan  
President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov  
For the Russian Federation  
For the President of the Russian Federation  
Minister of Security of the Russian Federation N. Baranikov

#### Decree on Creation of Academy for Ministry of Security

925D0680C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 3 Sep 92 p 6

[Decree No. 931 of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Establishment of the Academy of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] 1. The proposal from the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation for the establishment of the Academy of the Ministry of Security out of the Higher

School of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy and the Border Troop Academy within the staff limits set for the ministry and the budgetary allocations designated for maintaining it is agreed upon.

2. The Minister of Security of the Russian Federation is authorized to confer the rank of junior lieutenant upon cadets at the Academy upon their graduation to the fifth class and to those who have served the prescribed term of active military duty prior to registering for training upon their graduation to the fourth class.

3. The Government of the Russian Federation is to bring its decisions into conformity with this Decree and to ratify the Charter for the Academy of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation.

4. I declare to be null and void Decree No. 145 "On the Conversion of the All-Union Institute of Advanced Training for Officers of the Border Troops Into the Academy of Border Troops"

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation  
Moscow, Kremlin  
24 August 1992

#### Airborne Troops Reinforce Border Units Near Afghanistan

92UM1477A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Sep 92 pp 1,3

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Aleksandr Pelts: "Airborne Troops Come to the Aid of the Border Troops"]

[Text] Things continue to be troubled in the area of Russia's Pandja border detachment on the Tajik-Afghan border. I became convinced of this after visiting several outposts of that border detachment.

The shelling did not die down in the area of the 3rd border outpost during the night of 16 September. It involved tracer rounds fired from the direction of Afghanistan. The border troops believe that this was in preparation for the next "assault crossing" over the border. Several groups prepared for a breakthrough from Afghanistan on 16 September. The numerical strength of two of them was ascertained: ten armed militants in one, seven in the other. Cover groups and the reserve staved off the attempt to violate the border.

During a relative calm I managed to talk with Sr Lt Viktor Odrena. According to him, there are several shooting skirmishes with the militants almost every day, who are well armed and thoroughly familiar with the terrain.

Replenishments arriving in the Pandja border detachment from Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were drawn into action immediately. Even those who are still training at the border detachment's training center are ordinarily activated in operational search operations.

Airborne troops who arrived to reinforce the border with Kazakhstan were the first to master their new specialty. Some of the soldiers have only two or three months left in the service, but they want to be assigned to missions involving the greatest responsibility. The overall assessment is that they perform boldly and decisively.

Colonel Ravil Muldayanov, chief of the Pandja border detachment, told me that a certain timidity is to be seen in the militants today, particularly since the airborne troops have moved up to the border.

In addition to the military difficulties, unfortunately, there are increasing difficulties with respect to fuel, spare parts and equipment for the engineering and technical support at the border. Problems with personal services

are also having an effect. The border troops are particularly upset that they have received no mail since 10 August. They have no newspapers, and letters and packages are not reaching them.

The situation on the border continues to be warlike. Almost 60 percent of the Pandja detachment's outposts were put on alert during the night of 17 September, for example. The border violations began immediately at the onset of darkness. Border details detected them in time and illuminated them with rockets. Attempts to penetrate the border were then undertaken on other sectors, particularly at the boundary between the outposts commanded by captains Vladimir Kamulya and Sergey Shumikhin. Eight people attempted to break through there. Despite armed resistance, the violators were arrested.

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